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Abstract 
This thesis argues that the transmission of the European Union’s norms and values to Poland, 
and then to Lithuania and Ukraine, has helped those countries to better manage their relations. 
As a result of their integration into the EU and other western structures, relations between 
Poland and Lithuania have become more “normal”. The introduction of EU-mandated border 
controls has complicated relations between Poland and both Ukraine and Belarus. Poland has 
deep historic ties with Ukraine and is determined to ensure that Ukraine is offered a pathway 
that will lead to its eventual integration with Europe. However, relations between Poland and 
Belarus have worsened. Included in this thesis are the results and analysis of interviews and 
surveys carried out in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine in 2008.  
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Poland and its eastern neighbours have intertwined histories. The Polish, Ukrainian, 
Belarusian and Russian languages derive from a common Slavic tongue spoken less than 
2000 years ago. The Baltic Lithuanians share much history with their Slavic neighbours, 
particularly with Belarusians, Poles and Ukrainians. Poles and Lithuanians consider their 
countries to lie in the heart of Europe. Unlike Ukrainians or Belarusians, they have long 
looked to the West for cultural and political leadership and are well disposed to innovations 
sourced in the West – be those innovations democracy, the market economy or the European 
Union. Rich, democratic Western Europe has offered a model for development to Central 
Europeans and Balts. Proximity and easy access to Western Europe have fostered familiarity 
with democratic culture. Compared with other postcommunist states, Poland scores well in 
what has been termed “European compatibility potential”. Poland has been able to relay EU 
norms and values to its eastern neighbours Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.  
 
This thesis has developed within this context of post-2004 EU membership in the region. The 
main theoretical approach used in this thesis is a constructivist one, with a focus on examining 
to what extent the EU’s normative power can be used as a tool to achieve desired outcomes in 
prospective member states in Central and Eastern Europe. The research question this thesis 
seeks to answer is: “To what extent is Poland contributing to the transmission of values and 
norms from the EU to Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine?”  
 
It is important to be able to track the changes in relations brought about eastern enlargement 
and by the process of EU-isation of former communist countries such as Poland and 
Lithuania. It is also important to understand why EU policies and strategies with regard to 
prospective member states have been successful and others have not. This thesis is focused 
mainly on people-to-people interactions between Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and 
Belarusians. It does not delve deeply into traditional economic ties. 
 
In 1989 three countries shared land borders with Poland (see Appendix 1 Map 1). To the east 
and north-east, the Soviet Union gripped Poland in a tight hug. The stable border of the 
Carpathian mountain range separated Poles from their southern cousins in Czechoslovakia. 
Poland’s immediate neighbour across the 44-year-old border to the west was East Germany. 
The nearest part of the West was West Berlin, lying just 60 kilometres west of the Polish 
border. By 1993, none of Poland’s immediate neighbours of just four years earlier still existed 
(see Appendix 1 Map 2). The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany were no more. 
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Poland had seven new neighbours, six of them new or reborn states. Running clockwise from 
the Baltic Sea these new neighbours were Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, Lithuania, Belarus, 
Ukraine, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and the united Federal Republic of Germany. This 
transformation in the country’s immediate surroundings had a dramatic effect on Poland.  
 
Solidarity’s sweeping election victory in 1989 brought Poland’s first postwar non-communist 
government to power. Abrupt independence forced the new rulers of newly postcommunist 
states to decide where to place their countries in the international system. Most chose 
integrating with the West as offering the best possible security for their people. Central 
Europe’s political, intellectual and business elites realised early on that there was no 
alternative for their countries in the 1990s.  
 
With the collapse of Comecon, Poland’s new leaders decided EU and Nato membership 
offered the best possible security for the state. Since 1989, Poland, Lithuania and most other 
postcommunist European countries have become democracies, modelled after those of 
Western Europe. Poland’s first postcommunist government and its successors decided that for 
Poland to achieve its desired status and prosperity, a radical “shock therapy” economic and 
political programme would have to be initiated. The Polish “Big Bang” of 1990-91 was a 
sudden, radical break with the communist period. That programme would mean a period of 
hardship for the Polish people which would last a few years. However, for Poland’s new 
leaders, a successful navigation of that period held the promise of economic payoffs.  
 
Western Europe’s leaders realised in 1990 that the peaceful revolution which swept Eastern 
Europe in 1989 was probably the most significant event in global terms since 1945. It 
represented a challenge and an opportunity to which the EC responded immediately. With the 
collapse of the Iron Curtain, Central and East European countries (CEECs) were obvious 
potential candidates for EU membership. Of great significance was the chorus of demands to 
“return to Europe” from CEECs. The discourse of “reuniting Europe” included notions of the 
West’s betrayal of and responsibility towards countries which had been trapped behind the 
Iron Curtain.
1
  
 
                                                 
1
 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. 2006 The European Union as a Global Actor 2
nd
 ed Routledge Abingdon UK 
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As the focus of successful West European political and economic integration, the EU was the 
key international organisation that Europe’s postcommunist states wanted to join. The EU and 
prospective member states in Central Europe saw enlargement as a way of strengthening 
European security. When the Cold War ended, it was felt that postcommunist European 
countries had a right to seek membership in an association that claimed to be open to all the 
countries of Europe. Given their economic disadvantages, most European postcommunist 
states became fervent advocates of an enlarged and deeper EU.
2
  The EU’s hands were tied, in 
essence because of its fundamental “claim to pan-European inclusiveness”.3 When 
postcommunist countries such as Poland and Lithuania proclaimed their eagerness to rejoin 
Europe, they meant joining the EU. For them, EU membership was a stamp of approval and 
path to prosperity.
4
 
 
The removal of trade restrictions and the lowering of customs barriers have been goals of the 
EU since the Treaty of Rome. From the 1980s, especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the 
EU built a complex network of multilateral and bilateral trading networks and agreements 
with eastern European states, Poland foremost among them. By the 1990s, the EU was 
coordinating Western aid to postcommunist Europe, using the Phare and Tacis programmes. 
CEECs assumed central importance in EU external relations. By 2000, the European 
Commission was coordinating the regional aid efforts of the EU, Switzerland, Norway, the 
United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The EU’s leading role in this has 
helped define the Union’s foreign policy and made it a major actor in the CEECs and in 
relations between CEECs. The CEECs’ accession to the EU has brought important political 
and economic implications for all European countries.  
 
In the post-Cold War world, the EU was determined to avoid drawing new dividing lines in 
Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond its new borders. It aimed to 
develop a zone of prosperity and a “ring of friends” with which it could enjoy close and 
positive relations.
5
 Its neighbours would benefit from the prospect of closer economic 
integration with the EU. Beginning with German reunification in 1990, when the former East 
                                                 
2
 Dunkerley, D., Hodgson, L., Konopacki, S., Spybey, T. & Thompson, A. 2002 Changing Europe: Identities, 
Nations and Citizens Routledge, London  
3
 Dinan, D. 2004. Europe Recast: A History of European Union Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke p.265 
4
 Ibid. p.268 
5
 Commission of the European Communities 2003 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and 
Southern Neighbours’ Brussels p.4 
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Germany became part of the bloc, the EU has expanded into the former communist lands of 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
The 1993 Copenhagen summit of the European Council set down conditions candidate 
member states had to meet before being allowed to join the EU. Foremost among these was 
proof of respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of 
minorities. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the EU pressured CEECs to respect pan-
European standards. Postcommunist states wishing to join the EU have had to play by the 
EU’s rules. Western European pressure helped persuade postcommunist Europe’s 
governments with mixed human rights records to improve their performance.  
Enlargement was a slow process of many stages and breathing spaces. The first wave of new 
entrants from Central Europe would not join until a decade after the decision to admit them in 
principle. Negotiations with candidate countries were difficult and raised several foreign 
policy issues. Discriminating among prospective members had international fallout and 
complicated other aspects of the EU’s external relations. Entry negotiations to agree the terms 
whereby the new EU countries would assume the rights and responsibilities of membership 
took place between 1998 and 2002. In 2003, it was already clear that this enlargement would 
change the way the Union was run as the newcomers took their places in the EU’s key 
institutions. Enlargement would also bring about changes in the EU’s external relations, 
particularly with adjacent Balkan and post-Soviet countries such as Belarus and Ukraine.  
 
For Europe’s postcommunist states, the ability to mobilise populations in favour of reform 
and a Western-orientated foreign policy was directly related to the strength of national 
identity, historical memory and political culture. A foreign policy of “returning to Europe” 
was most evident in those former communist states where national identity was stronger and, 
in the case of the former Soviet Union, where the population’s sense of ethnos and 
Europeanness was not weakened by russification.
6
 The Polish and Lithuanian governments 
implemented difficult domestic reforms and modified foreign policies to obtain the political, 
economic and security benefits of membership. For this dynamic to work, candidates must 
consider EU membership to be an objective attainable within a reasonable timeframe.
7
 For 
                                                 
6
 Kuzio, T. 2001. ‘Belarus and Ukraine: Democracy Building in a Grey Security Zone’ in Zielonka, J. & Pravda, 
A. (ed.) 2001 Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe Vol. 2 International and Transnational Factors 
Oxford University Press p.483 
7
 Vachudova p.325 
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Ukraine and Belarus, sometimes grouped together with Moldova as the “BUM” countries, EU 
membership in the near future has never been a realistic goal.
8
  
 
In 2002 EU states agreed the bloc should avoid drawing new dividing lines and act to promote 
stability and prosperity on both sides of its new borders.
9
 A policy paper from the European 
Commission in March 2003 offered neighbours such as Belarus and Ukraine closer ties with 
the EU in return for progress towards respect for democratic values and political, economic 
and institutional reforms.
10
 The EU offered participation in the Union’s internal market and 
regulatory structures, preferential trading, more cross-border cooperation, more scientific, 
cultural and education exchanges, research programmes, closer cooperation against common 
security threats and in preventing conflicts, integration into transport, energy and telecoms 
networks, more investment and more aid.
11
 The EU sought “a zone of prosperity and a 
friendly neighbourhood”.12 Different member states had different priorities with regard to the 
east. Finland and Sweden, for instance, promoted a “northern dimension” for the EU, 
including early accession for Lithuania and the other Baltic states.
13
 
 
Bilateral processes dominated relations between the EU and CEECs, while multilateral 
processes promoted good relations among prospective member states and their neighbours. 
The Stability Pact required prospective member states to resolve outstanding border and 
minorities issues. A structured dialogue fostered EU-style cooperation among prospective 
member states. The EU insisted that applicant countries adopt pre-accession the Union’s set 
of laws and rules, the acquis communautaire.  
 
The culmination of these processes was the decision of the December 2002 European Council 
that Lithuania, Poland and eight other states would be ready to accede to the Union in May 
2004. The 2004 enlargement was the EU’s biggest and most ambitious. The enlargement 
happened mainly for political reasons: to consolidate peace and democracy in CEECs and to 
graft on to new members EU values and a Western system of government.  
                                                 
8
 Astrov, V. and Havlik, P. 2007 ‘Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova: Economic Developments and Integration 
Prospects’ in Hamilton, D and Mangott, G. (eds.) 2007 The New Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova 
Center for Transatlantic Relations Washington p. 127 
9
 Commission of the European Communities 2003 ‘Wider Europe’ p.3-4 
10
 Ibid. p.6 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid. p.4 
13
 Dinan p.270 
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The new member states acceded to membership because they saw their natural place as being 
within uniting Europe. For centuries, Poles and Lithuanians have considered themselves 
European. They now consider themselves part of “the West”.14 With some exceptions, the 
extent of Western influence can be mapped out geographically. Those CEECs closest to the 
Western European core have been those where the pull of the West has been strongest.
15
 
Countries further east and south have been less susceptible to Western influence. In Poland 
and Lithuania the prospect of membership in the EU provided a strong incentive to build 
liberal democratic states.
16
 By the first decade of the 21
st
 century, the Central European and 
Baltic states had functioning democracies. By 2004, according to the EU itself, Central 
Europe and the Baltic states had met the strict criteria for joining the Union.  
 
country Democracy score* 
Estonia 1.96 
Slovakia 1.96 
Hungary 2.00 
Latvia 2.07 
Poland 2.14 
Lithuania 2.21 
Czech Republic 2.25 
Romania 3.39 
Ukraine 4.21 
Moldova 4.96 
Russia 5.75 
Belarus 6.71 
*Scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress 
 
Table 1.1 Central and East European democracy scores, 200617 
 
Even before formal accession, the EU had opened its markets to exports from postcommunist 
Europe. Poland, in particular, and Lithuania also benefited from EU aid programmes. 
                                                 
14
 Holmes, L. 2006 Rotten States? Corruption, Post-Communism & Neoliberalism Duke University Press, 
Durham NC p.157 
15
 Smith, K. 2001 ‘Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy’ in Zielonka & Pravda (ed.) 2001 p.457 
16
 Vachudova, M. 2001. ‘The Czech Republic: The Unexpected Force of Institutional Constraints’ in Zielonka & 
Pravda (ed.) 2001 p.325 
17
 Freedom House 2006’Nations in Transit’ quoted in Kovalova, E. 2007 ‘Ukraine’s Role In Changing Europe’ 
in Hamilton, D and Mangott, G. (eds.) 2007 The New Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova Center for 
Transatlantic Relations Washington p.176 
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Enlargement would stimulate economic growth in EU countries both new and old, for the 
benefit of all. The new member states are much poorer than the EU average. One of the first 
priorities of the enlarged EU has been to raise their living standards as fast as possible 
towards those of the other EU countries.  
 
In 2003, the European Commission admitted that all the EU’s new neighbours, including 
Belarus and Ukraine were confronted by opportunities and challenges related to their being 
poor countries adjacent to the rich EU.
18
 The eastern shift in the EU’s border threatens to 
destabilise poorly integrated Ukraine by opening divisions between regions closer and further 
from the EU border. It could exacerbate tensions between western regions of Ukraine, such as 
Galicia, and Kiev. In Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Ukraine, the EU agreed 
to base a strong partnership on “historic links and common values”.19 Relations between 
Poland and Belarus have been poor throughout the last 15 years, strained by a variety of 
issues, including the Lukashenko regime’s treatment of Belarus’ Polish minority. Poland’s 
striving for EU membership would appear to have negatively affected its relations with 
Belarus.  
 
The ultimate borders of the EU depend on the amount of diversity the Union can accept as it 
enlarges. They also depend how external actors, notably Russia, China and the United States, 
will react to an EU with wider footprint. Also important is how open or closed the EU’s 
borders are and to what extent they come directly under EU control as opposed to national 
control. Many interlinked factors affect the type and scope of borders. Europe’s imprecise 
boundaries lead to confusion over the definition of Europe. Territories such as Cyprus, the 
Canary Islands and Reunion, which are clearly not part of geographic Europe, are part of the 
EU, yet Ukraine and Belarus remain outside the EU. If one accepts the Urals as forming part 
of the boundary between Europe and Asia, Belarus and Ukraine are part of Europe, but 
questions remain about those countries’ current and long-term status and prospects. The scope 
and type of the EU’s borders in a sense determines the Union’s profile. Despite the lack of a 
definite border to what can eventually become part of the EU, the Union cannot expand 
indefinitely without becoming very different from what it is.  
 
                                                 
18
 Commission of the European Communities 2003 p.6 
19
 Ibid. 
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Other continents are defined by marine borders, but Europe lacks a clear eastern boundary. 
The extensive plains of eastern Europe, as historic shifts in the borders of Poland, Lithuania 
and Ukraine have shown, offer neither defence nor a well-defined frontier zone between 
Europe and Asia. Yet Europe is seen as distinct from Asia, even if there is no universal 
consensus on where Europe meets Asia. No natural eastern border of Europe exists. One 
country has been rejected for membership (Morocco – for being non-European). Turkey has 
been kept out for decades, ostensibly for its human rights record and faulty democratic 
credentials.  
 
Ukraine and Belarus are outsiders, “accidental nation-states”.20 They have loose, semi-
detached associations with the EU and scant prospect of becoming full members in the 
foreseeable future. Many of Ukraine’s leaders profess a wish for their country to join the EU. 
As the results of surveys and interviews quoted later in this thesis show, residents of western 
Ukraine seem to be in favour of their country joining the EU and Nato. In contrast, Russian-
speaking residents of eastern and southern Ukraine seem less enthusiastic about Ukraine 
joining the EU, and mostly against the idea of Ukraine joining Nato. For Ukraine, rejection of 
the prospect of the country’s eventually becoming a member of the EU could bring into 
question the country’s democratic consolidation, economic progress and positive interaction 
with Poland.
 
 
Since 2004, Ukraine has made strides towards becoming a proper liberal democracy, but it 
still has a way to go before it becomes a fully democratic country in the European sense. It 
remains corrupt and poorly governed. The authoritarian government of Belarus has been 
much more suspicious of Western institutions. In Belarus, democratic reforms have been 
mostly more a matter of rhetoric than practice. Institutional arrangements have been crafted to 
suit the aims of those in power with little room for genuine public participation and fair 
political competition. After a brief flowering of freedom in the early 1990s, Belarus has 
become a dictatorship. Belarus is a self-isolated state, ostracised by the international 
community. It can be argued that if national elites in postcommunist European states choose a 
reform path they have little choice but to choose also a foreign policy orientation of “returning 
to Europe”. From Europe they can receive inspiration and security, technical and financial 
                                                 
20
 Stent, A. 2007 ‘The Lands In Between: The New Eastern Europe in the Twenty-First Century’ in Hamilton, D 
and Mangott, G. (eds.) 2007 The New Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova Center for Transatlantic 
Relations Washington p.3 
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assistance. A postcommunist country, such as Belarus, which shifts away from 
democratisation towards an authoritarian regime, is more likely to seek integration with 
Russia than with the EU.
 
 
Ukraine and Belarus “have as much reason to welcome [EU] influence as the [Union has] to 
seek a role”.21 The EU is Ukraine’s largest trading partner. Many in the Ukrainian elite want 
to reduce dependence on Russia. Kiev and, belatedly and inconsistently, Minsk see closer ties 
with the EU as a way of reducing the risks associated with dependence on Russia.  
 
Since 1990, many borders in Central and Eastern Europe have been changed, leading to many 
problems. In contrast, the tight Cold War border between East and West was stable. Little 
movement of goods and people occurred across the Iron Curtain. Those who did venture to 
cross it were subjected to strict scrutiny by border guards. In 1989-91 the Soviet empire 
collapsed, partly because the idea of a free, united Europe motivated resistance to it. Yet the 
Cold War’s legacy persists. Europe has found it hard to sort out the complicated issues of 
borders and mobility. A prime strategy of the EU in trying to cope with new border issues was 
eastern enlargement. But as borders between EU member states have come down, external EU 
borders have been tightened. The single market and Schengen system have made it harder for 
those left outside. Enlarging the EU to include only easier-to-digest postcommunist states 
such as Poland and Lithuania has replaced old dividing lines with new ones, with potentially 
destabilising implications.  
 
Poland’s eastern border now forms part of the eastern boundary of the EU. The eastern 
enlargement of the European Union to include Poland and Lithuania, but not Ukraine and 
Belarus, must have had a significant impact on relations between all four countries, and on the 
quantity and quality of norms and values transmitted eastward. Research conducted for this 
thesis appears to indicate that relations between Poland and its neighbours Lithuania and 
Ukraine have improved since 1990, and particularly since 2000. In large measure, this 
improvement appears to be related to Poland’s move towards EU membership. As will be 
seen, data from a variety of sources shows that Poland and Lithuania prospered as a result of 
their gradual integration into the EU and other western structures. In contrast, living standards 
in Belarus and, especially, Ukraine have fallen far behind. The entry of 10 postcommunist 
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countries into the EU erased the sharp east-west divide which ran across the European 
mainland from Lübeck to Trieste for half a century. However, despite stated desires that it 
should not happen, a more easterly dividing line has taken its place.
22
 
 
Since 1989, Europeans have become more mobile. New patterns of migration, the movement 
of professionals employed by multinationals and the rise of mass tourism have broken down 
psychological borders between states. For most people in postcommunist Europe, the right to 
a passport and to use it to move without hindrance across borders is the most appreciated gain 
from the revolutions of 1989-91.  
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up the previously difficult-to-cross 
border between Poland and its eastern neighbours in the 1990s, the economies of eastern 
Poland and western parts of Belarus and Ukraine became much more interdependent. 
Informal cross-border trade and commuting became a means of survival for many residents of 
the mostly peripheral and rural border regions. Open borders provided opportunities for long-
suppressed national minorities (ethnic Poles in the former USSR, and Ukrainians and 
Belarusians in Poland) to have more contact with their “mother country” and for positive 
encounters with “others” on both sides of the border, thus contributing to a reduction in 
mutual animosities. Generally good relations developed between Poland and Ukraine. 
Warsaw was also satisfied that the Polish minority in Lithuania, which had for the most part 
opposed Lithuanian independence from the Soviet Union and then complained about political 
discrimination, had by the time of EU accession become less disgruntled. Unfortunately, by 
the mid-1990s, the repressive political regime in Minsk, which has had no aspirations to EU 
membership, was making worse the situation of Belarus’ 400,000-strong Polish minority.  
 
If one thinks of frontier zones rather than line borders, borderlands can be viewed as links 
between countries which facilitate trade and human contacts. Much of Poland’s long border 
with Belarus and Ukraine runs through open country, which makes it difficult and costly to 
patrol. Security concerns led the EU to encourage regional integration in postcommunist 
Europe, but the Union’s emerging internal security policies are reinforcing barriers between 
Poland and its non-EU neighbours. Border controls between Poland and its eastern 
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neighbours have tightened since 2003, as Warsaw faced pressure from Brussels to cut down 
on smuggling of people and goods from the former Soviet Union. The advent of the Schengen 
zone loosened frontier controls in the West, but at the same time, borders between Poland and 
Lithuania on one side, and Belarus and Ukraine on the other are controlled more tightly. 
Paradoxically, “both of these border regimes are being wrought in the name of European 
integration”.23 
 
Poland seeks to maintain a balance between EU obligations and relations with Belarus and 
Ukraine. One way of keeping good relations with Ukraine while imposing new barriers is to 
emphasise cross-border cooperation. With EU enlargement, one of the biggest benefits for 
regional governments is the EU funding which becomes available to partners on different 
sides of national borders. 
 
 
In the lead-up to the 2004 enlargement, some feared that the accession of Poland and other 
Central European countries to the EU and then to Schengen would cause major problems for 
the EU’s border regime. Abolishing borders and controls inside the extended Schengen zone 
and their reinforcement outside could negatively affect economic relations between new EU 
member states such as Poland and excluded eastern neighbours Ukraine and Belarus.  
 
In late 2003, border guards in eastern Poland noticed a sharp drop in the number of Ukrainian 
and Belarusian visitors following the introduction of new frontier controls. The controls 
include a visa regime for visitors from Belarus and Ukraine. Previously, Belarusians and 
Ukrainians had been able to enter Poland for three months with just a passport. Now they 
must apply for a visa in advance at Polish consulates. The move was part of Poland’s 
preparations to join the EU. The tighter controls mostly affected people living close to the 
border who engaged in small-scale cross-border trade, some of it in black-market items such 
as alcohol or cigarettes. The trade was threatened with collapse under the new visa regime. 
Clamping down on the border has been a tricky issue for Poland, as it does not want to be 
seen as turning its back on its eastern neighbours. The disruption of bilateral relationships and 
regional economic integration impinges on security in Central and Eastern Europe. In 
particular, EU-driven border policies and visa regimes are reducing local actors’ ability to 
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cooperate on issues such as minority relations, migration, infrastructure and institution-
building. Changing the status and porosity of the eastern borders of Poland and Lithuania has 
the potential to re-awaken unresolved issues over those borders. The EU’s external border and 
visa regimes are disliked by many living in the eastern borderlands, particularly those 
stranded on the outside. The external border regime might negatively affect the borderland’s 
economic and political stability, and combined with economic downturn, might encourage 
separatist sentiment in western parts of Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
The thesis is organised into 12 chapters. After a literature review and an outline of 
methodology used, there is a historical overview. Then come individual chapters on Poland’s 
relations with each of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. Chapter 8 looks at public opinion in 
the four countries. The next chapter looks at migration to and from Poland, and its effect on 
relations between Poland and its eastern neighbours. Migration flows in and out of Poland 
have been considerable since 1990. During the 1990s, there was a movement of Polish 
workers westward, mainly into Germany, and of workers from the collapsing economies of 
the former Soviet Union into Poland. Migration from Poland to richer EU states increased 
dramatically with Poland’s entry into the EU in 2004, contributing to a labour shortage in the 
country. However, with Poland’s move towards Schengen zone membership, Poland’s natural 
source of immigrant labour in Ukraine and Belarus was blocked off. The movement of people 
across borders affects relations between source and destination countries in many ways, not 
least by facilitating transmission of norms and values from one society to another. 
 
Chapter 10 looks at the media in each of the four countries and how it relates to relations 
between them, particularly in the context of the 2004 EU enlargement and associated 
developments. There follows a chapter discussing possible future scenarios for the region and, 
finally, a conclusion chapter which ends the main body of the thesis. Maps are included in 
Appendix 1, while Appendix 2 includes an example of the survey questionnaire used in 
carrying opinion surveys in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine in 2008 and other documents. A 
CD of interviews recorded on audio is included as Appendix 3. A full bibliography is 
included at the end of the thesis. 
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2 Literature Review 
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Understanding the EU can give a better understanding of how it might affect the transmission 
of norms and values from Poland to its eastern neighbours. It is important to establish if there 
is something distinctive about the EU’s foreign policy and if there is something unique about 
the way the EU interacts with external countries and peoples. This thesis makes most use of 
the “norms and values” approach of the particular branch of constructivism associated with 
21
st
 century writers such as Ian Manners and Helene Sjursen. This literature review chapter 
contains an overview of other possible approaches which were found less relevant for this 
thesis. Functionalism, neo-functionalism, regionalism, federalism, intergovernmentalism and 
realism are among the theories used to explain the EU. 
 
States, nations and Europe 
 
When people try to understand their place in the global system, most think in terms of states, 
and of themselves as citizens of a state.
1
 World maps show countries divided by state borders, 
delimiting areas ruled by “different governments and separate systems of law”.2 Realists 
consider nation-states to be the main transforming agents in global politics. The development 
of the state over the last 200 years is linked to nationalism’s ascent and attempts to assimilate 
ethnic minorities. “State” is not a synonym for “nation”. While a state is a legal and political 
unit, history, language and culture tie together a nation.
3
 Sometimes, a nation coincides with a 
state, but most states enclose more than one national group, blurring distinctions between 
countries. Divided loyalties and identities make it harder to apply labels to people. Wallace 
calls the nation-state “an artificial construct … heavily dependent” on the history of two 
European states: Britain and France.
4
 It is debatable if Ukraine and Belarus are as completely 
nation-states as are the countries of western Europe. Most ethnic Poles living in Lithuania and 
Belarus consider their nationality to be “Polish”, despite never having lived in a Polish state. 
Marks says that “a paradox of European integration is that national and regional identities 
become more salient, not less” during recent decades.5 Such a rise in regional salience is 
notable within Britain, Spain and Belgium, and even in relatively homogeneous Poland.  
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Nationalism’s rise “as an organising political construct and as an objective social 
phenomenon” began in the 19th century as a result of economic changes.6 “Exclusive, 
belligerent nationalism” came to dominate people’s lives.7  
 
The fixation with states can curtail opportunities to think innovatively. Several schools of 
thought are based on the idea that the state, understood as an entity which governs territories 
which have defined geographical limits, is an irrational basis for governance and even has an 
inherent tendency to make war. For most, the Westphalian state form is the conventional 
image of the nation-state.
8
 Identification with the state was reinforced by waging war. The 
logic of such conflict demanded mobilisation of nation-state masses to fight wars with other 
nation-states. This culminated in the world wars, which wrought immense destruction in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, Ukraine and Belarus.   
 
European integration has been accompanied by a weakening of this exclusive nationalism and 
signs of “nested” identity, which Marks defines as “multiple, coexisting identities to local, 
regional, and supranational territorial communities” alongside a national identity.9 Postwar 
European integration can be seen as a response to superpower rivalry in the context of the 
Cold War. In historical terms, the EU and its forerunners represent “an intensification of 
interstate cooperation”.10  
 
With the end of the Cold War, some thought cooperation among European states would 
become harder without a tangible external security threat. In a multipolar world, Europe might 
be more likely to be a venue for conflict than cooperation. Yet, for the most part, since 1990, 
aside from the western Balkans and Caucasus, Europe has been at peace and has seen 
unprecedented cooperation and integration. Europeans increasingly have strong attachments 
to multiple levels of community simultaneously: local, regional, national and European. 
Sjursen argues that “the EU is one of the most formidable machines for managing differences 
peacefully ever invented”.11 
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Europe’s zones 
 
Some authors, such as Pal Dunay, see early 21
st
 century Europe as consisting of three distinct 
geographical zones.
12
 Western Europe is already “an established security community”.13 Most 
states of Western Europe have long been cooperating with each other in various international 
frameworks, notably Nato and the European Communities. Since 1945, no violent conflicts 
have erupted between any of the states of Western Europe.
14
 The lethal strife that occurred 
has been related to relatively minor separatist and terrorist movements, notably those in 
Northern Ireland and the Basque Country.  
 
Winn feels that the notion of territory is anachronistic in Western Europe, where territory is “a 
porous concept” given countries’ inter-connectedness.15 A “nexus of networks” operates 
across countries which ignores sovereignty and national borders.
16
 Transnational institutions 
could be more efficient welfare providers than national entities. This would lead to “a process 
of popular loyalty transference away from the nation-state”.17 The chances of international 
conflict would be reduced. According to Rosamond, applying “a technocratic and rationalistic 
approach” to governance brings about “a working peace system”.18 Sjursen says the EU, in 
contrast to nation-states and, indeed, other intergovernmental bodies, “seeks to overcome 
power politics through a strengthening … [of] cosmopolitan law, emphasizing the rights of 
the individuals in the international system”.19  
 
Rosamond asks if the emergence of regional blocs such as the EU has “implications for the 
construction of new identities and the deconstruction of established identities” at both elite 
and mass level.
20
 Regionalism might accelerate or retard free trade and multilateral exchanges 
between states if regional agreements and institutions form a threat both to the nation-state 
and the international system of states. The EU can be seen as being on the way to becoming a 
“regulatory state” composed of “a web of networks of national and supranational regulatory 
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institutions held together by shared values and objectives, and by a common style of policy-
making”.21 Some, such as Chryssachoou, think EU membership has helped countries to 
“rediscover themselves as states, and even develop their sense of forming distinctive 
identities”.22 Being part of the EU increases the likelihood that a country will adopt the norms 
which characterise the EU modus operandi. 
 
In Central Europe and the Baltic states, an emerging security community is integrating into 
the western zone. Countries in this area “have sought to tackle problems and disputes by non-
military means”.23 Significantly, these states have all joined both the EU and Nato in the last 
decade.  
 
To the east and south-east lies the third area of Europe, essentially the rest of the former 
Soviet Union and most of former Yugoslavia (and Turkey, if that is counted as being in 
Europe). For much of the last 20 years, these states have been “either actively fighting each 
other, enmeshed in other kinds of military activity or else are in situations of high tension 
with one or more of their neighbours which might potentially erupt into war”.24 For some 
writers, Europe’s more easterly and southerly parts are a type of buffer zone, protecting the 
secure western Europe from the instability and poverty of Africa, the Middle East and Asia.
25
 
That buffer zone can be thought of as a “rolling march”, which moves east and south as the 
EU enlarges.
26
 However, there is a crucial difference in the way the external east and external 
south are perceived. The Muslim, mostly Arab, lands south and east of the Mediterranean Sea 
are perceived by Europeans to be “profoundly alien”, beyond the borders of any kind of 
Europe.
27
 “In this context the southern border is viewed as somewhat fixed.”28 In contrast, the 
countries bordering the EU on the east are recognised as European and not intrinsically 
incompatible with EU values. For the eastern countries such as Ukraine, the main 
impediments to EU entry are poverty, poor governance and state failings, rather than innate 
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cultural incompatibilities of their inhabitants with EU values and norms. If poor, 
predominantly Eastern Orthodox, Romania and Bulgaria can become EU member states, 
despite having corrupt governance structures, then it seems strange to argue that Ukraine is 
not European enough to join the EU.  
 
Constructivism 
 
Constructivists claim that major aspects of international relations are historically and socially 
contingent, rather than inevitable consequences of human nature or essential characteristics of 
world politics. Constructivism challenges the dominance of neo-liberal and neo-realist 
international relations theories. A key tenet of the approach is the belief that “international 
politics is shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities”.29 
Constructivists claim that the structures of international politics are outcomes of social 
interactions and that states are not static subjects, but dynamic agents. State identities are 
constituted through complex, historical overlapping and often contradictory practices, and are 
therefore variable, unstable and constantly changing.
30
 The distinction between domestic 
politics and international relations is tenuous. In Europe, supranational institutions develop 
links with lobby groups that insert “non-state preferences into the EU’s decision-making 
system”.31 These connections allow the EU to enmesh itself within member states’ domestic 
politics, bypassing national governments. This leads to a situation that brings about changes 
in domestic policies and institutions. States themselves are changed as a result of their 
participation in European integration. This appears to have happened in the case of 
postcommunist states such as Poland and Lithuania over the last two decades, as the two 
countries strove to achieve full membership of the European club by transforming their 
societies, economies and administrative structures. 
 
Constructivists such as Manners, Sjursen and others believe the European Union is a unique, 
normative power, rather than a traditional military or economic power. Normative power is 
linked to the concept of “power over opinion”.32 The EU is, of course, not the world’s only 
normative power. Many writers have contrasted the EU’s normative power with that of the 
western world’s other superpower, the United States, seen by many as being primarily a 
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military power. However, as Sjursen points out, the United States is a normative, as well as a 
military power.
33
 Due to its unique position in the world, and particularly in Europe, the EU 
has been able to re-shape concepts of what is “normal” in international relations. This 
reshaping has been particularly marked in countries which have made the transition from 
being neighbours of the EEC/EU to being members. Aspirant members, keen to demonstrate 
their European credentials, have taken on board “European” norms and standards, as 
enunciated by the EU, and thus have entered an EU sphere of influence before formally 
joining the list of EU candidate member states. It could therefore be expected that the EU’s 
impact on Poland’s behaviour on the regional and world scene would be considerable. In 
particular, Poland’s interaction with its eastern neighbours is likely to have been 
fundamentally affected by Poland’s moves to integrate with the EU. 
 
We must define what we mean by norms, in particular, what we mean by EU norms. Manners 
identifies what he calls five “core” norms which characterise the EU: peace, liberty, 
democracy, rule of law and human rights.
34
 These norms can be tracked as fundamental 
expressed desires in the various treaties establishing the European Communities and EU.
35
 
The insistence on human rights, particularly in countries which aspire to EU membership, is 
something which does set the EU apart from other regional economic blocs, and indeed, from 
most other global powers (the United States partially excepted). This insistence can be seen as 
been contradictory to the principle of nation-state sovereignty.
36
  An adherence to the concept 
and practice of multilateralism can also be considered an EU norm. Four “minor” norms 
include social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. 
States aspiring to EU membership need to take on board these norms, or at least give the 
appearance of so doing, in order to progress to EU membership. 
 
If the EU is a normative power, it should be possible to see evidence of diffusion of its norms 
into the surrounding region, particularly into countries aspiring to membership. Some 
diffusion may be intentional, while other diffusion might be a result of increased contact with 
the EU and knowledge of the way it operates. Manners terms the unintentional diffusion of 
norms to other actors “contagion”.37 One type of contagion is procedural diffusion involving 
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the institutionalisation of a relationship between the EU and a third party, such as countries 
acceding to the Union.
38
 Another form of diffusion is “transference”.39 Such diffusion occurs 
as a result of trade and technical assistance, which requires the other party to adopt at least 
some EU norms. The EU operates a system of inducements and punitive measures to 
encourage partners to “normalise”. Manners notes the importance of the “cultural filter”: 
some countries and people are more disposed to adopting EU norms than are others.
40
 Factors 
such as state of economic development, the vigour of domestic civil society, religious 
tradition and language all come into play. In the words of Sjursen, in most of Europe, “the 
thickness of the social environment – a common cultural identity … [can] explain the 
emergence of, and commitment to, common norms”.41 Being in Europe, being part of a 
broader Western culture and having many of the prerequisites for EU membership all help in 
the transmission of EU norms to a receiving society. In other words, if a country is already 
pre-disposed to regard the EU and what it stands for favourably, it is more likely to accept a 
package of EU norms. Poland and Lithuania are examples of such countries. Poland should be 
able to act as a filter and relayer of norms and values from the established EU states into 
countries further east. And indeed, Poland’s elite and bureaucrats have taken it upon 
themselves “to promote democracy in the neighbourhood and import knowledge about 
Eastern Europe” into the EU.42 
 
Successful integration brings about an expectation of a significant reduction in the chances of 
integrated states waging war on each other. The mid-20
th
 century moves to (western) 
European integration took place in the context of the aftermath of two world wars. This has a 
fundamental impact on the way in which the EU (and its predecessors) developed as a 
normative power. As a normative power, the EU promotes regional cooperation, human 
rights, democracy and good governance, prevents conflicts and fights international crime. In 
practice, as economic, cultural and social ties between states intensify, the risk of war between 
those states diminishes as the states become more interdependent “for supplies of vital 
materials and for export markets and will not wish to see their access to these disrupted”.43 
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Bretherton and Vogler note an “increasing disjuncture” between military and economic 
power.
44
 In the late 1990s, Therborn felt that “without the backing of force and a willingness 
to use it”, the EU would likely not become a normative power.45 While military power is 
territorially based and generally controlled by national governments, economic power is more 
dispersed and less easy to regulate at the state level. The EU has evolved into something 
beyond the traditional boxes of military power and economic power. Its internal governance is 
somewhere between that of a federal nation state and a community of nation-states, and has 
both supranational and international aspects. The EU’s external projection also displays a mix 
of characteristics. In some situations, such as trade negotiations, the EU functions as a single 
actor, while in other situations, such as involvement in military conflict, the EU’s individual 
member states are usually distinct actors, but nonetheless prone to consult other member 
states before using military force. The EU’s advent and continued development might be part 
of a reorganisation of the international order beyond the Westphalian system of norms.
46
  
 
Liberalism 
 
Liberalism holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary 
determinant of state behaviour. Unlike realism, where the state is seen as a unitary actor, 
liberalism allows for plurality in state actions. Preferences will vary from state to state, 
depending on factors such as culture, economic system or government type. Integration can be 
seen as following on from bargaining between governments. Schimmelfennig sees a “liberal 
character” as the western world’s “defining feature”.47 The West is both a community of 
liberal states and a liberal community of states. Community organisations are built on liberal 
principles. They “pursue liberal values and act according to liberal norms”.48 In nation-states, 
the principles of pluralism, the rule of law, democratic political participation and 
representation, private property and a market-based economy can be seen to derive from, and 
be justified by, liberal values. “Only a state that bases its domestic political system on these 
principles is regarded as fully legitimate by the Western international community.”49  
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Internationally, “liberal political culture shapes the institutions of peaceful conflict 
management and multilateralist collaboration”.50 Democracies externalise domestic norms 
when interacting with other democracies. To be considered democratic, a regime must meet 
certain criteria. These include the prevalence of civil rights and legitimate, competitive 
elections. A country that exhibits all these characteristics may be called a liberal democracy. 
Today, Poland and Lithuania fit into this category. Some regimes are partially democratic, 
conducting legitimate competitive elections, but without guaranteeing civil rights. Ukraine 
can be considered to be a country with a semi-functioning democratic process but poorly 
organised civil society. Belarus fails to make it even to the status of a semi-democracy in this 
sense. 
 
The assumed fact that democracies do not go to war against each other has its roots in liberal 
states’ internal norms. These require conflicts to be resolved without violence, using 
constitutional procedures. These norms tend to be externalised out of custom. Democratic 
states perceive each other as sharing similar values, norms and practices. These perceptions 
aid positive identification among states. The belief that other democracies share a culture of 
managing conflicts peacefully and in an institutionalised way allows democracies to develop 
reasonable expectations of each other’s behaviour. In time, liberal democracies develop 
pluralistic security communities in which states positively identify with each other and neither 
expect nor prepare for organised violence as a means to settle interstate disputes.  
 
Some authors hoped that with universal liberalism and a worldwide network of democratic 
states, systemic anarchy could be replaced.
51
 Collective security would be achieved with the 
spread of liberal values and liberal processes, and the establishment of international 
organisations and law bodies. However, in a world with many non-democratic states, positive 
identification between such states (and between them and liberal democratic states) does not 
occur and can even be replaced by negative identification, preventing a long-term, stable 
peace.
52
 This is highly relevant to relations between Poland and its eastern neighbours. Poland 
and Lithuania have together tracked a similar path internationally over the last 20 years, 
moving from economically fragile, insecure postcommunist states to members of the EU. 
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Belarus’ trajectory has been almost in an opposite direction, away from the European Union, 
away from democracy and towards authoritarianism. Ukraine’s path and interaction with 
Poland and the EU has been erratic and inconsistent. Bearing all this in mind, one might 
expect Poland to have good relations with Lithuania, less good relations with Ukraine and 
poor relations with Belarus. This thesis will examine whether this hypothesis is true. 
 
International relations and the European Union 
 
In IR, the issue of the basic units that make up the international system and how these units 
interact is an important question. A decline in the ability of individual states to respond to the 
needs of citizens has led to more international cooperation on matters of mutual interest, 
particularly in Europe. International organisations (IOs) have taken on some of the 
responsibilities which nation-states cannot take on. Some have claimed IR is obsolescent as a 
disciplinary base for EU studies, while others have sought a shift of focus away from IR to 
comparative political science as the parent discipline of EU studies. This raises questions 
about whether it is still makes sense to use contemporary international theory to explain what 
the EU is and how it works. An implication of rejecting IR is that the EU defies categorisation 
and comparison in international terms. In other words, the EU is sui generis.
53
 
 
The EU only partly fits conventional ideas about the ways in which societies organise and 
govern themselves. The EU is a voluntary association of states in which many decisions are 
taken as a result of negotiations. Member states retain authority over their own affairs, 
although this authority is today much constrained by EU law. They have empowered new 
cooperative bodies when it suits them. Theoretically, they have reserved the right to take back 
that power. For most of its history, the EU and its predecessors lacked a strong and separate 
legal identity, political unity and sovereignty.
54
 Half a century after the creation of the 
European Economic Community, the EU’s taxing abilities and revenues are still small relative 
to its size and responsibilities. However, over the decades, the EU has developed considerable 
levels of power and influence over its members. In some areas, EU law overrides national 
law. In areas such as trade the EU has the authority to negotiate on behalf of member states. 
Third countries work with the EU institutions rather than with the governments of the member 
states. EU institutions have the power to make laws and policies which are binding on 
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member states. European political integration involves leaders and citizens creating new 
governing institutions and shifting loyalties to a new level of government. Rather than making 
separate decisions over foreign and domestic policy, states either make joint decisions or 
delegate decision-making powers to the new institutions, and so cease to function separately 
and independently.
55
  
 
The European Union as a security community 
 
As the EU is a voluntary union, member states are free, in theory, to leave it, though to date 
none has done so.
56
 Most analysts believe secession of a member state is unlikely to happen, 
as economic ties among member states make it more costly to leave than to stay in. Before the 
Treaty of Lisbon came into force in December 2009, no provision in the treaties or law of the 
European Union outlined the ability of a state to voluntarily withdraw from the EU. After the 
failure to ratify the Treaty establishing a European constitution, that provision was then 
included in the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Integration in a security sense can be considered to be the attainment, within a defined 
territory, of a sense of community and of institutions strong enough to produce reliable 
“expectations of peaceful change” among the general population.57 The EU has become such 
a security community. However, amalgams such as the EU are vulnerable to potential 
destabilising factors, among them “dissonance between government action and societal 
expectations”.58 Although the pursuit of group-interests by relatively small elites can push 
integration “it cannot continue indefinitely without some degree of European community 
feeling ... among the wider public”.59 There must at least be “a permissive consensus”.60 If 
national populations in each of the member states feel themselves to be part of the European 
integration project, that project is more likely to succeed.  
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As a significant civilian power, the EU contributes to European security in several ways. By 
enhancing member states’ economic and commercial strength and prosperity, the EU helps to 
promote peaceful relations among them.
61
 Some see the EU as a unitary foreign policy actor. 
Others see it as having separate “presences” on the world stage. Allen and Smith note the 
EU’s “structured presence” in the international arena.62 This presence has two elements: the 
first, distinctive external behaviour; the second, the EU is seen as being important by other 
world actors.
63
 
 
Rosamond says the EU has become “a genuine polity” which has taken on many of the 
features of national political systems.
64
 Others reject the image of a unitary EU and point to 
how different actors within the bloc have different relationships with and attitudes to 
globalisation. Bretherton and Vogler say that a state-centric worldview inevitably leads “to 
the conclusion that the EU is not (or not yet) an actor”.65  
 
This thesis will question to what extent the EU is an actor in Central and Eastern Europe and 
whether it has had a significant impact on the transmission of norms and values between the 
region’s countries. Reference will be made to the theories of European integration listed 
above, with particular use made of constructivism and the theory of norms and values, as 
expressed by Sjursen and Manners.
66
 The constructivist approach seems to be most useful  in 
answering the research question of this thesis. Other possible approaches are considered 
below. 
 
Functionalism and neo-functionalism 
 
Functionalism as a theory of international relations arose mainly from the experience of 
European integration in the middle of the last century. In the interwar period, Mitrany called 
for “universal leagues” of states rather than continental unions, considering the two to differ 
fundamentally.
67
 While unions use territorial definitions to exclude outsiders, leagues choose 
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and define functions to integrate in everybody’s interests. In the 1960s, Mitrany attacked 
various “fallacies” which had found expression in the postwar European Communities.68 One 
such fallacy was a move to draw boundaries and to impose artificial limits on which countries 
could join international entities such as the European Communities. Another was a tendency 
to build for political reasons a “United States of Europe” in the context of the European 
Community. Mitrany rebutted regional integration arrangements, setting functionalism aside 
from other major contributions to the debate about establishing conditions for peace.  
 
Other late 20
th
 century authors viewed the developing European Community as a 
confederation. Some, such as Forsyth, claimed that the European Community, as a “voluntary 
association of states with a common interest in building larger markets” continued a theme in 
European history.
69
 
  
Federal systems institutionalise territorial cleavages and do not eradicate or transcend them. 
The rationale behind federalist solutions is the hope that tendencies for conflict inherent in the 
states system can be overcome. However, federalist engineering normally produces a state-
like entity and thus replicates the nation-state format. Such is the case of the US and 
Australia, neither of which is an ideal model for a united Europe. Fuzzy borders are likelier 
consequences of an expanded EU than hard international borders of the Cold War-era kind. 
Rosamond says integrationists should accept the logic of “differentiated integration”, where 
the degree to which European countries are integrated varies considerably.
70
  
 
The fathers of European integration, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, had clear ideas about 
the road that would lead to an integrated Europe. Their strategy for building the European 
Communities was to integrate modestly in areas of low politics, creating a high authority to 
oversee and promote the integration process. Integration of particular sectors would create 
functional pressure to integrate other related sectors, making for gradual enmeshing of 
national economies. Interest groups within society would gradually shift loyalty from nation-
states to a European system. Deeper integration would lead to more institution-building to 
regulate it. Political integration would follow economic integration, leading to long-term 
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peace. The Community’s institutional architects made their decisions to formalise integration 
based on particular motivations and preferences.  
 
Functionalists argue that the best people to build cooperation are technical experts, not 
government representatives. Mitrany advocated the creation of international bodies with 
authority over functionally specific fields, such as security, transport and communication.
71
 
These international entities would be executive bodies with autonomous tasks and powers and 
do some of the same jobs as national governments. This focus on particular functions would 
encourage international cooperation more quickly and effectively than grand gestures. The 
dimensions and structures of these international organisations would be self-determined. IOs 
in this sense can be considered to be intergovernmental organisations made up of sovereign 
states, although they also have some of the characteristics of non-governmental organisations 
in that their main participants might not be government representatives. Functionalists argue 
that European integration has a logic that the EU member states find hard to resist. Although 
membership involves contracts that could be broken, in reality they have an almost irresistible 
authority. Functionalism can be considered as a theory of post-territorial governance.  
 
However, Deutsch regarded the levels of communication undertaken by functional IOs as 
“insufficient to generate the necessary loyalties among mass publics and thus to secure a 
lasting peace”.72 International civil servants tend to interact more with governments rather 
than with ordinary citizens. Systems and human nature mean direct communication between 
such civil servants and the general populaces they are supposed to be working for are limited.  
 
The neofunctionalist approach, integral to the study of European unity since 1950, can be 
considered an early theory of regionalism. Many political scientists have used 
neofunctionalist logic and vocabulary to analyse European integration and cooperation. For 
some, integration theory and neofunctionalism are virtual synonyms. A distinguishing feature 
of neofunctionalist analysis (as opposed to functionalism) is its claim that integration can take 
place within territorial limits. The EU’s predecessors evolved where and when they did within 
a defined territory (Western Europe) due to the existence and placement of the Iron Curtain. 
Following on from this, it can be argued that European integration represents the application 
of territorial logic.  
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However, supranational entities, multinational corporations, other transnational entities and 
subnational entities are all key shapers of the world order. Their operation blurs old 
boundaries between domestic politics and foreign policy. Relations have become transnational 
as much as international. Structural changes in the global economy have triggered 
supranational activism. The dissolution or reorganisation of governance for domestic 
purposes might itself reorder the international system. The two main communication lines are 
between societies and national elites, and between the various national elites. Chryssachoou 
claims a major recentralisation “of political authority within the member states has ... taken 
place in favour of executive-centred elites”.73  
 
The functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches work well in describing developments in 
western Europe during the mid-20
th
 century. They do not seem to work as well in explaining 
how norms and values are transmitted from liberal democracies into postcommunist states, 
where the normative approach seems to explain things better. The functionalist and 
neofunctionalist approaches were therefore not adopted as the conceptual framework for this 
thesis. 
 
Globalisation and the European Union 
 
Globalisation has encouraged the transfer of economic management from the nation-state 
level to the EU-wide level. At this level, tensions between moderate, non-revolutionary 
governance forms can be addressed in an arena out of the gaze of the general public. It can be 
argued that the transfer of macro-economic oversight from democratic nation states to the less 
directly democratic EU has disrupted the tradition of popular representatives’ political control 
over the general economy. European voters do have a say in the way they are ruled at the EU 
level, through European Parliament elections and, more effectively, by electing national 
governments, which form the European Council. However, an obvious gap in EU governance 
structures is the lack of a popularly elected executive. 
 
Globalisation theorists point to a world where territorial conventions have lost meaning due to 
the great growth of cross-border economic activity. However, geography and political divides 
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are as relevant today as they were a century ago. The economic changes globalisation brings 
about are not all gains, and not all irreversible. Globalisation as an ideology, if it is purely 
business-driven, is a strategy with many holes. Globalisation does not explain the expansion 
of the EU into Central Europe and the Baltics, nor does it come close to explain the pattern of 
interaction between the EU, Poland and their eastern neighbours. Therefore, globalisation 
theory itself is not used as a conceptual framework for this thesis. 
 
The European Union’s eastern enlargement 
 
Geography, history and culture are all important factors in influencing how innovations, 
including changes in norms and values spread from one political unit and people to another. 
Alex Pravda, who was interested in political changes in postcommunist Europe in the late 20
th
 
century, claims that four sets of characteristics are of particular importance when analysing 
the role external factors have played in “domestic regime change” in postcommunist 
countries.
74
 The first is proximity to core Western values and traditions, “in the form of close 
political, economic, and cultural ties or inclusion within European empires.”75 The further 
away from the EU core one travels in postcommunist Europe, the less successful and 
complete has been the process of converting nation-states into western-style functioning 
democracies in the mould of the EU’s founder states. One has only to compare Poland with 
Ukraine, or Lithuania with Belarus. Historical and cultural legacies in Eastern Europe seem 
“remarkably resilient”.76 Recent historical experience provides a second set of distinguishing 
characteristics: the relationship between nationalism and communism. Here the distinction is 
between those states (such as most of the Soviet Union) where communism took root and 
those (such as Poland and Lithuania) where “national identity and interest” opposed 
communism.
77
 The third distinguishing feature concerns the ethnic composition of the state 
and its qualities of “stateness”.78 The division here is between states, such as Poland, “based 
on ethnically homogeneous historical nations and those [such as Ukraine] with fragile 
national identities and ethnically fragmented populations”.79 In the latter group, state- and 
nation-building figure prominently in the process of transition. The stage reached in 
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democratic transition is the fourth distinguishing characteristic. Advanced democratic 
consolidation is linked with conditions which anchor democratic institutions and processes. 
Kaminska claims that Warsaw’s “active participation in the creation of a coherent EU policy 
on the Ukraine and Belarus might be a chance for Poland to join the … decisive core” of the 
Union.
80
  
 
Democratic communities’ characteristics are “influenced by durable ‘inherited’ cultural 
traditions”.81 In classifying nations according to these traditions, authors use various 
indicators, including the country’s dominant religion, which empire (German, Habsburg, 
Russian or Ottoman) citizens’ ancestors lived in, the length of communist rule, socio-
economic development and the depth of civil society. 
 
Badescu notes a continuous falloff in Europe from west to east in democratic communities’ 
quality and level of consolidation.
82
 While Poland and Lithuania fit into the broad category of 
“democratic communities”, Ukraine (despite recent competitive elections) and Belarus do 
not.
83
 Location is among the most important factors “in conditioning the overall impact of the 
international context”.84 In the case of postcommunist Europe, countries such as Poland, 
which maintained consistently good relations with the West saw a “steady thickening of 
relations” with major Western institutions in the run-up to EU entry.85 Kaminska notes that 
“the potential of EU membership was a motor of the Polish transformation” and that 
European integration “enabled democratization and stabilization in Poland”.86 The 
democratisation of Central Europe and the Baltic states stands out because of the specificity 
of the international environment, the outward orientation of the region’s elites and peoples 
and the fact that democratisation and the development of a market economy occurred at the 
same time. States further east, such as Ukraine and Belarus, have gone through periods of 
volatility and regression in their relations with the EU and West as a whole. One argument for 
further enlargement is that the EU will have fewer problems when postcommunist countries 
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are subject to the socialising effects of European integration rather than “left outside to 
fester”.87 
 
Central and Eastern Europe’s political and military elites see EU and Nato membership as 
bringing several security advantages. Foremost among these is that the direct and indirect 
security guarantees of Nato and the EU are seen as deterrence against any Russian or regional 
military threat. This has played a major role in Lithuanian, Polish and (sometimes) Ukrainian 
policies, where Nato membership or special relations with Nato were “seen as the best and 
cheapest reassurance against any Russian military threat or political blackmail”.88 As 
Kaminska states, “[t]he issue of territorial defence has been an obsession for Polish policy 
makers”.89 Poland’s decision makers know “that it is only though an active policy in the EU 
that Poland can realize its Eastern policy, which is the priority in Polish external relations”.90 
Lacking the power and standing of Germany, France or Britain, Poland must “find its own 
place within the EU, and its own methods of wielding influence, corresponding to its potential 
and capabilities”.91 
 
As the “the most powerful and integrated set of resources for promoting democracy” of any 
Western organisation and the “embodiment of … economic and political success”, the EU 
became the “main pole of attraction” for most democratising CEECs.92 The attraction derives 
from the price of being left outside the EU as much as from the benefits of accession, says 
Pravda.
93
 Small states on the outside find it costly to exist beside the protectionist EU and 
difficult to negotiate economic and political problems with larger states. Once inside the 
Union, they have protection, access to budgetary inflows and the opportunity to punch above 
their weight in decision-making councils. Two obvious examples are Ireland and 
Luxembourg. Lithuania is another small country whose international footprint has been 
significantly increased by its accession to the EU. 
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The EU attracts CEEC elites who associate the Union with what they see as European 
civilisation’s hearth. Another factor pushing CEECs towards the EU is a long-established 
regional tendency to look beyond the region for solutions to problems. For decades, CEE 
elites, particularly those in Central Europe and the Baltic states, have “coped with external 
constraints by a combination of adjustment and resistance”.94 These strategies fostered an 
“elite preoccupation with external factors which remains evident in current concern to engage 
outside involvement in their economic and political development”.95 
 
Writing from a left-wing, eurosceptic, perspective, Field calls the relations between the EU 
and applicant countries “an exercise in subtle racism using colonialist control mechanisms”.96 
However, this misrepresents how the EU has engaged postcommunist European states. Winn 
calls the relationship between the old EU member states and the new postcommunist 
members “asymmetrical, heavily favouring the west”.97 This is more valid. In the 1990s, 
CEECs reasserted national sovereignty within a framework “which depended on access to 
sovereignty-constraining western institutions”.98 Prospective member states looked west 
while the west determined who could join its international institutions “according to western 
criteria and standards”.99 To meet EU standards, Poland and Lithuania had to reorientate their 
political and economic systems. The prospect of eventually joining the EU added impetus to 
Polish and Lithuanian reform and affected their direction.
100
 Smith & Timmins see system 
transformation as a process of “the creation of a western-style multi-party democratic system 
and liberal market economy”.101 
 
For many in 21
st
 century Belarus and Ukraine, the EU’s presence mirrors the “mystical 
attraction” evident in Poland in the early 1990s.102 The European Neighbourhood Policy has 
been a way for the EU to interact positively with its new neighbours, including Ukraine and 
Belarus. However, most commentators agree that it is unlikely that the European 
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Neighbourhood Policy alone will achieve the EU’s aim of ensuring the economic and political 
stability of Belarus and Ukraine. Field criticises enlargement moves “for not focusing on a 
wider Europe, but instead encouraging” countries such as Ukraine “to feel excluded due to the 
construction of a ‘hub and spoke’ pattern of bilateral relations” between the EU and 
neighbouring countries.
103
 It is widely accepted that all Yugoslavia’s successor states will 
eventually join the EU, while Ukraine and Belarus have been excluded from the list of 
prospective EU members. Making such a distinction between EU candidates and neighbours 
“is divisive and, given the high expectations of Ukraine in particular, may be 
unsustainable”.104  
 
Many authors suggest that while it is not impossible for Ukraine to becoming a candidate 
country eventually, it will not be admitted to the EU before regional and ethnic tension in the 
country is eased and its unstable democratic system made stable. Much will depend on the 
EU’s commitment and consistency and its ability to manage relations with Russia, which still 
considers Ukraine and Belarus as part of its “near abroad”. Almost all authors agree that 
Russia stands no chance of joining the EU in the foreseeable future. Issues of EU 
inconsistency arise, with Paris and Berlin tending to prefer to placate Russia at the expense of 
relations with Ukraine, while Warsaw and Vilnius urge that relations with Ukraine be made a 
priority.
105
  
 
Schimmelfennig says that the expansion of the “European community of values” to 
postcommunist Europe, the stabilisation of the region, a “pan-European stability community 
of law”, the stabilisation of “economic transformation processes” in the new and prospective 
member states and the “provision of pan-European stability and conflict prevention” are the 
main components of the benefit side of EU enlargement.
106
 Internal and external 
preconditions affect the direction and magnitude of political and economic change. Internal 
preconditions include the transformation from a centralised economy based on state 
ownership into a free market economy “with its own criteria of success and failure”.107 
External preconditions include the EU’s expectations. External actors prioritise promoting the 
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market, claiming this will strengthen democratisation and secure ties with the West.
108
 For 
domestic leaders, building power is most important.  
 
What Schimmelfennig calls the “inclusive strategy of community-building” is aimed at 
socialising new member states from within.
109
 The EU admits aspiring states, then teaches 
them EU rules, which new members are obliged to learn. With an inclusive strategy, a state 
which aspires to membership is admitted. In contrast, an exclusive strategy involves 
socialisation from outside. The EU communicates its values and norms to prospective 
members and informs them to what extent they must adopt those values and norms before 
being admitted. Once it has fulfilled the requirements, the state is admitted to the club. Full 
accession means socialisation has been successful. So, if the EU pursues an exclusive strategy 
of socialisation, a state is admitted to the Union if it has internalised the EU’s basic values and 
norms. 
 
Security aspects of enlargement 
 
The opening of the EU’s eastern borders took place at the same time as the EU’s internal 
security agenda developed a stronger profile. The EU responded to threats to its citizens’ 
security by developing new EU-wide instruments. Many of these threats were perceived to be 
from Poland and former Soviet states. In the lead-up to eastern enlargement Germany and 
Austria warned of emerging threats to internal security from Poland and its eastern 
neighbours.
110
 Today, Poland and Lithuania as states no longer pose a security threat to 
Western Europe. However, Ukraine is another matter. During the 1990s, Polish and 
Lithuanian appeals to join the EU and Nato consistently emphasised the difference between 
their country and the “barbarous East” and that while the appellant’s state was definitely 
European, the next state to the east was not European.
111
 Poland expected Nato to differentiate 
between it and the likes of Romania, Lithuania and Ukraine. Lithuanian diplomats insisted 
that the Commonwealth of Independent States was “foreign to most Lithuanians”.112 No 
nation-state chose to call itself a Balkan state, but many often used the term to describe their 
                                                 
108
 Pravda p.2-3 
109
 Schimmelfennig p.74-75 
110
 Grabbe, H. 2006 The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and 
Eastern Europe Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK 2006 p.2 
111
 Schimmelfennig 2003 The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe p.231 
112
 Ibid. 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of norms and values to eastern neighbours                 Literature review                                                  
 
41 
 
more southerly or easterly neighbours. Romanian authors tried to detach Romania from the 
Balkans.  
 
Bringing countries like Poland and Lithuania “into the European polity implies the inheritance 
of their geopolitical security problems”.113 Acceptance of the acquis communautaire makes 
new member states “part of ‘western’ concerns relating to security, society, economics and 
politics”.114 It forces new members to perform and transition towards EU-required political 
and economic systems. Human rights regimes in acceding states must be brought into line 
with those of existing member states. More importantly, new member states must align 
foreign and security policies towards the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. They 
must work vigorously towards protection of human rights, promotion of democracy, 
acceptance of the market economy and acceptance of CFSP rules and procedures. As much as 
they are political or economic, the problems of transition are “socio-psychological” in 
nature.
115
 It takes time to implant democracy and capitalism into a people’s psyche. 
 
Conditionality and leverage 
 
Convergence and conditionality are discussed by Pridham, who sees “gradual movement in 
system conformity based on a grouping of established democratic states that has the power 
and institutional mechanisms to attract transiting regimes and to help secure their democratic 
outcomes”.116 Provided new democracies want to accede to the EU, the bloc has “compelling 
leverage over their elite groups and a channel of influence over their socio-economic interests 
and ... public opinion”.117 Pridham says that “perhaps more telling is the impact and influence 
on elite mentalities in new democracies”.118 This influence and closer contacts can reinforce 
the new democratic and economic structures in candidate countries. To apply for membership, 
CEECs had to show they were moving in the right direction, were politically stable or 
potentially so and met a set of democratic standards. Pridham says conditionality is 
“suggestive of deliberate efforts to determine from outside the course and outcome of regime 
change”.119 Applicant countries which comply with the EU’s democratic conditionality 
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requirements are eligible for membership. Democratic conditionality depends on domestic 
actors’ responsiveness and, in particular, their commitment to the European project. 
 
When political conditionality is used to relegate states in the membership queue, it has mixed 
effects on democratisation. In some cases, such as happened in Serbia and Slovakia in the 
1990s, “leaders may try to strengthen the nationalist basis of their support through more 
authoritarian and sustained defiance of international criticism”.120 This can lead to “a 
downward spiral” of marginalisation, with national leaders championing supposed self-
reliance and the West writing off the state as a permanent “outsider”.121 Sometimes, 
international pressure may help replace authoritarian governments with more democratic 
ones. This happened in Ukraine in the Orange Revolution, but has not happened in Belarus.  
 
The progressive process of driving towards EU membership enhances a national 
government’s domestic legitimacy. It is easier to justify and implement domestic and foreign 
policy changes and transformation hardships if they are seen as being demanded by the EU 
“as a condition of closer cooperation and accession”.122 Accession to the EU adds prestige to 
governments, boosts societies’ self-esteem and makes harder authoritarian reversals. The EU 
exerts leverage over acceding countries and is “a powerful external force for changes”.123 The 
process of EU accession has encouraged “new perceptions of national identity” and the 
“return to Europe” and has allowed CEECs “to shuffle off more easily associations with the 
dictatorial past”.124  
 
Ethnic relations  
 
Today, almost all the states of Central and Eastern Europe are based around a single, 
dominant ethnic group or nationality, united by a common language, usually specific to that 
country. This is the case for Poland and Lithuania and, to a much lesser extent, for Ukraine 
and Belarus. The latter two have less clear national identities and large Russian-speaking 
populations due to their long period of close ties with Russia. Minority rights is one area 
where the EU has provided “a consistent pressure for improvement”.125 A new minority rights 
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regime has emerged in Europe since 1989. This regime has the institutional support of all the 
European organisations, including the EU. In the case of Poland and Lithuania the emergence 
of the new minority rights regime owes as much to western countries and the EU as to shifts 
in identity within the nation-states.
126 
 
Gurr credits the end of the Cold War and ensuing spread of democracy and the increasingly 
important role of the EU as primary reasons for the observed decline in ethnic conflict in 
Central and Eastern Europe since the early 1990s.
127
 International efforts at publicising and 
preventing violations of group rights increased markedly after the Cold War. Compared with 
the rulers of authoritarian states, such as existed in communist Eastern Europe, elites in 
democracies “are less likely to rely on strategies of assimilation and repression” and more 
likely to follow policies of recognition, pluralism and group autonomy.
128
  
 
Heisler assumes that in developed Western democratic societies, where discrimination and 
overall salience of ethnic groups is less, ethnicity becomes less important relative to other 
forms of self-identification.
129
 It is not clear that this is the case. One might argue the opposite 
has taken place in at least some instances, such as in Britain. It is true that as nationalism has 
become less important as a motor for political and social change after the heady days of the 
early 1990s, the propensity for ethnic differences to be the main contributor to violent conflict 
has lessened. Fleming says that in today’s Europe “the treatment of national minorities has 
become an indicator of ... progress”.130  
 
Yet, while border disputes in western Europe have become less important since 1950, it seems 
that even in the early 21
st
 century, most Poles and many Lithuanians are not happy with their 
country’s borders.131 However, from the early 1990s Poland and Lithuania made considerable 
progress “towards democratic and civil society norms (as defined by the West)”, in a process 
led by national elites, with strong encouragement from the EU, its member states and the 
US.
132
 Schimmelfennig notes that in the early 1990s, postcommunist “Poland granted 
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minority rights to its German-speaking population and made no claims to Lithuanian, 
Belarusian and Ukrainian territory that had belonged to its prewar area”.133 This might not 
have happened had Polish leaders not been so taken by the process of European integration 
and a desire to be part of it. The Polish government’s stance in this respect differed markedly 
from that of several other governments in the region, notably Russia’s, Estonia’s and Latvia’s. 
The reasons for this difference are several but probably most important was the greater 
“westernisation” of Poland, the greater impact of EU-type values of tolerance and “European 
standards” on Poland’s new leaders and the belief among those leaders that rejoining the 
“civilised” West was a realistic prospect for their country.  
 
Conclusion 
 
An examination of the literature points to a conclusion that European integration may be 
leading to the development of new state-type entities which are not nation-states in the sense 
understood in the 20
th
 century. The EU itself can be regarded as a new type of transnational 
state or as another, so far unique, category of human collective entity. The entry of Poland and 
Lithuania into the EU has been an important event for those countries and their neighbours. 
The exclusion of Belarus and Ukraine from the EU is at least as important for Eastern Europe 
as a whole. This thesis begins with the hypothesis that the EU has had a significant impact on 
the countries of postcommunist Europe and on relations between those countries. It examines 
the belief that the EU has had a particularly strong impact on Poland, which for historical, 
cultural and geographical reasons is well disposed to innovation from the West. A reading of 
the literature reviewed in this chapter gives some pointers about what should be looked for 
when investigating the EU’s impact on Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbours and the 
way in which Poland has functioned as a filter and relayer of EU norms and values to its 
eastern neighbours.  The approach of this thesis will be primarily a constructivist “norm and 
values” one, as this appears the most apt, but in certain places and times, use is made of other 
ideas and approaches mentioned in this chapter.  
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This thesis builds on research carried out for two master theses (at Curtin University of 
Technology, Perth and the Jagiellonian University, Kraków); other studies at the Jagiellonian 
University in the mid-1990s, including a Postgraduate Certificate in Central and East 
European Studies; a BA dissertation at University College Cork, which looked at the 
Changing Information Fields of the Cracow Region; and other studies and research. Sources 
of this PhD thesis include the author’s personal experience of life in each of the countries 
concerned, especially more than three years spent in Poland; an extensive bibliography; and a 
survey and interviews conducted in June-July 2008 in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. Most of 
the interviews were conducted in English. Some were conducted in Polish. 
 
This thesis investigates how Poland has been a vector and filter for the transmission of values 
and norms from the old EU to Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, particularly in the years 
leading up to the 2004 eastern enlargement. It also looks at how a new political, economic and 
social border for “Europe” is being defined and how it is affecting communities on either side 
of it. While relations between Poland and Lithuania are now those of two nations within the 
EU, a new dimension in relations between Poland and non-EU members Belarus and Ukraine 
has been created by Poland’s accession to the EU. Separate chapters look at the EU’s impact 
on Poland’s relations with each of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. As it is impossible to 
comprehensively cover the whole ambit of the EU’s impact on relations between these 
countries, particular aspects of the relations are singled out for study. Chapter 8 looks at 
public opinion in Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus, particularly in as much as it relates 
to the transmission of European norms and values. The findings of the author’s survey of 
public opinion in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine in June-July 2008 are including in this 
chapter. Migration to and from Poland, particularly as it relates to the transmission of 
European norms and values to and from Poland and its eastern neighbours, is examined in 
chapter 9.  Chapter 10 looks at the media’s role in relations between the countries concerned, 
with a focus on Poland’s media. Chapter 11 looks at prospects for the future. There is a final 
concluding chapter. 
 
The author was in New Zealand during most of the time study for this thesis was taking place. 
Most of the research was conducted using written sources: books, magazines, periodicals, 
most available at the University of Canterbury library, and many electronic resources, 
including the Factiva database. Most source materials were accessed in English and Polish, 
though during the course of research, the author was able to learn sufficient Belarusian and 
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Ukrainian to be able to utilise some sources in the Belarusian and Ukrainian languages, 
particularly from websites and radio stations. Listening to online audio news broadcasts in 
Belarusian (RFE/RL and Radio Racyja) and Ukrainian (BBC, RFE/RL) helped improve the 
author’s understanding of those languages, as did reading texts and news websites in 
Ukrainian and Belarusian.   
 
All forms of media were used as sources. Much use was made of internet sources, particularly 
academic papers online and news websites, in particular the BBC News and the Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty websites. The latter website was viewed in its English, Ukrainian and 
Belarusian-language versions. Many newspaper websites were also accessed, including in 
particular the websites of popular Polish daily newspapers Gazeta Wyborcza (www.gazeta.pl), 
which has a liberal, generally pro-EU, orientation and Rzeczpospolita (www.rp.pl), a more 
conservative publication. Other sources included EU and government websites. A full 
bibliography has been included at the end of this thesis. 
Free-to-air state and commercial television programmes were viewed in two periods in Poland 
(May 2006 and July 2008) and in July 2008 in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. Throughout 
2006-2009, many relevant video clips from television stations in Poland, Ukraine and Belarus 
and elsewhere, were accessed on YouTube. Television appears to be the most popular 
medium in each of the four countries in the study, in terms of audience. As in other parts of 
the world, newspapers appear to have a declining readership. Internet users are predominantly 
young, and overall levels of internet use in the countries concerned, particularly in Ukraine, 
are on average still low compared with most of the western EU.
1
  
Field research 
 
It was felt there should be at least one field-trip component of the research. A decision was 
made to visit Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine in 2008. In addition to the main series of 
interviews conducted in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine in June and July 2008, other, 
informal, interviews of experts in the fields of migration and European Union studies and 
Polish accession to the EU were undertaken in Ireland and New Zealand. An earlier field trip 
was made to Poland in May 2006. A short visit was also made to Ireland in June 2008, when 
University College Cork academics involved in studying Polish and Lithuanian migration to 
Ireland were interviewed, mainly about Polish immigration to Ireland. 
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Purpose of the research trip 
 
The main purpose of the 2008 field trip to Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Poland was to 
interview and survey people in all four countries to determine their impressions of the EU’s 
impact on relations between the countries and to observe at first hand how EU norms and 
values were being transmitted between the peoples of the countries concerned. Previous visits 
to the region had been made between 1988 and 2006, including several months-long periods 
based in Kraków, so it was possible to compare the overall economic and social environment 
in Poland in the 1990s and the period post-2000.  
 
Most of the people interviewed and surveyed in 2008 were students, academics or teachers. 
This was because such people were the most willing to be interviewed, were generally well 
informed and comparatively well travelled, and for the most part had a reasonable or good 
command of English. Some interviewees were business people. Interviews were undertaken in 
cities and areas near the borders of Poland and its eastern neighbours, where the impact of the 
EU on relations between Poles and their eastern neighbours might be assumed to be greater 
and the transmission of EU norms and values more in evidence. 
 
A further purpose of the 2008 trip was to collect data from publications (particularly 
newspapers) and universities en route and to investigate at first-hand the situation at land and 
air border crossings in the area.  
 
Where the research was carried out 
The primary areal focus of the thesis is on Poland, Lithuania and areas in Ukraine and Belarus 
within 200 kilometres of the Polish border. In Kaunas, many surveys and interviews were 
carried out in a university dormitory, among students from various faculties of Vytautus 
Magnus University and the Kaunas University of Technology. Interviews in Vilnius were 
carried out mainly at university buildings. One was carried outdoors on a busy square. The 
author visited the town in Ireland that in 2006 had the highest proportion of Poles in its 
population: 14 per cent, according to Ireland’s census that year. 
Three overland international border crossings were made, all by public scheduled bus, from 
Lithuania to Belarus, from Belarus to Ukraine and from Ukraine to Poland. Three intra-EU 
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flights were made in 2008, from London to Dublin, from Dublin to Kaunas and from Warsaw 
to London. Most of the passengers on these flights were Polish or Lithuanian.  
 
 
Why certain areas were chosen for the survey 
Because of geography, history and family ties, it can be expected that inhabitants of western 
Ukraine and western Belarus would be more familiar with Poland and Poles than inhabitants 
of eastern Belarus and eastern Ukraine would be, and the impact of the EU on relations 
between the nations concerned should be more evident in areas closer to their mutual borders. 
It appeared to make sense to focus on those areas. It was decided that universities would be 
good places in which to find interviewees who spoke English, had some knowledge of the EU 
and who were amenable to being interviewed.  
Apart from their ease of access, the three Lithuanian survey locations were chosen because 
they were representative of three different categories of regions in Lithuania.  
Kaunas is a largely ethnic Lithuanian city with relatively few ethnic Poles, where day-to-day 
contact with Poles was limited or non-existent for most residents.  
Vilnius has a large Polish minority and a recent Polish past, being ethnically predominantly 
Polish from the 1700s until 1945 and part of Poland in the interwar period. Today, about one 
in five of the city’s residents speaks Polish as a mother tongue. Most residents of Vilnius have 
day-to-day contact with ethnic Poles in their city and have met visitors from Poland, 
particularly because Vilnius is an attractive tourist destination for Poles. Domestic Polish 
television channels are available to Vilnius cable television subscribers.  
The third Lithuanian interview location, Alytus, is in the south of the country, close to the 
borders with Poland and Belarus. It is predominantly ethnic Lithuanian, but has a long history 
of interaction with Poland. Many Alytus residents have some Polish ancestry, and many older 
residents can speak Polish. Terrestrial Polish television signals can be picked up in Alytus. 
It had been intended to survey and interview people in at least three locations in Belarus: 
Navahrudak/Novogrudok, Hrodna/Grodno and Brest.
2
 These locations were specifically 
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selected. All three locations have strong links to Poland. Grodno is located near the borders of 
both Lithuania and Poland. Brest is located on the Polish border. Grodno and Brest are both 
on major transit routes between Poland and the former Soviet Union. Brest is on the main 
road and railway lines between Berlin and Moscow. Grodno is on the historic main route from 
Warsaw to Vilnius and St Petersburg. Navahrudak is an ancient settlement associated with the 
histories of both Lithuania and Poland.  
 
 
Who was interviewed 
Most interviewees were either academics or students, as these people were generally most 
conversant in English, amenable to being interviewed and reasonably knowledgeable about 
the EU. It was felt that such people would provide the most useful data within the time 
constraints available. In Lithuania, most academics were helpful and amenable to being 
interviewed. Most interviewees had a reasonable command of English. Respondents varied in 
age from 18 to nearly 60, although most were under 30. Most Polish respondents were based 
in Kraków, while all but one of the Ukrainian respondents were students or academics based 
in Lviv.  
Three academics at University College Cork interested in the topic of recent migration to 
Ireland were interviewed together informally, as were people with first-hand experience of the 
wave of Polish migration to Ireland. In New Zealand, Paweł Świeboda, an expert on Polish-
EU relations and a negotiator during Poland’s accession negotiations with the EU, was 
interviewed in September 2009. 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out in three cities in Lithuania (Vilnius, Kaunas and 
Alytus), one city (Lviv) and one village (Skelivka) in Ukraine and three cities (Kraków, 
Warsaw and Rybnik) in Poland. A total of 48 respondents (23 in Lithuania, 15 in Poland and 
10 in Ukraine) completed two-page survey questionnaires, an example of which is included in 
Appendix 2. Twenty people living in countries concerned (nine in Lithuania, five in Ukraine 
and six in Poland), most academics or students, were interviewed in relatively formal sit-
down face-to-face interviews, usually one-on-one.  
                                                                                                                                                        
country. In general, Russian is the vernacular of the cities of Belarus and the east of the country, while 
Belarusian is used in rural areas, especially in western Belarus. Largely for this reason, the transliterated 
Belarusian spelling is used in this thesis for Navahrudak (Novogrudok in Russian), while the more widely used 
Russian (and Polish) spelling is used for Grodno (which is called Hrodna in Belarusian). 
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Nationality Number of 
interviewees  
(A) 
Main language used for 
interview 
Number of 
questionnaires 
completed (B) 
Total  
A + B 
Polish 6 English (5)*, Polish (1) 15 21 
Lithuanian 8 English 22 30 
Ukrainian 5 English (4), Polish (1) 10 15 
German 1 English 1 2 
Total  20  48 68 
*One interview carried out on 16/9/2009 
Table 3.1 Survey respondents by nationality 
 
One of the Polish respondents, political analyst Paweł Świeboda, was interviewed in 
Christchurch at the National Centre for Research on Europe. Most of the interviews were 
recorded on audio and are contained on the CD attached as Appendix 3. Interviewees in 
Ukraine did not want to be recorded on audio. The tabulated survey and interview results later 
in this thesis reflect data collected from the above sources. In addition, about a dozen people 
(mainly in Poland and Ukraine) were interviewed on a less formal basis, mainly because these 
respondents exhibited signs of being uncomfortable being put in a semi-formal interview 
situation.  
 
Where interviews took place 
 
country 
Number of 
interviewees   (A) 
Main language used 
for interview 
Number of questionnaires 
completed (B) 
Total 
A + B 
Poland 5 English (4), Polish (1) 15 20 
Lithuania 9 English 23 32 
Ukraine 5 English (4), Polish (1) 10 15 
New Zealand 1* English 0 1 
Total  20  48 68 
*NZ interview was conducted on 16/09/2009 
Table 3.2 Survey respondents by location 
 
Most of the interviews took place in universities; some were carried out in the respondents’ 
homes or on the street. Apart from the interviews and surveys in the region, interviews were 
also carried out in Ireland and New Zealand. As a prelude to the field trip to Lithuanian, 
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Belarus, Ukraine and Poland, a visit was made to Ireland to research Polish and Lithuanian 
migration to Ireland, particularly in the period after the 2004 eastern enlargement, when 
Ireland lifted restrictions on Poles and Lithuanians working in Ireland. 
 
How the interviews were carried out 
 
In most cases, interviews were carried out in English, although Polish was also used in Poland 
and Ukraine. In Lithuania and Ukraine, a local interpreter (a student or academic) was 
sometimes present to facilitate communication. Initial contacts in Lithuania included a student 
friend in Kaunas, met on Facebook in 2007, and a language school director in Alytus, known 
to the author from a previous visit to Lithuania in 1996. With the Kaunas friend’s help, more 
prospective respondents were found, using a snowballing method. These in turn then helped 
access more students and academics at Kaunas universities. A visit to the EU information 
office in Vilnius provided one interviewee and a university contact who was also interviewed. 
Visits to the university led to more respondents being found. Interviews in Lviv were 
conducted in English, although sometimes Polish and Ukrainian were used to help 
interviewees understand some questions.  
 
Constraints 
 
Time and other constraints meant it was not possible to undertake on-the-spot interviews in 
eastern and central Ukraine. It is probable that the opinions of respondents interviewed and 
surveyed in Lviv are not entirely typical of Ukraine as a whole, but they are probably typical 
of educated people in western Ukraine. While Ukrainian, Belarusian, Russian and Polish are 
all Slavic languages, with a high degree of mutual intelligibility (varying depending on region 
and dialect), the Lithuanian language is not mutually intelligible with Slavonic languages. 
However, most young Lithuanians encountered on the 2008 field trip to the region could 
speak at least some English and interviews were conducted in English. Though the timing of 
the field trip meant that the academic year was finishing in the countries in question and it 
was not possible to get more than a handful of interviewees in most interviewing locations. In 
Lviv, unsuccessful attempts were made to interview students and academics at the main 
university, the Ivano-Franko National University of Lviv (Львівський національний 
університет імені Івана Франка), with academics saying that neither they nor their students 
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had time to complete the surveys. More success was had with interviewing students and 
academics at the Institute of Tourism and Trade in Lviv. 
 
It is probably the case that the respondents would be more favourably disposed to the EU than 
the general population, because other surveys and polling quoted later in this thesis indicate a 
link between education level and attitude towards the EU in the countries of the region. The 
level of knowledge of the EU varied with location and nationality of respondents, with Poles 
and Lithuanians, in general, giving the impression of understanding the workings of the EU 
much better than Ukrainians, understandable given that Lithuania and Poland are in the EU, 
and that Ukrainians now find it much more difficult to visit EU countries for financial reasons 
and also because of visa requirements. The opinions offered by Polish and Lithuanian 
respondents are felt to be genuine.  
 
The strong similarity of responses from Ukrainian respondents, particularly the students who 
completed the survey questionnaire, might indicate some answered questions in a manner to 
elicit a favourable response from the interviewer. It might also be the case that the language 
used in the surveys (mainly English) might predicate respondents to answer questions in a 
particular, probably more positive, way. A study in the United States examined the effects of 
using different languages (in that case English and Spanish) when interviewing respondents 
about issues that have a social bearing on particular nationalities and ethnicities.
3
 The study 
found that the language that interviewers used affected the answers that the respondents 
provided.
4
 Because English is the major Western language, using it might encourage 
Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Polish respondents to adopt a frame of mind which predisposes 
them to answer questions in a way which fits in with the way they feel questions should be 
answered. This is particularly likely if there are other environmental factors that encourage 
respondents to answer in a certain way. The interviewer tried to adopt a neutral tone in the 
structure and delivery of questioning, but it is inevitable that certain unconscious cues or 
signals might be picked up by respondents.  
 
Respondents in Lviv were surveyed and interviewed in the same room. Some interviewees 
were able to hear the responses of others previously interviewed. The survey questionnaires 
were handed out to three batches of students in Lviv, with the help of staff members of their 
                                                 
3
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Harvard. Retrieved on 8/3/2010 from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=303165  
4
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institute. There was some discussion about the survey questions among the students in each 
group, partly because some students’ grasp of English was less than ideal. This discussion 
might have encouraged students to answer the survey questions in a more similar way than 
they might have without such discussion.   
 
The 2008 Ukraine survey data included in the public opinion chapter is mainly based on 
interviews and surveys carried out in Lviv. The few informal interviews carried out in the 
village of Skelivka were in Polish (no-one encountered in Skelivka spoke English). Only one 
interview in Skelivka took place largely indoors. Owing to the circumstances in Skelivka, 
where existence for most is rather rudimentary, potential respondents were spoken to on the 
street and/or outside their houses. Among the oldest villagers, most perceptions of Poland 
seemed based on prewar days, when they lived in Poland.
5
 Villagers were able to understand 
Polish, though their responses to questions were in a mixture of Polish and the local dialect of 
Ukrainian. Most respondents in Skelivka had a basic schooling and little knowledge of the 
EU. Because of potential respondents’ apparent bewilderment at the interviewer’s presence in 
the village and, in some cases, reticence to communicate with the interviewer, it was decided 
not to proceed with a series of semi-structured interviews in Skelivka.  
 
Some interviewees in Ukraine and Lithuania were reluctant to sign consent forms, having had 
previous negative experience of bureaucracy and officialdom, especially in Soviet times. 
According to University of Canterbury PhD regulations, any surveys and interviews carried 
out as part of a PhD require approval from the university’s Human Ethics Committee (HEC). 
To obtain such approval, survey questionnaire forms and pages outlining the purpose of the 
survey and interviews and why and by whom they are being carried out, must be drawn up 
and shown to the HEC. On approval, these forms must then be shown to respondents at the 
time of survey. Interviewees are required to read and sign a form acknowledging they 
understand the purpose of the research. 
 
 Several potential interviewees in Ukraine and a couple in Lithuania were unsettled by being 
presented with papers to sign, particularly those who grew up in the Soviet Union, during 
whose existence signing documents was not always a safe activity. Several potential 
interviews in Ukraine were lost because of this requirement. The author feels that many of the 
                                                 
5
 Skelivka was in Poland until World War II. The population of the town today is made up mainly of Ukrainians 
who lived in the area before World War II and Lemkos resettled from rump Poland in the 1940s, and their 
descendants. 
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“ethics” requirements deemed essential in New Zealand, presumably for legal reasons, are not 
helpful in obtaining data in countries such as republics of the former Soviet Union, where 
people’s life experience is much different from that of New Zealanders’, and where the legal 
and social system is also hugely different. None of the respondents surveyed in Poland, 
Ukraine and Lithuania in 2008 were native English speakers. It is probable that being 
presented with a document in English to read and sign was an unnecessary additional stress to 
them.  
 
Language difficulties were expected, as much source material is not in English or Polish.  
While the spoken forms of Ukrainian and Belarusian are similar to Polish, allowing for a level 
of oral communication between a Polish-speaking interviewer and Belarusian and Ukrainian-
speaking respondents, nuances and subtleties in meaning may be missed. In addition, 
speaking in Polish to Ukrainians and Belarusians tends to invoke a certain image and attitude 
among the respondents. Many Belarusians insist on speaking Russian (less similar to Polish) 
when speaking to someone using Polish, believing perhaps this gives them a higher standing 
in the conversation. Many Belarusians appear to regard the Belarusian language as a folk-
tongue rather than a “proper” language of standing like Russian or Polish.  
 
It was expected there would be difficulties accessing information from Belarus, because of the 
authoritarian nature of the regime in that country. In Belarus, people were reluctant to be 
interviewed and it proved impossible to conduct even semi-structured interviews or distribute 
survey questionnaires. Prospective respondents in Belarus became evasive and uncooperative 
when they understood they were being asked to be part of this research project. The lack of 
freedom in Belarus was obvious and expected, though the degree to which people were 
reticent to contribute to the research was surprising, given that other authors have gained 
polling data from Belarus. The reticence was most obvious in the case of academics who, the 
author was told, were “unavailable” for interviews and would be unavailable the next day and 
the next. Students were also said to be “unavailable”.  
 
Belarusians in the lower ranks of society were more talkative, perhaps because they felt they 
had least to lose and fear by talking with a Westerner asking questions about their country’s 
links with Poland and the EU. The conversations with such people were informal and are not 
presented in this thesis, though in essence they tend to back up the main contentions of this 
thesis as regards the EU’s impact on relations between Poland and Belarus. There was some 
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tension between Belarus and the EU at the time of the survey. In July 2008, a small bomb 
attack on an event in Minsk attended by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko unsettled 
many Belarusians. 
 
Media sources 
 
Source 
Approximate number of articles 
used as sources for thesis 
International news websites/print media 
BBC 45 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 23 
The Economist 18 
International wire agencies 
Reuters 21 
AP 10 
AFP 4 
Polish newspapers 
Rzeczpospolita 15 
Gazeta Wyborcza 13 
Dziennik Polski/Tydzień Polski (London) 12 
Other print and website news sources 
Irekw.internetdsl.pl 11 
Irish Independent 9 
Ukrainian News Agency 6 
The Irish Times 3 
 
Table 3.3 Main print, website and newswire media sources 
 
Media sources used included newspapers, internet, television and radio. A wide range of 
newspapers was accessed during the whole period between February 2006 and March 2010. 
Most of the newspapers were accessed through their respective websites. Major reference 
sources were Polish newspapers Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. Other sources were 
English-language newspaper websites in Lithuania and Ukraine (Kyiv Post and others) and 
other countries in the region, for example Latvia’s Baltic Times (www.baltictimes.com), 
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which covers Lithuanian news. Articles from British and United States newspapers were also 
accessed.  
Other media websites accessed frequently included the BBC News website and the Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty website, the latter particularly for Belarus and Ukraine news. 
RFE/RL’s radio services in Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian were listened to as was Polish 
radio, including Radio Racyja (a Polish-based station broadcasting in Belarusian, mainly for 
an audience in Belarus). EU websites were also accessed, including those of the EU 
information offices in Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Poland. Many more articles and news 
stories were accessed from other sources, notably through the University of Canterbury’s 
Factiva system. 
 
 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours             Historical overview                     
58 
 
 
4 Historical Overview 
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In 1957, representatives of six Western European countries signed the Treaty of Rome and a 
major step was taken in the long road to establishing what became the European Union. The 
creation of the EU was one of the last century’s most remarkable advances. A set of treaties, 
laws and institutions has altered Europe’s human landscape, changed the way Europeans 
relate to each other, made Europe an economic superpower and helped bring to most of the 
continent the longest period of peace in its history. 
 
Historical background 
 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have long historical ties. Relations between the 
peoples of Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine have been particularly close. Poles, 
Belarusians and Ukrainians are Slavs, speaking closely related, somewhat mutually 
intelligible, languages. Most of the territory that forms Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and 
Ukraine was for long united in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and later most of it 
came under rule from Moscow, first in the form of the Russian Empire and, later, the Soviet 
Union. At times relations between the nations were bad. The first half of the 20
th
 century was 
a time of particularly bad relations, with a low point reached during World War II, when 
conflicts turned bloody, particularly between Poles and Ukrainians. In World War II and its 
aftermath, borders were shifted wholesale and ethnic cleansing reduced the sizes of ethnic 
minorities. The decades of communist rule limited interaction between Poland and its eastern 
neighbours and kept a lid on ethnic tension. The post-Cold War period has been marked by a 
big improvement in relations between the governments of Lithuania, Ukraine and Poland. 
This improvement is partly a result of the EU’s interaction with the region. Meanwhile, 
Belarus remains relatively isolated.   
 
Poles regard themselves as having belonged to Western civilisation since the dawn of the 
Polish state a thousand years ago.
1
 Historically, Polish elites have seen themselves as 
conveyors of enlightenment and Western civilisation to the less advanced east.
2
 Lithuania and 
the western parts of Ukraine and Belarus have particularly strong historical links with Poland. 
Those links have had the effect of accentuating national feeling in those areas, particularly in 
western Ukraine, as local populations reacted to attempts to polonise them. In both Belarus 
                                                 
1
 Lukowski, J. & Zawadzki, H. 2001 A concise history of Poland Cambridge University Press p.3 
2
 Rak, K. 2006 ‘Federalism or Force: A Sixteenth-Century Project for Eastern and Central Europe’ The 
Sarmatian Review January 2006 Volume XXVI, No 1 Retrieved on 23/4/2009 from 
www.ruf.rice.edu/~sarmatia/106/261rak.html 
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and Ukraine, the main social divide is between those who identify more with Russia (who live 
mainly in the east of those states) and those who have a greater sense of national identity (who 
live mainly in the capital cities and in areas close to Poland). For historical reasons, national 
identity is far stronger in Ukraine than in Belarus.  
 
Poland has played a central role in European affairs for much of the last millennium. For 300 
years Poland “was the anchor of Eastern and Central Europe”.3 Ukraine and Belarus first 
came into existence as independent states in the last century – first briefly at the end of World 
War I, and again when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991.
4
 Poland and Lithuania have long 
been predominantly Roman Catholic societies. They remained strongly so throughout the 
years of communist rule. In contrast, mainly due to their longer experience of Soviet rule, in 
Belarus and Ukraine, religion has been less closely associated with national identity and 
independence. In both Ukraine and Belarus the dominant religion is Orthodox Christianity, 
which experienced a different history to western Christianity. It lacked a “Renaissance, 
Reformation or Counter-Reformation”.5 This, for some, helps define “what is European and 
what is not”.6 
 
The 1569 Polish-Lithuanian Union of Lublin led to the nobility and much of the urban 
population throughout what later became Belarus and western Ukraine becoming Roman 
Catholic. In these lands, this process of Catholicisation was also, in large measure, a process 
of polonisation, as within a century of the union the landed class throughout the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth was Polish in language and culture. Today Belarus has a large 
Roman Catholic minority in its western half, while Ukraine has a Greek Catholic minority in 
its far west (Galicia). 
 
After being partitioned and vanishing from the map of Europe for 123 years, an independent 
Poland re-emerged in 1918. The post-World War I Republic of Poland, which included 
Vilnius, Lviv and what is now western Belarus within its borders, was a multi-ethnic state, 
with ethnic minorities amounting to almost a third of the population. Census data from 1931 
                                                 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Many Belarusians consider the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to have been “their” state as much as modern-day 
Lithuanians’. Ukrainians can point to Kievan Rus as a progenitor state of Ukraine.  
5
 Dunkerley, D., Hodgson, L., Konopacki, S., Spybey, T. & Thompson, A. 2002 Changing Europe: Identities, 
Nations and Citizens Routledge, London p.111 
6
 Ibid. 
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indicate that at that time only 69 per cent of Poland’s population were ethnic Poles.7 While 
western and central parts of interwar Poland were predominantly Polish (with significant 
Jewish and German minorities in urban areas), eastern Poland was ethnically mixed.
8
 A strip 
running along the border with Lithuania, including Grodno and Vilnius, was predominantly 
Polish. After World War II this area was divided between the Lithuanian and Byelorussian 
Soviet Socialist Republics. The area south of this as far as Brest and the Pripyat marshes had a 
mixed population of Belarusians, Poles, “Tutejsi” and Jews.9 This area now forms most of 
western Belarus. Further south, Volyn and Galicia had Ukrainian majorities, but until the 
1940s also had significant populations of Poles and Jews.
10
  
 
The relationship between interwar Poland on the one hand, and its minorities and 
neighbouring countries on the other, was often tense, and occasionally violent. Poland’s 
seizure of Vilnius from Lithuania in 1923 resulted in no diplomatic contact between the two 
countries until 1938.
11
 The new Polish state in 1920 inherited a “national” division of labour, 
a further factor militating against tolerance of ethnic minorities.
12
 The Belarusian and 
Ukrainian minorities languished as “poor illiterate peasants” in the backward eastern 
provinces.
13
 The murder of Polish officials in the early 1930s by Ukrainian separatists led to 
repression.
14
 The Belarusian minority also “suffered at the hands of state-sponsored 
violence”.15   
 
World War II “solved” Poland’s minority problem.16 It saw the extermination of 95 per cent 
of the Jewish population of the area, as much as quarter of the populations of Belarus and 
Ukraine and a sixth of the population of Poland.
17
 The post-war settlement moved Poland’s 
borders about 240 kilometres westward, and reduced the country’s area by almost a quarter. 
                                                 
7
 Cited in Fleming, M. 2003. National Minorities In Post-Communist Poland, Veritas, London p.41 
8
 Musgrave, T. 2000 Self-determination and national minorities Oxford University Press p.57 
9
 The people who called themselves Tutejsi were Slavs without a clearly defined sense of national identity. The 
Soviet authorities decided that the Tutejsi were Belarusian, although some (Poleszuks) spoke dialects more 
similar to standard Ukrainian than standard Belarusian. 
10
 Galicia here refers to that (eastern) part of the Austrian province of Galicia and Ludomeria that is now in 
Ukraine. The main city of this area is Lviv. 
11
 Sanford, G. 1999 Poland: The Conquest of History Harwood Academic Publishers, Amsterdam p.9 
12
 Fleming p.45 
13
 Ibid.  
14
 Ibid. p.46 
15
 Ibid.  
16
 Ibid.  
17
 Various sources. It is impossible to get an accurate count of the number of dead, but the total number of those 
killed in these countries during World War II was certainly more than 10 million and perhaps more than 20 
million. 
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The eastern provinces, which contained most of Poland’s Ukrainians and Belarusians, were 
annexed by the USSR in 1939. In the late 1940s and 1950s the Polish population of those 
areas was deported west into the lands taken from Germany and given to the new Polish state. 
Rebels, intelligentsia and others seen as threats to communist rule were killed or deported, or 
fled to the West, during and after World War II. Most of the Germans who had been living in 
what became Poland’s “recovered” western and northern territories fled the Soviet advance or 
were deported to Germany in the late 1940s.
18
 This territorial shift left Poland comparatively 
homogeneous. Communist Poland aimed to assimilate all remaining ethnic minorities. The 
everyday social contacts between neighbouring nationalities that had persisted until Soviet 
rule ended.  
 
The communist period 
 
Communist rule had a calamitous effect on society in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Communism destroyed “the fabric of all spontaneous, immediate, interpersonal ties ... 
stretching between the micro-level of the family and macro-level of the state”, producing a 
social vacuum.
19
 The degree of destruction of pre-communist social structures, many of which 
lend themselves to transmission of European values and ideals, was greater in Belarus and 
Ukraine, intermediate in Lithuania and much less in most of Poland. The shorter period of 
communist rule and the continued existence of an intelligentsia with strong links to the west 
and with democratic ideals meant Tischner’s anti-ideal of man, homo sovieticus, was less 
omnipresent in Poland than in the Soviet Union.
20
  
 
Stalin’s death in 1953 saw an end to the period of state terror in the region. The post-Stalinist 
era saw comparatively little physical abuse in Poland.
21
 Instead, the emphasis “was on 
creating widespread mistrust”.22 Poles were encouraged to be suspicious of fellow citizens, 
neighbours and, to some extent, even family members. Lithuanians were encouraged to 
believe that Poland would seize Vilnius if given the chance, while Poles were taught in 
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 Fleming p.47 
19
 Nowak, S. 1987 Społeczeństwo polskie drugiej połowy lat 80-tych [Polish society in the second half of the 
1980s], Polskie Towarzystwo Socjologiczne, Warsaw 
20
 Tischner J. 1992. Etyka Solidarności i Homo Sovieticus, Znak, Kraków  
21
 Horne, C. & Levi, M. 2004. ‘Does Lustration Promote Trustworthy Governance? An Exploration of the 
Experience of Central and Eastern Europe’ in Kornai, J. & Rose-Ackerman, S. (eds.) 2004 Building A 
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schools to count Ukrainians (after the Germans) “as the greatest and most vicious wartime 
enemy”.23 
 
To this end, school texts [in communist Poland] placed the war against Ukrainian 
partisans at the centre of Polish-Ukrainian relations. Ukrainians were treated as Slavic 
counterparts to the Nazis, bound to them by a wild spiritual kinship ... Ukrainian 
patriotism was thus reduced to a kind of mindless collaborationism with fascism, which 
fitted an older Polish prejudice of believing the Ukrainians to be something less than a 
nation.
24
 
 
The Cold War and the hostility of the Soviet Union towards the West “helped cement 
[western] European integration”.25 However, the Soviet Union prevented the European 
Community from establishing diplomatic relations with Poland, insisting instead that it deal 
instead with the Soviet Bloc’s supposed EC equivalent: the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance. The EC recognised the CMEA only in 1988, when events in CEECs were making 
it obsolete. 
 
The overthrow of the Soviet order 
 
In 1989-1991, Central and East Europeans escaped from the old system without a clear idea 
of what the new system was. Snyder calls the “return to Europe” slogan of opponents of 
communism and reformers of postcommunist states an oxymoron.
26
 Few had a clear vision of 
what it meant. For most, it was a vague, heavily loaded catchword. “Europe” was a “synonym 
of good life”.27 In the 1980s, with better communications, consumers in Poland and Lithuania 
became more aware of the higher living standard enjoyed by western Europeans.
28
 What 
Poles meant by the “return to Europe” was “a leap forward to the achievements of postwar 
Western Europe”.29 The 1980s saw Poland in deep crisis. The country was practically 
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bankrupt and so “vulnerable to external influences”.30 Solidarity’s apparent defeat and the 
imposition of martial law in 1981 in a land facing economic catastrophe meant that Poland in 
the 1980s was discontent, and a step away from open revolt. Since 1945 there had been 
several unsuccessful attempts at economic reform in Poland. These attempts aimed at Poland's 
catching up with Western Europe economically, but did not deal with the fundamental 
problem: the communist system. Rulers played the Russian card till the Soviet Union’s 
obvious weakness forced them to negotiate with the opposition.  
 
The dramatic collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989-1991 led to the CEEC new leaders looking 
to the EU, which represented all that CEECs “hoped to achieve with their new-found liberty – 
stable democracy, economic prosperity [and] a powerful international voice”.31 So began the 
long process of seeking EU membership. In the early 1990s, some warned that it was 
probable that rather than being able to successfully transit to western-style developed 
economies, postcommunist countries would “sink into the Third World”.32 Some authors 
thought CEECs’ rapid transformation from communism to “peripheral capitalism” would lead 
to “Third World characteristics” such as “vertical international division of labour, asymmetric 
investment, tight elite cooperation and increasing inequality and unemployment, even 
misery”.33 One author warned of a mutinous society and “social outburst”.34 To some extent, 
he was right, particularly with regard to the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine. 
 
Pravda stresses the diversity among CEECs. Communist “rule covered a collection of states 
and societies which always differed in fundamental respects”.35 As the transition proceeded, 
these differences became more noticeable. The “general openness of the elites to international 
influences, and particularly to the Western project” distinguished relatively liberal Poland and 
Lithuania from illiberal Belarus and Ukraine.
36
 The Western orientation of Poland’s leaders 
made them more receptive to an EU values package, which included democracy, a market 
economy and human rights. Some were attracted to western models of democratisation, some 
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by a general identification with things Western and what seemed modern and fashionable, 
others by the absence of an alternative. 
 
The reasons for Poland’s relative success in the 1990s were many. Polish society and 
especially its elite were orientated to the West. The West supported Poland’s efforts to 
transform into a western-style society. Poland’s history, its national character and overall 
cohesion helped it make the huge adjustments necessary to adapt to a new system quickly. 
Being next to Germany and close to the EU core helped. The experience of the Solidarity 
years and the establishment of non-government organisations had strengthened Poland’s civil 
society. Economic “shock therapy” in the early 1990s cemented the change, making the 
process of democratisation irreversible. Poland had a pathway to EU membership. That 
provided a goal and made it easier for Poles to accept temporary hardship. 
 
The early 1990s saw a huge gap in economic and political performance between Poland and, 
to a lesser extent, Lithuania on the one hand, and Belarus and Ukraine on the other. In 1990, 
Ukraine had a higher per capita GDP than Poland.
37
 While Poland’s GDP per capita rose 
substantially during the 1990s, Ukraine’s GDP per capita slumped.38 In Belarus the fall was 
less extreme. This gap was reflected in the growing disparity in mortality rates. United 
Nations figures show that while death rates in Poland remained stable between 1990 and 
2007, they increased in Belarus and Ukraine, so that by 2005 the crude death rates in Belarus 
and Ukraine were about 50 per cent higher than in Poland.
39
 
 
Postcommunist states such as Poland and Lithuania, which had the most national unity and 
ethnic cohesion, were the states where reform moved fastest.
40
 In contrast, sharp regional (to 
some extent also ethnic and religious) differences in Ukraine and the lack of a strong sense of 
nationality in Belarus, combined with the persistent fatalism of the general population which 
had endured seven decades of Soviet rule, hampered the reform effort in those countries. 
Corruption and bureaucratic incompetence were (and are) widespread problems in all 
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postcommunist countries, but in general the countries of Central Europe, including Poland, 
were better able to overcome these obstacles to progress than were the post-Soviet states such 
as Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
 GDP per capita (purchasing power parity in constant 1995 dollars) 
 1990 1995 2000 2002 
Poland 6781 7159 9114 9350 
Ukraine 7855 3950 3769 4315 
Belarus 4884 3189 4405 4887 
Russia 9457 5933 6644 7289 
 
Table 4.1 GDP per capita in Poland and its eastern neighbours, 1990–200241 
 
The experience of having an independent nation-state in the inter-war period was an important 
factor for Poland and Lithuania. Pre-war independence had strengthened national 
consolidation in both countries. Poland also benefited from the fact that it remained outside 
the Soviet Union and thus had developed an indigenous bureaucracy and civil service. In 
contrast, the lack of experience of a period of independence made it even harder for Belarus 
and Ukraine to successfully transit from a centrally planned economy to a free-market one. 
Ukraine and Belarus lacked an indigenous national governing class. The ruling caste in Soviet 
times had been Russian or Sovietised.  
 
Central European co-operation 
 
The EU accession issue is linked to regime change and democratic consolidation. Poland had 
no real alternative to joining the EU. In Poland and Lithuania, opposition to EU membership 
was associated with “nostalgia for the past”, either to the immediate communist past, or to a 
memory of national glory days.
42
 In the 1990s, most Poles and Lithuanians knew that their 
benchmark of success in the reform process was joining the EC/EU and Nato. The 1991 
Visegrad Declaration by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland pledged mutual support 
towards this objective. 
 
                                                 
41
 UN data quoted in Mangott, G. 2007. ‘Deconstructing a Region’ in Hamilton, D and Mangott, G. (eds.) 2007 
The New Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova Center for Transatlantic Relations Washington p.270 
42
 Henderson, K. 2005. ‘EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus’ in Szczerbiak, A. & Taggart, P. (eds.) 
2005. EU Enlargement and Referendums Routledge, Abingdon UK  p.112 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours             Historical overview                     
67 
 
With its history of dissident activity and resistance to the Soviet system, Poland could claim a 
moral force among newly independent postcommunist European countries. After an inaugural 
meeting in April 1990, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland met in February 1991 in the 
Hungarian town of Visegrad to sign a joint declaration. This pledged mutual support for their 
common objectives of achieving  
 
the restoration in full of each state’s independence, democracy and freedom, the 
dismantling of the economic and spiritual structures of the totalitarian system, the 
building of parliamentary democracy and a modern constitutional state, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the total integration into the European 
political, economic, security, and legislative order.
43
  
 
The Visegrad declaration eventually led to the establishment of the Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (Cefta), which initially grouped Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia. Within a few years, their eastern and southern neighbours, including Lithuania and 
Ukraine, were seeking membership in the Visegrad Group. This set the stage for Poland and 
the other Visegrad countries “to create their own membership requirements and occupy 
themselves with judging the political reforms of their post-communist neighbours”.44 Cefta 
later expanded to take in other pre-accession countries. As postcommunist countries joined 
the EU, they left Cefta.  Entities such as Cefta were a “practical means of integration, creating 
interdependence and solidarity”, fostering “cooperative behaviour and reduced tensions”.45 
Cooperation across frontiers also helped economic development within states. Cefta and other 
such groups offered experience of multilateral cooperation. They facilitated cross-border 
interaction, “thus helping to build wider social foundations for stability and understanding”.46 
 
Reasons for the eastern enlargement 
 
In 1963, Robert Schuman stated clearly the EU’s responsibility to remain open to eventual 
membership applications from eastern Europe:  
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We must build the united Europe not only in the interest of the free nations, but also in 
order to be able to admit the peoples of Eastern Europe into this community if, freed 
from the constraints under which they live, they want to join and seek our moral 
support. We owe them the example of a unified, fraternal Europe. Every step we take 
along this road will mean a new opportunity for them. They need our help with the 
transformation they have to achieve. It is our duty to be prepared.
47
 
 
French President Mitterrand “floated the vague idea of a pan-European confederation in 
1990”.48 By the 1980s West German politicians “had established contact with Polish 
dissidents who were to become members of the new governing elite at the beginning of the 
1990s”.49 These Germans “felt that Germany had a special responsibility for … [Poland’s] 
democratic consolidation and stability”.50  For newly united Germany, two countries in the 
east mattered: “Russia first, plus Poland.”51 In 1996, German Defence Minister Volker Ruhe 
said that opening the EU and Nato to Poland was “vital” to Germany.52 Ruhe was blunt: “One 
does not have to be a strategic genius to understand this. You only have to look at the map.”53 
Germany’s eastern border could not remain the border “between stability and instability in 
Europe” indefinitely.54 Neither could it remain the eastern border of the EU and Nato. “Either 
we export stability or we import instability.”55 
 
From the perspective of the existing EU member states, enlargement would boost the 
European single market’s size and “generate access to new and wider markets for both EU 
and accession states”.56 The entry of Poland and the other accession states would “offer new 
production locations for EU enterprises and contribute to greater market competition”.57 EU 
enlargement would boost international confidence in CEECs and encourage inward foreign 
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direct investment. The net effect would be “a more flexible market and growth in 
prosperity”.58 
 
EU enlargement would help stabilise CEECs. It would help resolve problematic border issues, 
such as those between Poland and its neighbours, and would help quash the potential for 
ethnic conflict. CEECs’ interest in joining the EU was mainly economic. They wanted market 
access, agricultural subsidies, structural funds and help consolidating democracy. Events in 
CEECs in the early 1990s brought common interests among Western states into sharper focus, 
especially stabilisation of the region to prevent mass immigration and economic opportunities. 
Enlargement was an obvious focus of populist slogans. It proved “easy to exploit popular 
fears of unrestricted flows into Western Europe” of Poles and others.59  
 
From assistance to association 
 
The European Stability Pact, which promoted good relations among CEECs, was among the 
EU’s and most successful joint actions. An initiative led by French President Francois 
Mitterrand resulted in the establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. With the EC and member states as its main shareholders, the bank became a 
major provider of loans to promote economic development in CEECs.
60
 In 1990, the 
European Commission proposed an association agreement with Poland, seen as one of the 
most economically advanced and strategically important CEECs.
61
 The agreement dealt with 
free trade, economic cooperation and an institutionalised political relationship. 
 
The European Council built a single negotiating framework with all applicant countries. The 
Amsterdam European Council summit and the publication of Agenda 2000, which backed 
starting accession negotiations  with the “ins” and not the “pre-ins”, a position backed by 
Britain, France, Austria, Finland and the Benelux states, led to much discussion about the best 
way in which to begin accession negotiations.
62
 Some member states wanted accession 
negotiations to begin concurrently with all postcommunist applicants. Denmark and Sweden 
applied political pressure by publicising the plight of the Lithuania and Latvia. Eventually, a 
compromise permitted formal accession talks to start with all postcommunist applicant states.
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In the early 1990s, Poland and Lithuania were in poor shape administratively, economically 
and environmentally. Ukraine and Belarus were in a much worse position. All faced the 
legacy of “decades of Communist mismanagement” and “struggled with the transition from 
communism to capitalism and from dictatorship to democracy”.63 In the case of Belarus the 
democratisation process failed. In Ukraine’s case, it has been partially successful.  
 
Reconstruction and rehabilitation involved a wide range of reforms, privatising state-owned 
companies, modernisation and social welfare reform. There would have to be “a revolution in 
public administration”, a new educational system and an overhaul of infrastructure.64 The 
prospect of EU membership encouraged CEECs to persist with necessary painful reforms. 
However, “the EU model of economic management” which CEECs had in their sights “was 
not necessarily the most appropriate” for them.65 
 
Once membership negotiations started with the EU, it became more possible to identify 
that organisation’s own impact because of the gradual effects of the acquis 
communautaire ... and because the Commission from 1998 annually featured the 
different conditions and progress over them in each country.
66
 
 
At the June 1993 European Council the principle of CEECs’ membership was formally 
acknowledged and the Copenhagen Criteria for membership established. The Copenhagen 
criteria drawn up by the Commission for the accession of new member states included: 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection 
of minorities; existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressures and market forces in the EU; and the ability to take on the obligations 
of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
The 1995 Madrid summit added the criterion “that countries should have the administrative 
capacity to meet these obligations”.67 The EU began the process of integrating Poland and 
Lithuania into the single market. It reformed the Phare programme and started other initiatives 
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to help CEECs introduce EU single market standards.
68
 The Commission was charged with 
devising a pre-accession strategy for postcommunist European countries, “which involved 
two major tasks – assessing the readiness of candidates for accession; and assessing the 
potential impact of enlargement upon the EU itself”.69 The results were presented in June 
1997 as Agenda 2000. Due to its size, location, and economic importance, Poland was at the 
top of the accession queue. 
 
In 1999, Lithuania was shocked by being excluded from the list of CEECs put on the fast 
track to EU membership. The exclusion may have helped Lithuania to redouble “reform 
efforts in order to rejoin the first division as soon as possible”.70 But as late as 2002, most 
thought that although Poland would join the EU in 2003 or 2004, Lithuania would join a few 
years later.
71
 By 2003, the integration process was already well under way. Even before the 
formal accession of Poland and Lithuania in May 2004, the EU had opened its markets to 
exports from the newcomers. In November 2003, the EU’s Directorate-General for Press and 
Communication said the EU’s 2004 enlargement had healed “the rift opened up by … the 
Cold War”.72 Poland and Lithuania had met the criteria for joining the EU.  
 
Polish reform in the 1990s 
 
The changes in Poland since 1990 are far-reaching. A multi-party parliamentary democracy 
has replaced the one-party system. The old communist political elite has been removed from 
government. In its place, a democratic, mostly formerly dissident, elite is in power. However, 
Lomax argues, changes at the elite level in Poland in the 1990s were not matched by 
equivalent social changes.
73
   
 
In the early 1990s, many new political parties were established in Poland. Many had roots in 
the Solidarity movement. There were parties composed of intellectuals such as Tadeusz 
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Mazowiecki, the first Polish postcommunist prime minister. Others grouped nationalists and 
Catholic fundamentalists, still others socialists or libertarians. Most of the remaining Polish 
communists regrouped to form the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratyczny 
- SLD) which was led by leading members of the communist party, notably Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski (who became president after Lech Wałęsa). This latter group proved to be the 
most stable political grouping throughout the 1990s and right up to EU accession, and 
claimed some of the credit for Poland’s successful completion of its journey to EU 
membership, though it would later split into multiple parties, most with little electoral 
support.  
 
In the 1993 general elections, Solidarity supporters disillusioned with fratricidal disputes and 
the speed and effects of economic restructuring, avoided voting. The former communists 
regained power, in coalition with their Peasant Party allies. However, the new government 
continued the policy of economic reform. The national march to the west would continue to 
be headed by the state, although the state’s rulers were mostly the same people who had toed 
the Moscow line in the 1970s and 1980s. The old Communist Party power structure remained 
under a different name and gradually returned to dominance in the 1990s, but there was a 
general acceptance among Poles that Poland’s future lay with the West and particularly with 
the EU. The new self-proclaimed “social democrats” of the SLD, swapped slogans like 
“revolution of the proletariat” for catchphrases such as “pluralism”, “road to Europe” and “the 
market economy”.  
 
The period between 1995 and 2005 saw a gap between Polish society’s expectations and 
reality. During the late 1980s and early 1990s the situation had “seemed to be clear cut”.74 On 
the one hand, was the old establishment: the postcommunists and their allies. On the other, 
there was the Solidarity-led opposition camp. Solidarity was a trade union but in addition to 
workers it included politicians and intellectuals who opposed communism. The late 1990s 
brought significant changes in the political landscape, particularly on the right side of the 
political spectrum. Parties emerged that stressed their ties with the Catholic Church. Other 
parties emphasised allegiance to liberalism. Others still stressed national traditions.
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Poland began the process of administrative reform in 1990, when the first local government 
elections in the country in 50 years were held. A new constitution in the early 1990s provided 
for governmental reform. Poland saw further local and regional government reforms as the 
country prepared for entry into the EU. In the biggest administrative change, in 1999, 16 
relatively large regions (most based on historical regions) were created to replace the 
communist system of 49 smallish centrally administered regions. This change means that 
there are now similarly sized subnational administrative regions in Poland, Ukraine and 
Belarus.  
 
Independent Poland’s foreign policy: ‘European standards’ 
 
Between 1989 and 1991 Poland’s foreign policy towards its eastern neighbours had little to do 
with the EU. Poland’s leaders aimed to help build nation-states in Lithuania, Belarus and 
Ukraine. Then, from early 1992, Polish diplomats, led by foreign minister Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski, articulated a policy of “European standards” to their eastern neighbours.75 This 
policy “exaggerated the clarity of European legal norms, thereby contributing to their 
transmission to [Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine]”.76 The change was designed to prevent 
problems that could harm Poland’s image in the EU and US, to improve Poland’s position in 
the east and to justify support of eastern neighbours to Poles worried about Polish minorities 
in the eastern neighbours.  
 
The foreign policy priorities of Polish governments in the 1990s were straightforward: first, to 
join the EU and Nato and prevent any future threat from Russia; second, to work for political 
stability in the country’s neighbourhood; and third, to protect Polish minorities in the post-
Soviet states. The principles of Poland’s eastern strategy were also fairly straightforward: 
first, to promote “European standards” of governance and democracy and decent behaviour of 
states towards their citizens and other states; and, second, early support for the newly 
independent states on its border. This support included moral support and other aid, such as 
supplying military equipment to Lithuania. To prevent a rise in national tensions, Poland early 
on sought mutual recognition of the state borders inherited from the communist system. In 
other words, Poland indicated it would not seek the return of territory seized by the Soviet 
Union in 1939. “This strategic concept implied reconciliation and the rejection of imperial 
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ambitions as well as territorial claims by both Poland and Russia.”77 Efforts were made to 
encourage social and economic interaction between Poles and their eastern neighbours, an 
example being the providing of scholarships for people from Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania 
to study in Poland. 
 
From as early as 1990, when Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine were still officially republics 
within the Soviet Union, Poland began treating each of them as nation-states. In 1991, Poland 
established relations with Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, then still officially part of the 
Soviet Union.
78
 In the aftermath of the Moscow coup of August 1991, the Polish government 
formally recognised Lithuanian independence. When the Soviet Union dissolved a few 
months later, Poland recognised the independence of Belarus and Ukraine. Embassies were 
set up as soon as Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine were recognised as independent countries. 
After 1991, negotiations started on treaties to regulate bilateral relations. The most important 
issues during these talks were border regulations and rights of ethnic minorities. From 1992 
on, Warsaw treated Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine as partners in European integration. 
Poland’s leaders in the early 1990s showed a common sense approach to reorientating Polish 
foreign policy. “[S]uch a policy could work only when Poland itself was perceived … as an 
integral part of Europe”.79  
 
To understand what motivated the European standards policy, one must begin with Polish 
interests. The first priority of newly democratic Poland’s governments was to join the EU and 
Nato. Poland’s priority with regard to its eastern neighbours was that problems with those 
neighbours not impede Poland’s integration with those organisations. Poland’s leaders knew 
that perceived problems with eastern neighbours would be used as arguments against Poland’s 
inclusion in the EU and Nato. They aimed to prevent such difficulties by establishing good 
relations rapidly. 
 
Poland also wished to ensure Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine remained independent from 
Russia. Even in the early 1990s, Poland already feared future Russian imperialism. In Polish 
eyes, the EU in the 1990s seemed to be more interested in developing good relations with 
Russia than with helping stabilise other post-Soviet countries, such as Ukraine, Belarus and 
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the Baltic states, which “were struggling to free themselves from Russian domination”.80 
Poland’s third interest in the east was the protection of the Polish minority in the 
neighbouring states. The treatment of Poles in the east sometimes seized centre stage in Polish 
domestic politics, but it was consistently a lower priority in foreign policy than the return to 
Europe or the independence of the eastern neighbours.  
 
The three interests of integration with the EU, eastern consolidation and minority protection 
were furthered by treaties with Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. These treaties included 
“European standards”. European standards meant the territorial integrity of nation-states and 
the protection of the cultural rights of minorities.
81
 The policy of European standards, “set 
aside special pleading on behalf of this or that abused minority or this or that poorly designed 
frontier” in favour of “an immediate and comprehensive legal settlement between states 
within their present borders”.82 This was a policy of voluntary Europeanisation. Poland aimed 
to “dampen conflicts” before Brussels was aware they existed and to introduce European 
norms to Poland’s eastern neighbours before alternatives could emerge.83 
 
 “Poland’s ambition has always been to promote democracy and economic development in 
Eastern Europe, while exporting the success of its own transformation process.”84 Poland was 
defining as well as introducing norms, as strictly speaking, no European standards for 
minority rights existed in the early 1990s. While claiming to appeal to a set of generally 
understood “European standards”, Poland was consolidating them, in an approach designed to 
meet the approval of Poland’s western neighbours. The best way for Poland to be accepted as 
European was to avoid territorial disputes. When some Polish MPs pushed for more energetic 
protection of Polish minorities in the former Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski “scolded” the MPs for not knowing “European standards”.85 
 
Warsaw at first focused on the security vacuum in Central Europe and the potential Russian 
threat to justify requests for Nato and EU membership. This, says Schimmelfennig, was close 
to Poland’s true motivation.86 By the later 1990s though, Polish diplomats were stressing “the 
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western integration of Poland” and arguing that enlargement could strengthen Polish-Russian 
ties.
87
 Polish diplomats at the time appreciated the importance of taking “the moral high 
ground”, saying that Nato and EU enlargement would consolidate democracy and promote 
European stability.
88
 
 
As the eastern neighbours became more stable economically and politically, and especially 
after Poland joined Nato in 1999, Poland’s eastern policy altered somewhat. As it became 
clear that Lithuania, like Poland, was bound for a future in the EU and Nato, Polish policy 
towards Lithuania changed to become less mentoring and more comradely. Warsaw accepted 
that Lithuania was becoming a stable, democratic European state with a similar international 
outlook to Poland. On the other hand, things were not progressing well in Belarus and 
Ukraine. Increasingly, Zbigniew Brzeziński’s view that an independent Ukraine was in 
Poland’s vital interest came to the fore, and greater importance was attached to supporting 
democratic and pro-Western groups in Ukraine and Belarus. Poland stepped up efforts to 
encourage contact between Poles and their eastern neighbours, but as years went by the EU’s 
insistence that Poland beef up its eastern border worked against this.  
 
Belarus and Ukraine 
 
In the Soviet Union’s dying days, Solzhenitsyn expressed a hope that Ukraine and Belarus 
“would choose to remain in union with their Russian brethren”.89 Solzhenitsyn proposed the 
formation of “a Pan-Russian Union” to accomplish this.90 Aware that separatist sentiment had 
grown in western Ukraine, Solzhenitsyn said that Ukrainians “should not be held in union 
with Russia by force”.91 Instead, they should be free to vote on whether they remained in 
union with Russia, on a region by region basis.
92
 Like some other Russian thinkers at the 
time, Solzhenitsyn believed that Ukraine would break up, with Galicia, Volyn and some other 
western areas voting for independence, while the country’s eastern regions would choose to 
stay with Russia.
93
 Like most Russians then and now, Solzhenitsyn neither expected nor 
accepted the idea that a united Ukraine could separate itself politically from Russia without 
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losing its Russian-speaking eastern part. In his view and that of other Russians, Belarusian 
separatism was weak.
94
 
 
The collapse of communism in Belarus and Ukraine did not lead to the ruling elite’s total 
replacement. In essence, three surviving groups “constituted the base for the ‘new’ political 
class”.95 The first group included “members of the previous bureaucracy who coped 
successfully with the new political and economic situation”.96 The second included “leaders 
of the new bourgeoisie (oligarchs), who merged with both the political elite and some 
criminal elements”.97 The third group was the secret service. While the secret service 
remained in the background in Ukraine during the 1990s, from 2000 its members’ political 
impact increased.
98
 This third group includes “major players who determine the rules of the 
game and change them if it fits their own interests”.99        
 
The severity of the early 1990s economic downturn in Ukraine and Belarus made for 
“unfavourable conditions for the inculcation of new loyalties” in eastern Ukraine and 
Belarus.
100
 Sustained economic reform can succeed “only if the population remains strongly 
supportive … and willing to tolerate the short-term hardships of the transition”.101 In eastern 
Ukraine and Belarus, support for independence actually fell during the 1990s, which explains 
the electoral success of Aleksander Lukashenko and Viktor Yanukovych.
102
 In Belarus, with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, “disappearance of the ‘imperialist centre’” and lack of a 
strong national identity, Belarusians became disillusioned. This created “a legitimacy crisis” 
for the country and quashed what support for reform there had been among ordinary 
Belarusians.
103
 Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the 1990s saw ethnic divisions between Ukrainians 
and Russians rapidly sharpen.
104
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Differentiation in the 1990s 
 
Communism was imposed on Poland and Lithuania in the middle of the last century by Soviet 
force, against the will of the people. During the 40-year period of occupation, elites and 
masses in both countries used “Western democracy” as a reference point for their 
dissatisfaction with rule from Moscow.
105
 In the early 1990s, Poles and Lithuanians broadly 
supported a return to “European” values. Civic culture in Poland and Lithuania differs from 
that of Ukraine and Belarus. The former two experienced only 45 or so years of communism 
and “living memories of pre-war systems of government” remained.106 Although for most of 
the interwar period, both Lithuania and Poland had undemocratic, authoritarian governments, 
they were not totalitarian. There was some party competition and free speech. This gave the 
Polish and Lithuanian elites of the early 1990s “half-remembered experiences to build on”.107 
In contrast, communist rule in most of Belarus and Ukraine had been considered normal and 
was unquestioned. The disintegration of the Soviet Union led to “genuine bewilderment” in 
both countries.
108
 
 
From 1991, relations between the EU and post-Soviet states “underwent a process of 
differentiation”.109 This began in 1991 with the transfer of the three Baltic states, from 
“neighbour” to candidate status. From the mid-1990s, the increasing priority afforded 
relations with Russia and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine was a further source of differentiation.
110
 
The Helsinki summit of 1999 set an eastern border to Europe.
111
 EU membership would be 
open to the Baltic States, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria. But Ukraine and Belarus, “with 
more or less similar legitimate claims”, and European identities and locations would not be 
admitted.
112
 
 
It is possible that the unfortunate developments in Belarus and Ukraine in the 1990s had an 
impact on the way the EU regarded Poland’s accession bid, but this is uncertain. Said Paweł 
Świeboda, one of Poland’s chief negotiators during the country’s accession talks with the EU:  
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Poland and the others in the region posed a sufficiently tough challenge for the EU that 
probably what was happening even further to the east wasn’t so much on the radar 
screens. .... I suppose we presented such a challenge ourselves that probably no-one 
really looked beyond ... there was always a qualitative difference between the countries 
that were part of the Soviet Union and those which were not, with the exception of the 
Baltic states...
113
 
 
Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States, Yuri Shcherbak, warned that to “avoid new 
dividing lines in Europe, the principle of the indivisibility of security should be observed”.114 
Starys Sakalauskas of the Lithuanian Embassy in Washington claimed that “all the new 
democracies should have the same starting points in terms of opportunities”.115 Including 
Lithuania in the “accession process would thus be an act of recognition that all of us together 
are members of the Western community of nations”.116 Lithuania’s Ambassador-
Extraordinary Česlovas Stankevičius also referred to the principle of “indivisible security” in 
order to promote the Baltic states’ inclusion in Nato enlargement.117 At the same time, “the 
proponents of the indivisibility principle cared little about dividing lines running east of their 
countries”.118 Stankevičius said “the existing line between the European and Eurasian areas of 
political, economic and defence integration can hardly be regarded as a dangerous division of 
Europe”.119 
 
In 2006, The Economist said the EU had “never … had a policy towards its neighbours, 
except enlargement”.120 When CEECs became members, the EU faced a new issue. For the 
first time, the EU mainland directly bordered multiple countries that could not be offered the 
possibility of membership.
121
 The EU’s neighbourhood policy encouraged stability and 
reform in countries like Belarus and Ukraine, but now that policy’s incoherence mattered.  
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Co-operation between Poland and Lithuania 
 
EU policy towards Ukraine and Belarus is a key area of interest for Poland and Lithuania. 
However, Lithuania’s influence on EU foreign policy outputs remains marginal. As early as 
the 1990s, Poland and Lithuania were complaining “about their lack of involvement in EU 
activities”.122 Some member states were concerned that Poland and Lithuania were tougher 
towards Russia than the EU was. “Poland seems to be Russia’s natural adversary in the 
region.”123 Postcommunist states were excluded from the 1995 declarations on Chechnya as 
the EU was afraid associating them with the declaration might “antagonise Russia and … 
confirm her fears that closer relations with the CEECs would be directed against her”.124 
CEECs were invited “to associate themselves with the presidency statement on the Russian 
elections in December 1995, but not on Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe in 
October 1995”, about which Poland and Lithuania were critical.125 On those few issues on 
which Poland and Lithuania asked for EU support, the EU “refused politely”.126 One attempt 
to enhance the role of the CEECs in the CFSP was a Polish-Lithuanian “non-paper”, which 
suggested CEECs be allowed to initiate draft proposals for CFSP joint actions and 
positions.
127
 Poorly coordinated with supporters in Brussels and opposed by most member 
states, the initiative failed. EU officials later suggested that “after substantial initial 
differences”, political dialogue led to a shift in the positions of Warsaw and Vilnius and a 
“more relaxed and pragmatic attitude” towards Russia.128 
 
“The year 2004 should be regarded as an important turning point for the Polish Eastern 
policy.”129 In the 21st century, Poland is having some influence on the EU policy and the 
policy of individual western European states towards Russia. In particular, there appears to 
have been a mild shift in Germany’s Ostpolitik “away from over concentration on Russia 
towards the rest of the eastern neighbourhood”.130 The joint Polish-Swedish paper on Eastern 
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Partnership showed Poland’s “desire to accelerate Ukraine’s pace of European integration, as 
a test case for the other ENP countries”.131 
 
The region today 
 
From the early 1990s Poland’s leaders exploited the attractions of the EU even when there 
were few signs that an eastern enlargement would take place. Until 1993 the EU refused to 
consider an eastward enlargement. But just as it had anticipated the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Polish government anticipated the EU’s eastern enlargement. Poland’s “European 
standards” policy, which could only have a chance of success in the context of the existence 
of an EU-type body, led directly to improved relations between Poland and its eastern 
neighbours Lithuania and Ukraine and, even, temporarily, Belarus. In the end, Lithuania and 
Ukraine, which “had become more or less clearly defined nation-states with European 
aspirations”, reacted positively to Poland’s “European standards” eastern policy, while 
Belarus, which had no aspirations to join the EU, reacted negatively.
132
 
 
Poland wants the EU to enlarge further east, not just because of economic and political 
reason, but also “partly out of a sense of historical destiny” and a sense of responsibility and 
kinship towards the lands and peoples of Ukraine and Belarus.
133
 In line with what would be 
expected by Manners and others, Poland was able to use some of Europe’s normative power 
to improve its standing with its eastern neighbours, in particular with Lithuania and Ukraine. 
Lithuania and Poland have been predisposed to accepting influences from western Europe, 
while Belarus has not. Ukraine is torn between its west, with strong ties to Poland, and its east 
and south, with much closer ties with Russia. Cultural and historical filters meant that 
Lithuania and Ukraine were more open to positive approaches than was Belarus, whose 
national orientation remains directed towards Russia.  
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5 Ukraine 
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Besides Russia, whose Kaliningrad exclave borders Poland on the north, Ukraine is Poland’s 
largest neighbour in area.
1
 Stretching about 1200 kilometres from west to east, Ukraine 
bridges a huge cultural and geographical gap between Central Europe and Russia. After 
decades of poor relations, particularly in the first half of the 20
th
 century, Polish-Ukrainian 
relations took a sharp turn for the better in the 1990s, when for the first time Poland was 
dealing directly with an independent Ukraine.
2
 As Poland strove to towards EU membership, 
relations with Ukraine were considered an important part of Warsaw’s overall foreign policy. 
Polish leaders have put in much energy to support Ukraine in its efforts to become a 
successful, modern market economy with a healthy democracy. Over the last few years, 
Ukraine has seen Poland as an important supporter of its efforts to join western institutions, 
especially the EU. There are two main formations in Ukrainian politics: one broadly pro-
Western and the other what Trenin calls “nativist”.3 “[C]onstantly torn between a European 
and an East Slavic choice, Ukraine constitutes a critical test case for the viability and success 
of the European Union Neighbourhood Policy.”4 
 
Ethnicity and language 
 
According to official data, ethnic Ukrainians today make up 78 per cent of Ukraine’s people.5 
Russians, the only ethnic minority to account for more than 1 per cent of the republic’s 
population, accounted for about 17 per cent of the population of Ukraine in 2006, down from 
22 per cent in 1990.
6
 The proportion of Russians has decreased mainly due to large-scale 
emigration to Russia, but is also related to a greater tendency for people of mixed 
Ukrainian/Russian background to identify themselves as Ukrainian rather than Russian. The 
Russian population lives mainly in eastern and southern Ukraine. In some areas, such as 
Crimea, ethnic Russians form a local majority.  
 
The Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian languages belong to the East Slavic sub-group. Most 
Ukrainians say Ukrainian is their mother tongue, though the actual language used at home and 
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on the street varies across the country. Ukraine is split between a Ukrainian-speaking west 
and centre, and a Russian-speaking east.
7
 In most of western Ukraine, more than 95 per cent 
of the population uses the Ukrainian language on an everyday basis. In contrast, in the 
Donbass in eastern Ukraine, only about a quarter of the population uses Ukrainian on a daily 
basis. In the Crimea the figure is 10 per cent. In Crimea, the Donbass and Odesa, Russian is 
the main language. Many people in central and eastern parts of the country speak a mixture of 
Ukrainian and Russian, known as “Surzhyk”. In western Ukraine fewer than 4 per cent of the 
residents use Russian as their everyday language. Most Russians are reluctant to view 
Ukrainians as a distinct ethnic group.
8
 This attitude has influenced Russian perceptions of 
independent Ukraine. Said Russian President Boris Yeltsin: “We cannot get it out of our 
systems that the Ukrainians are the same as we are. That is our destiny. Our common 
destiny.”9 According to this view, the Ukrainian people wish to reunite with Russia, but are 
prevented from doing so by the United States and nationalist elites. 
 
Poles in Ukraine 
 
Many Ukrainians, particularly in the west of the country, have Polish ancestry, but in contrast 
to the situation in Belarus and Lithuania, relatively few people in Ukraine today consider 
themselves to be Poles. Poland has some concerns about the fate of the remaining ethnic Poles 
living in Ukraine.
10
 Census data in 2001 indicated that just 0.3 per cent of the population 
(some 200,000 people) called themselves Poles.
11
 A similar number claimed to speak Polish, 
but all of those people also speak Ukrainian and/or Russian. The Polish minority is 
concentrated in western Ukraine (especially in Lviv) and in some of the larger centres in the 
centre of the country, notably Kiev. Polling carried out in Ukraine between 2004 and 2008 
which looked at the attitude of Ukrainians to other nationalities found that Poles were not 
particularly badly viewed, although the image of Poles was much worse in eastern Ukraine 
and in Crimea – the areas which have had the least contact with Poles.12 Most residents of 
eastern Ukraine have never (or rarely) met Poles and yet have a bad opinion of them because 
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of national mythologies.
13
 In contrast, for western Ukrainians, who have more contact with 
Poles, the image of Poles is decidedly better, as evidenced by the results of the interviews and 
surveys carried out for this thesis.  
 
Ukrainians in Poland 
 
The Polish census of 2002 records Poland’s Ukrainian minority as amounting to 27,000 
people.
14
 Some authors give a much higher figure (up to 300,000) for the size of Poland’s 
Ukrainian minority.
15
 During the communist era, official Polish government policy was to 
ignore the continued existence of minorities and make every effort to assimilate national 
minorities (particularly Belarusians and Ukrainians, who were considered easier to assimilate 
than non-Slavic minorities) into mainstream Polish society. Unlike Poland’s Belarusian and 
Lithuanian minorities, which live mostly near the borders of Belarus and Lithuania, 
respectively, the Ukrainian minority is scattered over Poland, owing to its enforced 
resettlement after World War II. When the Polish-Soviet border was redrawn after World War 
II, many ethnic Ukrainians living within the borders of the new Poland were encouraged or 
coerced into moving to western Ukraine.
16
  
 
In 1947, owing to ongoing inter-ethnic violence and, in particular, guerrilla activities by the 
Ukrainian insurgent movement along the borders with Czechoslovakia and Ukraine, a Polish 
communist operation called Akcja Wisła (Operation Vistula) saw Ukrainians and related 
ethnic minorities living in southeastern Poland forcibly resettled on land taken from Germany. 
Today the largest concentrations of Ukrainians in Poland are in those northern and western 
regions, especially Warmińsko-Mazurskie (formerly the southern portion of German East 
Prussia) and West Pomerania. Since the end of communism in Poland, Ukrainian minority 
organisations have been established and there is now an active Ukrainian minority social 
scene, with activities focused in northern and western Poland. A remnant population of a few 
thousand Ukrainians lives in southeast Poland, along the border with Ukraine.  
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The mountainous area along the Slovak-Polish border was once the home of ethnic groups 
who spoke dialects of Ukrainian. The national identity of these people was ambiguous. 
Traditionally they were referred to in English-language literature as Ruthenians. Some 
(particularly in the extreme southeast corner of Poland) regarded themselves as Ukrainian, but 
most (generally those living further from Ukraine, in what is today the southern fringe of 
Małopolskie region) saw themselves as Rusini (Ruthenians) or Łemkowie (Lemkos) related 
to, but distinct from, Ukrainians. Some identified more with Russia than Ukraine. Official 
communist policy was to regard all these people as Ukrainians. The area was depopulated by 
1947, as this population was dispersed to western Ukraine and to the territories taken from 
Germany. Most of the deportees’ descendants were assimilated into the majority Polish 
community, but some continue to identify as Lemkos and/or Ukrainians. 
 
Ukrainians   Lemkos 
 region number*  region number* 
Warmińsko-
Mazurskie 
11,881  Lower Silesia  3082 
West Pomerania 3703  Małopolskie 1580 
Podkarpackie 2984  Lubuskie 784 
Pomerania 2831  Podkarpackie 147 
Lower Silesia 1422  West Pomerania  66 
Podlaskie 1366  Total 5850** 
Lubuskie 615   
 Mazowieckie 579   
 Małopolskie 472   
 Lubelskie 389   
 Silesia 309   
 Total 27,172**   
 * 2002 census count of Polish citizens 
 ** includes smaller numbers in other regions 
 
Table 5.1 Poland’s Ukrainian and Lemko minorities in 200217 
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Historical baggage 
 
Ukraine’s territory was the core of Kievan Rus, during the 10th and 11th centuries the largest 
state in Europe. The cultural and religious legacy of Kievan Rus laid the foundation for 
Ukrainian (more often termed “Ruthenian” until the 20th century) nationality. Weakened by 
invasions, Kievan Rus was gradually incorporated into greater Lithuania in the 14th century. 
When Lithuania formed a union with Poland in 1569, most of Ukraine then became part of the 
Polish kingdom within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Over centuries much of the 
Ukrainian nobility was polonised. As part of the polonisation process, much of the upper class 
converted from the Eastern Orthodox Church to Roman Catholicism. This was particularly 
the case in western Ukraine, where religion was often seen as a marker for nationality as late 
as the 20th century.
18
 
 
Following the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, by the end of the 18th 
century most of Ukraine (with the important exception of Galicia) was in the Russian Empire. 
After the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine endured a few years of fighting 
involving several military and paramilitary groups, during which two short-lived independent 
Ukrainian republics (1917-18) were declared, before most of Ukraine was conquered by the 
Red Army and absorbed into the Bolshevik state that became the Soviet Union. After the end 
of the Soviet-Polish War of 1919-21, the Treaty of Riga assigned Galicia and Volyn to 
Poland. Galicia and Volyn remained in Poland and outside the Soviet Union until 1939, a fact 
crucial to developments decades later.  
 
For most of the last century, Ukraine was subjected both to sovietisation and “the 
psychologically dislocating impact of ‘Russification’”.19 Ukraine’s ties with the non-Soviet 
world were cut and the nation “lost most of its historical memory”.20 Ukrainian society’s 
diverse organisational forms were destroyed and the Ukrainian population “regimented”.21  
During the interwar period, Soviet Ukraine endured brutal rule. More than 8 million 
Ukrainians died in two artificial famines in 1921 and 1932-33.
22
 During the Stalinist Terror of 
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the 1930s and 1940s millions of Ukrainians “were shot, exiled, or incarcerated”.23 Many of 
Ukraine’s more independent leaders and other opponents of Stalin’s russification strategy 
were killed, while Ukrainian culture was russified.
24
 The budding Ukrainian intelligentsia was 
destroyed.
25
  
 
The Polish-Ukrainian borderland 
 
Interactions between Poles and Ukrainians in the borderland areas, where the two ethnic 
groups were in competition for dominance, deeply affected the Polish attitude to Ukraine and 
Ukrainians in the 20
th
 century. Of particular importance were the violent events which took 
place during the two world wars in what is now western Ukraine, mainly in Volyn and 
Galicia. The events which took place in this area between 1914 and 1956 still affect relations 
between Poles and Ukrainians today.  
 
In its broader meaning, Galicia refers to a large area stretching from Kraków in the west to 
Ternopil in the east, corresponding roughly to the Polish regions of Małopolskie and 
Podkarpackie (together forming western Galicia), and the Ukrainian oblasts of Lviv, Ternopil 
and Ivano-Frankivsk (eastern Galicia). In a narrower sense, the term Galicia refers to just the 
three Ukrainian oblasts. Most of western Galicia, the part which remained in Poland after 
1945, has been ethnically Polish for centuries, although the mountain ranges along its 
southern border were populated by east Slavic people until 1947. Galicia passed from Polish 
to Austrian rule in 1772, as part of the first partition of Poland. Volyn, which corresponds to 
today’s Ukrainian oblasts of Volyn and Rivne, together with small parts of Zhytomyr and 
Ternopil oblasts, passed from Polish to Russian rule in 1793-1795, in the second and third 
partitions of Poland.  
 
Galicia was part of the Habsburg Empire until the end of World War I, when there was a 
multisided violent conflict in eastern Galicia between the new Polish state, supporters of a 
short-lived West Ukrainian Republic (1918-1919) and the Red Army. Following the Soviet-
Polish War of 1919-1920, all of Galicia and most of historic Volyn were confirmed as part of 
Poland in the Treaty of Riga. At that time both Volyn and eastern Galicia had Ukrainian 
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majorities, but had large Polish populations and several other minorities, notably Jews. Lwów 
(Lviv in Ukrainian) was a predominantly Polish city surrounded by territory which had a 
Ukrainian majority. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Polish authorities suppressed the Ukrainian 
language and attempted to polonise Volyn and eastern Galicia. These measures resulted in an 
expanded population of ethnic Poles in eastern Galicia and Volyn.
26
 For most of the 1920s 
and 1930s, Poland had authoritarian regimes but it was not a totalitarian state like the Soviet 
Union. The level of oppression of Ukrainians in interwar Poland was much less than in Soviet 
Ukraine. “Ukrainians in Poland enjoyed enough freedom to organise themselves, but were 
denied the political options which might have satisfied the ambitions of their elite.”27 By 
1939, most villages in eastern Galicia had mixed populations, with a Ukrainian majority (of 
70-90 per cent) and Polish minority (10-30 per cent).
28
  
 
On 17 September 1939, under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union 
invaded and annexed eastern Poland, including Volyn and Galicia. Ukraine’s mortality rate 
during World War II was higher than that of any other countries apart from Poland and 
Belarus. An estimated 5 million to 8 million Ukrainians were killed in World War II, 
according to official Ukrainian sources.
29
 The chaos and brutality of World War II spawned 
“bands of marauders” who terrorised local people.30 Following the deportation and killing of 
the area’s Jews during World War II, Poles were the main victims of atrocities committed in 
Volyn.  Tens of thousands of Poles were murdered in Volyn between 1942 and 1945, most at 
the hands of Ukrainian militias, notably the Ukrainian Insurgent Army or Українська 
Повстанська Армія (UPA).31  
 
UPA was the military wing of one faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists 
(OUN), a grouping which had resisted Polish rule in Galicia and Volyn in the interwar period. 
The activities of “bandits” worried organised resistance organisations like the Polish Armia 
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Krajowa (Home Army), which was loyal to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London.
32
 
Ethnic Ukrainians were often also treated brutally by Ukrainian nationalist paramilitaries, 
particularly as the Soviet Army advanced into western Ukraine in 1944.  
 
The Soviet pacification of western Ukraine was brutal. Data from formerly top secret NKVD 
files held in Russian state archives, show that between February 1944 and June 1945, the 
Soviets conducted 15,733 military and paramilitary operations against Ukrainian 
nationalists.
33
 The stated results of their efforts included: 91,615 Ukrainian “bandits” killed; 
96,446 captured and 41,858 surrendered.
34
 In addition 10,139 Ukrainian families (26,093 
people) were deported during the first year of Soviet pacification of western Ukraine.
35
 Tens 
of thousands more were deported in the following years.
36
   
 
The longstanding enmity and strife between Poles and Ukrainians did not end with the 
coming of the Red Army. Instead, each tried to use Soviet power to crush the other. The 
Soviets played Ukrainians against Poles.  In Galicia, at least in 1944 and 1945, Polish 
nationalists were more likely to form a common front with Soviets than were Ukrainian 
nationalists, as the former two sought to root out the latter.
37
 Atrocities committed by UPA 
units in Volyn and Galicia eventually made it easier for a significant portion of the local 
population  - Ukrainian and Polish - to accept Soviet rule, which was seen as preferable to the 
risk of becoming victims of the bandits.
38
  In 1944 and 1945, there were numerous reports of 
ethnic Poles (and some ethnic Ukrainians) providing information to the Soviet forces fighting 
Ukrainian nationalist groups in Galicia and Volyn.
39
 UPA remained active and fought against 
communist Poland until 1947 and against the Soviet Union until 1949.
40
  
 
During and after World War II, most of the Polish population of Volyn and Galicia was 
deported. By the late 1950s, most of the surviving deportees were living in communist 
Poland, mainly in former German Silesia. Soviet power was able to achieve what years of 
conflict between Ukrainians and Poles had not: the mass removal of Poles from western 
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Ukraine and the creation for the first time of a clear territorial border between the two 
nationalities.  
 
Polish and Ukrainian memories of World War II are different. 
 
For Poles, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 was an act of unprecedented treachery. 
For Ukrainians, its division of Poland allowed all Ukrainian lands to be united into a 
single political unit. For Poles, the enemies in the Second World War were the Germans 
and their (sometime) Ukrainian henchmen.
41
 
 
In recent years, there had been more open discussion in Ukraine of the wartime events in 
Volyn and Galicia. In 2008, Taras Wozniak, an adviser to the mayor of Lviv and an expert on 
events in wartime Volyn, told Poland’s Gazeta Wyborcza that the debate within Ukraine 
about the Volyn events was not confined to western Ukraine.
42
 The wartime killings were 
discussed not just in Lutsk and Lviv but also in eastern Ukrainian cities, where there was no 
Ukrainian-Polish conflict during the war or since.  
 
In May 2005, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Arturas Paulauskas and Volodymyr Lytvyn, 
chairmen of the Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian parliaments respectively, signed the 
founding declaration of an Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the three countries. The 
ceremony was held in Lutsk, in Volyn. The new inter-parliamentary assembly can be viewed 
as a symbolic distant successor to the diet of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.  
 
Lutsk is the chief city of Volyn, which over “centuries passed from Lithuanian to Polish to 
Ukrainian control”.43 The choice of venue symbolised “Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation in the 
post-nationalist era”.44 The forum’s main goals included advancing Ukraine's aspirations to 
join the EU, “helping transfer Poland’s and Lithuania’s successful reform experience to the 
legislatures of Ukraine” and advocating an EU open-door policy towards Ukraine.45 
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Independence 
 
Galicia mobilised the Ukrainian nation in the lead-up to Ukraine’s independence, with former 
dissidents in Galicia pressing for the launch of a Ukrainian “people’s front”, in the style of the 
popular movements which had taken the Baltic states by storm.
46
 The national movement 
rapidly spread from Galicia to other areas of western Ukraine. Miners from eastern Ukraine, 
were exposed to ideas of independence by strike committee colleagues from Lviv and 
Volyn.
47
 In September 1989, the People’s Movement for Restructuring (Rukh) held its 
constituent congress in Kiev.
48
  
 
In the elections of March 1990, “the Communist Party for all intents and purposes collapsed 
in Galicia”.49 Rukh’s language was nationalistic. Its core objective was independence for the 
Ukrainian people, whom the movement defined in non-ethnic terms that allowed minority 
Russians and Poles to support it.
50
 A “de-Sovietization” programme which involved removing 
visible symbols of Soviet rule, changes to school curricula and so on, took place.
51
 Radical 
market reform, beginning with serious moves to de-collectivise agriculture, began. At the 
same time as the March 1991 referendum on the fate of the Soviet Union, a separate 
referendum in Galicia produced an almost 90 per cent vote in favour of Ukrainian 
independence. Days after the attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991, the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic declared its independence from the Soviet Union. 
 
The abrupt and unexpected independence had major consequences for Ukraine. Ukraine’s 
task was immense. Inexperienced elites faced an uphill struggle to transform Ukraine into an 
independent state and to create “everything that totalitarianism had destroyed or stifled”.52 
Attaining all its goals quickly after seven decades of totalitarianism and centuries of 
imperialism proved impossible. On independence, the country “lacked a civil society, a 
market, and a state ... a coherent sense of national identity, democracy, and rule of law”.53 
Democracy proved difficult to attain. Ukraine’s political system remained centralised. 
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Ukraine had a sizable, well educated, population and many informal non-governmental 
organisations, administrators, former dissidents and prospective elites. But the Soviet collapse 
had left Ukraine in “an institutional vacuum”. 54 The “legacy of state control and endemic 
corruption” slowed reform efforts.55 Ukraine was insufficiently consolidated to be a stable 
independent state. Its legacy of division and decades of communist rule from Moscow 
haunted independent Ukraine. Apparent unity covered up a myriad of regional and social 
divisions. The country’s leaders had to build “all the characteristics of a ‘normal’ country”.56  
 
The country’s Soviet legacy precluded a rapid full-scale introduction of a market economy. 
Without the rule of law, the drive to a market economy amounted to “gangster capitalism”.57 
Organised crime and a black market thrived. Ukraine was strangled by corruption, which 
remains widespread in the country. Corruption and organised crime’s penetration of the 
highest echelons of government contaminated the political scene. As politicians restructured 
“support bases, they discovered the usefulness of parties”.58 Murky economic elites “found it 
convenient ... to invent attractive party images”.59 A premature “big Bang” approach, a poorly 
executed attempt to emulate early Polish reforms, discredited the reform process.  
 
Ukrainian dilemmas 
 
Faced with a daunting road to building a modern nation-state, Ukrainian leaders searched for 
models. Ukraine’s new leaders prioritised “collective and territorial integrity” and a pro-
European foreign policy.
60
 Integrating with Europe “has been on Ukraine’s agenda since its 
independence”.61 Next door, in Poland, they found a country which had already embarked on 
a dramatic transition from communism to a western political and economic system. On the 
eve of Ukrainian independence, Ivan Drach, leader of Ukraine’s Rukh nationalist movement, 
said:  
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We want to travel the Polish path. We know that the path to Europe (and perhaps this 
makes us different from Lithuania) really does lead through Poland.
62
 
 
In October 1990, while still part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine concluded an agreement with 
Poland, recognising the existing border between the two countries. Leonid Kravchuk, post-
Soviet Ukraine’s first president, accepted that Poland was Ukraine’s route into Europe and 
even felt Poland was “a more important partner for Ukraine than Russia”.63  
 
From Poland’s viewpoint, Ukraine’s independence from Russia is “crucial to preventing the 
re-emergence of Moscow as a major regional security threat”.64 One Polish academic 
interviewed for this thesis said in July 2008:   
 
We are always – we as Poles – saying ‘Ukraine’ thinking ‘Russia’. So we are positive 
toward Ukraine at the same time being negative to some extent toward Russia. So a 
strong Ukraine is actually protecting us from Russia. So we are promoting pro-Western 
Ukraine, at the same time guaranteeing us a more secure environment. 
 
In a 1991 German study evaluating all Soviet republics “on the basis of their potential to 
integrate into the European market”, Ukraine ranked first with 83 points out of 100, ahead of 
the Baltic states and Russia.
65
 Ukraine had the most mature civil society of any CIS country.
66
 
Ukraine was aware of the preferential treatment Poland received due to its candidate status.
67
 
EU membership has been an aim for Ukraine since 1998. A Decree on the Strategy of 
Integration into the European Union was issued that year reflected a belief that Ukraine is at 
the centre of Europe. The country tried to get the West to recognise it as a European or even 
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Central European nation and launched an ambitious strategic agenda of membership of the 
EU.
68
 
 
In the early 1990s, motivated by Ukraine’s “strategic importance ... and worried that it might 
become a Russian puppet”, the United States “provided $2.8 billion in aid to encourage 
democratic reform”.69 The funds were supplemented by billions from the EU and large 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank loans.  
 
In 1992, Leonid Kuchma was appointed prime minister, a role in which he was relatively 
successful. His main backers were the Dnipropetrovsk regional clique, many of whose 
members later became oligarchs, and managers of state companies. In 1994, Kuchma rather 
unexpectedly won presidential elections, defeating Kravchuk. In his first year in power, 
Kuchma disrupted the networks of corruption and pursued market reforms. Then, however, 
the oligarchs came to an understanding with him and “the Kuchma regime had become 
corrupt”.70 Kuchma won re-election in 1999 and remained in office until Viktor 
Yushchenko’s inauguration in 2005. Although his presidency was surrounded by numerous 
corruption scandals and the lessening of media freedoms, under Kuchma’s watch the 
Ukrainian economy grew rapidly, bringing relative prosperity to many residents. But 
Ukraine’s “endemic corruption and lack of progress in reforming its economy, together with 
the brutal harassment and murder of journalists and others ... angered the West”.71  
 
Ukraine and Russia  
 
Unlike Poles, most Ukrainians do “not regard Russia as a hereditary enemy”.72 According to a 
2006 poll quoted by Mangott, 42 per cent of Ukrainians consider relations with Russia to be a 
priority.
73
 The same poll indicated that one in five Ukrainians wanted the Soviet Union to be 
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restored.
74
 In 1996, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement to 
establish a customs union. In reaction to this move and to developments in the relationship 
between Belarus and Russia, in 1997 Ukraine joined Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova to set 
up the Guam group. When Uzbekistan joined Guam in 1999, the group became Guuam. The 
grouping can be seen as a response to pressure to follow a Moscow-controlled foreign policy 
and as a pro-EU initiative.  
 
However, in 2002, as much as 77 per cent of Ukraine’s exports still went to Russia and other 
CIS countries, while only a fifth of exports went to the EU.
75
 In 2003, the European 
Commission noted that Ukraine would be the enlarged EU’s poorest neighbour (apart from 
Moldova), with a per capita GDP of just €855.76 In 2004, Ukraine’s parliament ratified a 
Single Economic Space agreement with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. 
 
Poland and Ukraine are heavily dependent on Russian oil imports. Much Russian gas is piped 
to Europe across Ukraine. In September 2006 the EU and Ukraine signed a deal paving the 
way for European financing of oil and gas meters on pipelines across Ukraine’s borders. In 
December 2006, Russian President Putin visited Ukraine. Energy was high up the agenda, 
with a number of agreements signed. The timing of the trip, almost a year since a dispute over 
the price Ukraine paid for gas led to supplies being briefly cut by Moscow, was symbolic. 
Putin’s trip to Kiev came when there was a power struggle between President Yushchenko 
and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.
77
 Yanukovych helped to negotiate a deal with 
Moscow for 2007.  
 
Yanukovych wanted “to keep both Russia and the West on his side”.78 In September 2006, he 
said Ukraine “should be a reliable bridge between” the EU and Russia.79 In November 2006, 
Yanukovych expressed readiness to help improve relations between Poland and Russia after 
the first meeting of a Ukrainian-Polish commission on economic cooperation.
80
 He repeatedly 
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said he favoured joining the EU but slowed moves towards membership of Nato and was 
amenable to the Single Economic Space trade bloc of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine, even though membership of this bloc would likely harm Ukraine’s chances of 
joining the EU.
81
  Ukrainian public opinion is divided on the question of the desirability of 
Ukraine participating in the moves to recreate an economic bloc centred on Russia. A quarter 
of Ukrainians “support both Ukraine’s membership in the EU and the country’s participation 
in the union with Russia and Belarus”.82 However, Shumylo says, few Ukrainian “politicians 
are ready to endorse a customs union with Russia and CIS countries [or] to transfer national 
power to a supranational body”.83  
 
Three opinion polls taken in 1994, 2001 and 2005 respectively show a marked regional 
variation in support for such an option. In 1994 a majority (70 per cent) of residents of eastern 
Ukraine wanted Ukraine to orientate itself towards Russia and/or the CIS.
84
 By 2005 this 
figure had fallen to a quarter. Meanwhile, the proportion of people in western Ukraine who 
favoured the “eastern” option fell from 28 per cent to just 7 per cent.85 Throughout the period, 
western Ukrainians generally favoured either intensified cooperation with the west or for 
Ukraine to develop using “the country’s own resources”.86  
 
Ukrainian nationalists, who come mainly from western Ukraine and Kiev, regard Russia as 
the “Other”, while they see Ukraine as the easternmost outpost of European civilisation. In 
this, Ukrainians have a similar view to their eastern neighbours as Poles do to theirs, and 
Germans, in turn, to theirs. Evidence suggests an association in Ukraine between support for 
democratisation and a pro-Western orientation.
87
 
 
Ukrainians’ support for Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and allied parties “should not be 
attributed to increasing support for pro-Russian and/or ... anti-EU views”.88 Ukrainian 
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national identity is stronger now than when the Soviet Union disintegrated.
89
 The regional 
divides within Ukraine “are not premised on ethnic or religious intolerance and hatreds”.90 
This is despite Russia fomenting “destabilizing developments” in Ukraine, “deepening the 
historical division of the country and halting Ukraine’s drive to Nato”.91  However, 
throughout the country there is widespread disappointment with Ukraine’s economic 
difficulties.
92
 Yanukovych did not turn Ukraine back towards Russia, but Ukraine’s 
integration with the West proceeded slowly.  
 
Ukraine and the European Union 
 
Many businessmen-politicians in the Party of Regions want closer ties between Ukraine and 
the EU so that Ukrainian exporters (including many PoR members and supporters) could gain 
access to the EU’s internal market. 93 In September 2006, Ukraine won the promise of 
negotiations early in 2007 on broader ties with the EU that could include a free trade deal. 
Ukraine aspired to eventual membership of the EU, but Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU’s 
external relations commissioner, reiterated the EU’s position that this was not a prospect for 
the time being. Ferrero-Waldner said that signing a free trade deal with Ukraine was 
dependent on Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade Organisation. In September 2006, 
Yanukovych said Ukraine aimed to pass all the laws needed to join the WTO within four 
months and that his government was working on reforms to deal with corruption and boost 
economic growth. Energy cooperation would be part of the talks with the EU. In May 2008, 
Ukraine became a member of the WTO.  
 
In October 2006, President Yushchenko met EU leaders and pushed the case for membership 
talks to start by 2008. Yushchenko has sought closer ties with the West since coming to 
power in the Orange Revolution of 2004. But the EU remains concerned that reforms are 
being slowed by political divisions. In October 2006, EC President Jose Manuel Barroso said 
Ukraine needed to carry out more reforms before accession talks could begin. “Ukraine is not 
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ready and we are not ready,” Barroso told Yushchenko.94 Barroso said that the EU and its 
member states were “not ready to assume new membership obligations”.95 EU leaders offer 
the prospect of closer political and economic ties with Ukraine, with a free-trade area with 
Ukraine as the first aim.  
 
In January 2007, Polish and Ukrainian oil supplies were badly affected by a commercial row 
between Russia and Belarus, which led to the closure of the main transit pipeline to Europe.
96
 
Later in 2007, the presidents of Poland and Ukraine announced plans to build a pipeline 
which would reduce their dependency on Russian oil.
97
 Yushchenko expressed hopes that the 
EU would co-finance the project.
98
 The Odessa-Brody pipeline would be extended to Płock, 
site of Poland’s main refinery, PKN Orlen, which relies entirely on Russian oil supplies. The 
extension of the pipeline could help bring Caspian oil to Poland, bypassing Russia. 
Yushchenko gave EU leaders renewed assurances over security of energy supplies.  
 
Until the Orange Revolution of 2004,  
 
most international organisations and media persisted in viewing Ukraine as part of the 
Russian sphere of influence, a problem in east-west relations rather than an 
independent country in its own right, whose inhabitants seemed to have resigned 
themselves to post-Soviet apathy.
99
  
 
An opinion poll in 2006 showed that most Europeans did not think Ukraine would join the EU 
before 2020.
100
 Central and East Europeans were even less likely to think Ukraine would join 
the EU by then, although in the same poll, 77 per cent of Poles said they were in favour of 
Ukrainian membership, a figure much higher than in other EU states, such as Germany (41 
per cent in favour) and France (58 per cent in favour).
101
 “Germany believes that Poland is too 
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focused on the East and Ukraine in particular.”102 With the exception of Poland, EU member 
states “have not had a wide public debate on Ukraine’s place in the EU”.103 Ukraine is “a land 
routinely dismissed if not forgotten”.104  
 
Typical supporter Typical opponent 
ethnic Ukrainian ethnic Russian 
Ukrainian-speaker Russian-speaker 
Resident of western or central Ukraine Resident of eastern or southern Ukraine 
Resident who identifies with Ukraine Resident who identifies with USSR 
Resident of city with >250,000 people Resident of small town, village 
Person aged less than 40 Older person (especially over 50) 
 
Table 5.2 Supporters and opponents of Ukraine’s European integration, 2006105 
 
Shumylo warns of the “euroindifference’ of Ukrainians.106 Ukrainians perceive European 
integration as a foreign policy issue, not “a framework for domestic reform”.107 When it 
comes to the European integration process Ukrainians remain outsiders. The concept of 
European integration is not understood well by most Ukrainians. Public information drives 
have failed.
108
  
 
Ukrainians divide into three main groups as regards foreign policy. One group supports both 
EU and Nato membership for Ukraine. A second group wants to see Ukraine join the EU but 
not Nato, while the third group is opposed to both EU and Nato membership for Ukraine. 
Support for EU membership among Ukrainians has been falling in recent years. Shumylo 
notes that 56 per cent of Ukrainians supported EU membership in 2000 and 2001, while only 
10 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively, of Ukrainians opposed membership.
109
 By 2005, 44 
per cent of respondents favoured EU membership, while 28 per cent were against. A National 
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Institute for Strategic Studies poll in 2006 put support for Ukrainian membership at 43 per 
cent.
110
 
 
The international community has more “possibilities to influence Ukraine than Belarus”.111 
The European Neighbourhood Policy laid a “foundation for Ukraine’s integration with the 
EU”.112 Including the political Copenhagen criterion in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan 
encouraged further democratisation.
113
 Although there is scant enthusiasm in western Europe 
for Ukrainian membership of the EU, membership of the ENP “does not close any doors to 
European countries that may at some future point wish to apply for membership”.114  
 
There is “a close relationship between international assistance and the progress of the 
transition process”.115 Western anger with Ukraine’s slow pace of reform, widespread 
corruption and misgovernance, caused Ukraine “to shy away from the West” and move 
towards “Russia’s more accepting embrace”.116 Some feel that Ukraine’s “endless failures to 
implement the reform” mean the country will never qualify for EU membership.117 Ukraine’s 
“elites do not offer a clear and coherent strategy for Ukraine’s relations with the EU”, feeling 
that if Ukraine does “not have membership prospects, [it] should focus on the benefits of the 
ENP and ‘four freedoms’ promised by the EU”.118 The carrot of an EU-Ukraine Free Trade 
Agreement could be a tool for modernising Ukraine’s economy and help bring about greater 
integration with the EU.
119
 The EU and other western institutions have “powerful leverage” 
over Ukraine.
120
 However, because Ukraine is not a prospective EU member, the Union’s 
leverage is weaker than it has been in Central Europe. 
 
Ukraine’s main backer remains Poland, “a powerful ‘behind-the-scenes’ player in the geo-
political ‘sandpit’” of Eastern Europe.121 Despite Poland not being a member of the CDC “a 
strong Polish-Lithuanian axis within the EU [has had] a significant impact on the CDC 
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activities”.122 Ukrainians do not see other Central European countries like the Czech Republic 
or Hungary as possible supporters or advocates of Ukraine’s interest in the EU.123  
 
One Polish academic interviewed by this author in July 2008 said: “As long as Ukraine is pro-
democratic and pro-Western, there will be friendly relations.” What is important for Poland is 
not who is running Ukraine but what their programme is. Warsaw wants to ensure that Kiev is 
orientated towards Europe and the West, and to ultimate membership in the EU and Nato. It is 
also important that Ukraine consolidate and strengthen its democracy and ensure human rights 
in the country. “Poland will work with anyone who will go that way.”124  
In October 2006, at an economic forum in Lviv, EU Commissioner for Regional Policy 
Danuta Hubner (who is Polish) said that transborder cooperation between Ukraine and the EU 
had great potential to speed up Ukraine’s integration into Europe.125 Under the terms of the 
EU Regional Policy programme for 2007-2013, Ukraine would participate in four transborder 
cooperation projects with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.
126
  
In 2006, Ukraine and Poland made a joint bid to host the 2012 European Football 
Championship and in 2007 won the right to host the event. Referring to this, one Ukrainian 
interviewee said in July 2008: “We must work together, improve infrastructure [and] border 
crossings.”127 
Ukraine’s participation in the Community of Democratic Choice, an intergovernmental 
organisation established in 2005 by nine postcommunist states in Kiev, whose main task is to 
promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the region, may earn the country “the 
reputation of being a reliable and enthusiastic political partner; an important image for 
attracting external supporters for Ukraine’s perspective bid for EU membership”.128  
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The Orange Revolution 
In 2004, Ukraine was dominated by three wealthy regional oligarchic groups. These oligarchs 
enjoyed close connections with President Leonid Kuchma. They had large parliamentary 
party factions, owned media empires, had extensive governmental privileges and controlled 
many officials. 
The Orange Revolution of 2004 forced the authorities to overturn a rigged presidential 
election and allow a new internationally monitored vote that swept into power a reformist 
slate under Yushchenko. As one Polish academic says: “Poland was clearly openly involved 
in the Orange Revolution.”129 A “remarkable sight in Kiev was the image of Lech Wałęsa ... 
striding onto the makeshift stage in Independence Square to the acclaim of 200,000 
Ukrainians”.130 Wałęsa’s Kiev visit was important because it emphasised the link between the 
Orange Revolution and Solidarity’s traditions, which share many common themes: “their 
peaceful nature, an uncompromising demand for dignity and freedom, and a desire for 
statehood independent of Russian tutelage”.131 Poland’s main political parties helped 
Yushchenko in his campaign, sensing that despite the negative legacy of history, the interests 
of Ukraine and Poland were in harmony. 
Poland’s involvement in the Orange Revolution has important implications for Europe’s 
future. Ukrainians “reminded the world that politics is about more than the technical art of 
governing and managing the distribution of resources”.132 At crucial moments, “it becomes 
the expression of the difference between right and wrong, of deeper moral instincts of 
individual dignity and the desire for freedom”.133 While western leaders “failed quickly to 
grasp” the importance of what was happening in Kiev, “the rapid engagement of Polish 
politicians in the unfolding Ukrainian events allowed Poland ... to show that it is at the heart, 
not the periphery,” of Europe.134 The Orange Revolution thrust Poland into the position of 
leading the EU’s involvement in Ukraine. The slogan “Back to Europe!” helped mobilise 
Western-orientated Ukrainians, while those who looked east lacked a fighting spirit.
135
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In its reaction to events in Ukraine, Poland had one eye on Russia. In 2009, Paweł Świeboda, 
founder of Polish think-tank demosEuropa said:  
 
Clearly, democratic Ukraine is seen as increasing the chances that Russia will evolve in 
the right direction and so, in that sense, supporting the Orange Revolution was also an 
activity with Russia in mind. But at the same time, Ukraine is a case in itself. There are 
strong enough ties between the two countries for Poland to support Ukraine’s case. ...  
but obviously Russia plays a big role because ... it’s becoming increasingly 
unpredictable. ... this is seen as a source of great concern ... It could very easily lead to 
some cases of confrontation.
136
 
 
The EU’s first reaction to the Orange Revolution “was ambivalent and hesitant”.137 The new 
EU member states favoured promoting democracy in Ukraine but France and Germany had a 
Russia-first position. As the situation developed, all member states backed the pro-democracy 
position. The Orange Revolution was seen in Moscow as a humiliation and as a rebuff to 
Russian President Putin.
138
 The resistance of Polish officials to the preference in some EU 
capitals for stable relations with Russia prevented Yushchenko from being sacrificed. Paris 
and Berlin could “no longer monopolise or dictate the ‘European’ position”.139 Poland’s 
history allowed it “to recognise a time of historic opportunity and to find appropriate 
responses”.140 The democratisation of Ukraine could “shift the dynamic of European politics” 
to the east.
141
  
 
Interest and sympathy created by the Orange Revolution gave more prominence to Ukraine’s 
aspirations to join the EU, aspirations strongly backed by Poland and Lithuania. This “may 
herald the emergence of a discourse of ‘responsibility’ towards Ukraine and, ultimately, 
accordance of candidate status”.142 Accession might be essential for the survival of Ukraine’s 
democracy. The EU, having accepted Poland’s standpoint on Ukraine, including support for 
Yushchenko and his allies, must consider the possibility of eventual Ukrainian membership of 
the EU.  
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Poland will be in the forefront of this unfolding process, helping to translate Ukrainian 
aspirations into practical realities, and constantly reminding the older EU states of the 
need to maintain and accelerate the process of EU-Ukrainian dialogue.
143
  
 
Yanukovych’s comeback in the 2006 parliamentary elections was a disappointing 
development for Poles, many of whom regarded Yanukovych as a Moscow puppet. At the 
2006 parliamentary election, support for the pro-Moscow Party of Regions was concentrated 
in the east and south of Ukraine. Support for President Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc was 
concentrated in Galicia, traditional hotbed of Ukrainian nationalism, while Yulia 
Timoshenko’s pro-Western bloc drew support mainly from central and western Ukraine.  
Political impasse led to another parliamentary election in October 2007 which produced a 
slim majority for the Orange parties and led to Yulia Timoshenko becoming prime minister 
again. In general, the south and east of Ukraine voted for the pro-Moscow Party of Regions, 
while the west and centre of the country voted for pro-Western parties. In the 2007 election 
Timoshenko’s bloc dominated the west and centre. Map 8 in Appendix 1 shows the political 
divide in Ukraine in 2007, which displays a remarkable similarity to the linguistic divide 
illustrated in Maps 6 and 7. Other elections, including the early 2010 presidential elections, 
which saw Yanukovych defeat Timoshenko in the second-round runoff, have produced a 
similar geographical split.  
Polish leaders constantly stress the importance of Ukraine in Polish foreign policy.  
 
[In] Poland’s view Ukraine’s European vocation is a key foreign policy objective and 
too much has been invested in it for that to change even though there is a sense of 
unease ... with the way the situation in Ukraine is shaping up. There is a feeling that 
Ukraine is not living up to expectations, that it is wasting an opportunity. So that 
creates a sense of unease, but not to the extent of anyone openly questioning Ukraine’s 
European vocation. In fact, you wouldn’t come across anybody in Warsaw ... who 
would not be in favour of Ukraine joining the EU at some stage in the future. ... In spite 
of the difficult history between the two countries or maybe because of that history, 
Poland has identified Ukraine and its EU membership as a mission in foreign policy 
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and that is likely to continue even though, again, there is a huge sense of 
disappointment about the way the Orange Revolution ended up. ... [Government] in 
Ukraine is still to a large extent a top-down exercise in which there is a power vacuum 
at the top. Things don’t function lower down.144 
 
In  2007, Ukrainian military officers were receiving training at Polish military academies.
145
 
 
However, by 2008, some Polish commentators feared that the battle for Ukraine had been lost, 
and that the country was set on a path away from integration with Europe and towards 
rapprochement with Russia.
146
 Some blamed the new centre-right Civic Platform government 
led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk which had moved to patch up relations with Moscow after 
the disruptive era of the nationalist PiS-led government of the Kaczyński brothers: “Polish-
Ukrainian relations are ruined and that Donald Tusk has lost Ukraine.”147 
 
Conclusion 
Between 2000 and 2010, relations between Poland and Ukraine have been the best they have 
ever been. The EU has played a considerable part in improving relations between the two 
countries, in particular by improving Poland’s image among Ukrainians and by creating a 
successful, established framework towards which Poland and Ukraine could gravitate. The 
Polish-Ukrainian relationship has become “a pivot” of Polish foreign policy, its importance 
recognised “across the Polish political spectrum”.148 Ukraine’s stability, its independence 
“and eventual integration into the west are ... vital national interests in Poland”.149 Poles “will 
never give up” on Ukraine “because we believe in democracy”.150 Poles, who achieved so 
much thanks to their own efforts and ample assistance from western governments and 
international organisations, are now in their turn helping “less fortunate” kindred peoples.151 
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Despite political difficulties, the Polish establishment “will never abandon democracy and 
human rights” in Ukraine.152 
The rapprochement between Poland and Ukraine since 1990 has been “one of the most 
positive and hopeful developments in post-communist Europe”.153 Polish officials continue to 
express support for Ukraine’s integration into the EU and Nato. Despite more than century of 
unsatisfactory, often tense, relations between Poles and Ukrainians, in the early 21
st
 century 
Poland and Ukraine established a “strategic partnership”, with Poland promoting Ukraine’s 
“European vocation”.154 Poland, along with Lithuania and the United States is the strongest 
proponent of Ukrainian membership of the EU.
155
 Good Polish-Ukrainian relations are of 
great importance for the European Union. The research would indicate that the EU appears to 
have had a positive, normative influence on Poland’s interaction with Ukraine, in line with the 
theories of Manners and others.  
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Belarus has pursued a unique path in postcommunist Europe. Alone of Poland’s neighbours, 
since the mid-1990s it has a policy of integration with Russia, to the extent of announcing a 
Union of Russia and Belarus. Polish-Belarusian relations have suffered, especially as Poland 
moved in the opposite direction, towards closer ties with Western Europe and membership of 
Nato and the EU. Warsaw’s western-orientated foreign policy and Minsk’s Moscow-
orientated one have driven the two neighbours apart. Although the EU has, on several 
occasions, adjusted its policy to Belarus to encourage the regime in Minsk to democratise the 
country and open up the country more to the West, it has had limited apparent success. This 
might serve to show the limits of the EU as normative power. 
 
Żukowski, writing in Polish, says Belarus is a country lying on the borders of two worlds – 
the EU to the west and the Russian Federation to the east – and between two economic, social 
and cultural systems.
1
 Strongly linked with Russia, Belarus cannot decide which model of 
economic development to choose. Unlike its western and southern neighbours, Belarus is not 
a democracy. Economic and political reform such has taken place in Lithuania and Poland, 
and even Ukraine, has no equivalent in Belarus. A short-lived attempt to pursue a neutral path 
in international affairs was curtailed by the rise to power in 1994 of Aleksander Lukashenko. 
Since Lukashenko became president, the Belarusian regime has progressively isolated itself 
from Europe. Belarus has seen frequent human rights violations, including jailing and beating 
critics of the government, exiling of dissidents and sometimes murder by security forces. 
According to Mangott, “Lukashenko’s sultanistic regime” has more in common with Central 
Asian regimes than its neighbours.
2
 
 
One Belarusian media commentator describes the current Belarusian system as: 
 
… much like the old Soviet system ... It is a banal paternalistic autocracy. All its stable 
continuance needs is for the people to show up once every five years for the presidential 
election in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the Leader
3
 
                                                 
1
 Żukowski, M. 2005. ‘Współpraca gospodarcza Polska-Bialoruś’ in  Chalupczak, H & Michalik, E (eds.) 2005, 
Polska-Bialoruś: Problemy Sąsiedztwa, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin p.34 
2
 Mangott, G. 2007. ‘Deconstructing a Region’ in Hamilton, D and Mangott, G. (eds.) 2007 The New Eastern 
Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova Center for Transatlantic Relations Washington p.274 
3
 Drakakhrust, Y. 2008 ‘Belarus’s Quiet Campaign’ RFE/RL Belarus service. Retrieved on 27/9/2008 from 
www.rferl.org/Content/Belaruss_Quiet_Campaign_Election_Lukashenka_Vote/1291139/html 
 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours                                    Belarus 
 
110 
 
 
Historical background 
 
It is claimed a distinct Belarusian identity came into being after the Mongol conquest of 
Russia in the 13th century. This identity was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 
which later united with Poland. Many speak of Belarusian history as being characterised by 
the conflict between two traditional rival components.
4
 For many writers, the territory that 
became Belarus was thus for centuries a border zone between settled Europe and “the East”. 
The “ongoing political struggles in Belarus [reflect] ... an age-old confrontation between Rus 
(Old Russia) and Poland”.5 The Polish-Catholic tradition dominated western Belarus for 
centuries. After centuries of Polish rule the local nobility had become Polish in language and 
culture and was largely Roman Catholic. The Russian Orthodox tradition remained strong 
among the peasantry throughout the years of Polish rule and came strongly to the fore after 
the territory became part of the Russian Empire in the late 18th century.  
 
Apart from in a band of territory running along today’s border between Belarus and Lithuania, 
the mass of Belarusian peasantry remained mainly Belarusian speaking, but in the 19
th
 
century, the growing urban population in the area largely spoke Polish. In the early 20
th
 
century, Polish cultural influence on Belarus was as strong as Russian influence. Lukiewicz 
says Poland’s exceptional role in Belarus is due mainly to the legacy of the centuries 
Belarusians found themselves in one state with Poles.
6
 
 
After World War I, western Belarus was absorbed into re-born Poland, while eastern Belarus, 
including Minsk, was organised into the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. In the 1930s, 
the Polish minority in the BSSR was largely eliminated, mainly through deportation to remote 
parts of the Soviet Union. At the time, western Belarus (then northeastern Poland) had a 
mixed population of Belarusians (48 per cent in 1931), Poles (36 per cent), Tutejsi (“locals” – 
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Slavs with no stated nationality) and Jews.
7
 The distinction between Poles and Belarusians in 
the area was as much a class and religious divide as an ethnic one. Most of the educated class 
in the area, in particular teachers, public servants and army officers, were Roman Catholic 
Poles. On the other hand, 92 per cent of Poland’s Belarusians were described in the 1931 
Polish census as chłopów (peasants) or children of such.8 Most Belarusians were Russian 
Orthodox, but some were Roman Catholic. Poles formed the absolute majority of the 
population in the arm of territory stretching from Grodno through the Vilnius district to the 
Latvian border, including most of the area now covered by Grodno oblast.
9
  
 
In 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Poland and annexed the territories that became western 
Belarus. All of Belarus would remain under Soviet rule until 1991, apart from three years of 
Nazi occupation in 1941-1944. Much of the Polish population of western Belarus was 
deported to Russia and Kazakhstan in 1940-1941. Most remaining Poles were transported 
west into communist Poland in 1945-1956, although a significant number, mainly less 
educated and rural Poles, remained in Grodno region. The future of local border traffic is 
especially important on the Polish-Belarus border because the border drawn in 1944 divided 
areas which for centuries had formed one region. The border divided families and residents 
from their cemeteries.  
 
The Polish minority in Belarus 
 
With regard to Belarus, Poland’s policy differs from that of most other EU member states. 
“Poland has sought to maintain dialogue with Minsk, despite the undemocratic and 
authoritarian practices of its president.”10 The late former Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław 
Geremek said Poland found itself “in a particularly complicated situation when matters 
concern Belarus because that is the country where hundreds of thousands of our kin live”.11 
Official data show that the Polish minority in Belarus numbers about 400,000 people, 4 per 
cent of the country’s population. The number of Belarusians with Polish ancestry is much 
higher. The proportion of Poles varies greatly within Belarus, from less than 1 per cent of the 
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population in eastern Belarus to 25 per cent in the Grodno region, which hosts about three-
quarters of the country’s Polish minority. The city of Grodno, close to the borders with 
Lithuania and Poland, holds the major concentration of Poles in Belarus. In some villages in 
Grodno region near the Lithuanian border the population remains almost entirely Polish. 
 
What is striking about the figures in Table 6.1 is that most residents of Belarus who describe 
themselves as Poles speak Belarusian at home, while most who describe themselves as 
Belarusian speak Russian. In other words, at least in one respect, Poles in Belarus are more 
effectively Belarusian than the Belarusians themselves. Many Belarusians consider the 
Belarusian language to be a folksy holdover from their past. As early as 1960, most 
Belarusian-language schools in the country had closed. During his term of office, President 
Lukashenko has derided the Belarusian language as “inferior” to the “two great languages in 
the world – Russian and English”.12  
 
ethnic group  language spoken at home, % 
  Belarusian Russian other 
Belarusians 8,159,100 41.3 58.6 0.1 
Russians 1,141,700 4.3 95.7 - 
Poles 395,700 57.6 37.7 4.7 
Ukrainians 237,000 10.2 83.6 6.2 
Jews 27,800 3.8 95.7 0.5 
Total 10,045,000* 36.7 62.8 0.5 
* includes less numerous ethnic minorities 
Table 6.1 Belarus: population by ethnicity and language, 199913 
 
About three-quarters of Belarusians belong to the Russian Orthodox Church. Roman 
Catholics form about 15 per cent of the country’s population.14 The relationship between 
Belarusian Catholicism and Polish sentiment is complex. Catholics in Belarus who describe 
themselves as Poles “are strongly attached to ‘collective farm ethics’”.15 These ethics provide 
a “refuge for those unable to join” the wider Polish, Belarusian or Russian cultures.16 The 
self-declared Poles of Belarus are “elderly, poorly educated people who promote an 
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environment of ‘Polishness’”.17 For such folk, “Lukashenko represents a guarantor of an 
accustomed lifestyle, while to Lukashenko, they are the most reliable part of the electorate”.18 
The urbanised grandchildren of such folk tend to consider themselves to be Belarusian and to 
declare Belarusian as their maternal tongue. Belarusian nationalists see the link between 
Catholicism in Belarus and Polishness as playing into the hands of Lukashenko. The 
Belarusian Catholic intelligentsia is “wary of attempts to expand Polish influence in 
Belarus”.19 In the early 1990s, the Belarusian opposition led demands for a reduction in the 
number of Polish-born Catholic priests in Belarus. According to one Belarusian journalist 
“most of Lukashenko’s opponents are members of the pro-Belarusian Catholic movement”.20 
 
Friction over the Union of Poles in Belarus 
 
Throughout the period of Lukashenko’s rule, the situation of the Polish minority in Belarus 
has been a concern to the Polish government and society. Several incidents strained relations 
between the two governments. For example, in May 2005 a diplomatic spat erupted between 
Poland and Belarus after the Belarusian Justice Ministry refused to recognise the newly 
elected leadership of the Union of Poles in Belarus (Związek Polaków na Białorusi or Саюз 
Палякаў Беларусі - SPB), preferring instead to push for the re-installing of a more compliant 
figure who had been leader of the SPB from 2000 to 2005. Most saw “the conflict as 
primarily an attempt by ... Lukashenko to get full control of the country’s largest NGO before 
the 2006 presidential election”.21 The SPB claimed to have 25,000 members on paper, which 
would make it the largest NGO in Belarus, but its active membership is much lower.
22
 In July 
2005 Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Załucki ordered the expulsion of a Belarus 
diplomat from Warsaw.
23
 Poland’s foreign ministry explained the move as a response to 
Minsk’s “totally unjustified expulsion of the head of the Polish consulate in Minsk”.24 Three 
days later, Poland withdrew its ambassador from Minsk, in protest at a police raid on the 
premises of the SPB. In July 2005, after “reciprocal diplomatic expulsions and the recalling” 
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of the Polish ambassador to Belarus, the conflict between Warsaw and Minsk over the SPB 
entered “a calmer stage”.25  
 
At the time, Polish foreign ministry spokesman Piotr Paszkowski said the Belarusian 
authorities “knew very well” that one of the conditions for improving Polish-Belarusian 
relations was the normalisation of the situation of Poles in Belarus.
26
 Warsaw hoped SPB 
members would choose a new leader in free elections.
27
 The duly elected new leader, 
Andzhelika Borys, was arrested in 2007.  
 
Poland’s free media sometimes complicates the work of the Polish government in its relations 
with Belarus. In September 2008, Gazeta Wyborcza reported that the Polish foreign ministry 
denied it had put pressure on Andzhelika Borys to resign from her position and chair of the 
SPB.
28
 Gazeta Wyborcza quoted rival broadsheet Rzeczpospolita as saying that the foreign 
ministry had suggested to Borys that she step down in the name of “geopolitical rationality” 
and repairing Polish-Belarusian relations.
29
 The request was made shortly before a meeting 
between the diplomatic chiefs of Poland and Belarus. The article in Rzeczpospolita said that 
the Polish and Belarusian governments had a plan of action with regard to the SPB.
30
 In 
November there was to be a combined meeting of the two SPBs – one led by Andzhelika 
Borys and the other “legal” one by Józef Łucznik. A new candidate for the position of head of 
the SPB had been proposed. If the report was true it would mean that the Polish government 
had caved in to the Lukashenko regime. Sikorski said that Poland was working hard to bring 
about the return of democratic elections in Belarus and that the Rzeczpospolita article had 
made that work harder, adding that talks with the Belarus authorities on the topic were at such 
a delicate stage that it would be better to be discreet.
31
 Sikorski said he hoped for an end to 
                                                 
25
 Maksymiuk 2005. ‘Poland/Belarus: Warsaw Seems To Be Losing Duel With Minsk Over Ethnic 
Organization’ 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Gazeta Wyborcza. 19/9/2008. ‘Sikorski: Nie naciskamy na Andżelikę Borys’ Retrieved 20/09/2008 from 
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80269,5714615,Sikorski__Nie_naciskamy_na_Andzelike_Borys.htm
l 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. “Rozmowy z władzami białoruskimi na ten temat nie są łatwe i na takim delikatnym ich etapie lepiej by 
było zachować dyskrecję.” 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours                                    Belarus 
 
115 
 
“political games” over the Polish minority in Belarus, adding that “the last time that happened 
it led to the virtual breakdown of Polish-Belarusian relations and the isolation of Belarus”.32 
 
Belarusians in Poland 
 
For as long as a Belarusian identity has existed, Belarusians have had low levels of national 
consciousness, when compared with their neighbours.
33
 This is so both in Belarus and in 
Poland. The Belarusian minority in Poland numbers about 48,000, according to official Polish 
census figures.
34
 Some Belarusian minority advocates claim figures of a few hundred 
thousand Belarusians in Poland. Poland’s Belarusian minority is concentrated in Podlaskie, 
the poorest region of Poland, near the border with Belarus. After 1945, developments in 
Soviet Belarus, particularly russification, encouraged Belarusians in Poland to embrace 
Polishness. Poland’s Belarusians assimilated throughout the period of communist rule in 
Poland, mainly due to rural-urban migration and the weak salience of Belarusian ethnicity. 
“Assimilation to the high culture (Polish)” has been rapid.35 The Belarusian language in 
Poland is seen as a rustic patois.
36
 However, in the 1980s, Solidarity’s abundant use of 
Catholic imagery and association of being Polish with being Catholic turned the largely 
Eastern Orthodox Belarusians away from embracing Polishness.
37
 At least in the Białystok 
region, in the early 1980s Solidarity excluded and alienated the Belarusian community by 
stressing the link between Catholicism and being Polish.
38
 Today, the few ethnically 
Belarusian communes in Poland are a stronghold of the postcommunist left and register the 
lowest levels of electoral support for parties with roots in the Solidarity movement. 
 
Poland’s Belarusian minority leaders have since 1989 tried to promote Belarusian identity, 
but have been hindered by several factors, which include low economic development in areas 
of Poland with a Belarusian majority and a negative image of Belarus and Belarusians.
39
 
Poland’s Orthodox church has not helped. The Orthodox mass is in Old Church Slavonic and 
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sermons in Russian. The exclusion of Belarusians “from effective democratic participation is 
a major factor contributing to their disappearance” in Poland.40 The government of Belarus 
has little interest in the situation of Belarusians in Poland, except to occasionally raise the 
matter of their relative deprivation when Minsk is criticised for its harsh treatment of the 
Polish minority in Belarus. 
 
Accidental independence 
 
Belarus became an independent state when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, much to the 
dismay of many in the country. Independent Belarus was among “the least national of the 
Soviet successor states”.41 The March 1991 referendum for a “revived (Soviet) union” was 
backed by 83 per cent of Belarusians, the highest figure outside Central Asia.
42
 Had there 
been an independence referendum, it would have been defeated. The early 1990s saw a 
largely unsuccessful attempt at nationbuilding.  
 
In October 1991, the authorities in Warsaw and Minsk signed a joint state declaration that 
reduced fears that Poland would make a claim to any of western Belarus.
43
 It also marked the 
end of Belarusian pretensions to the Białystok area in Poland.44 In 1992, Poland offered newly 
independent Belarus a treaty which confirmed existing borders and established “clear 
principles of minority rights”.45 When the treaty was signed in April 1992, Polish Prime 
Minister Jan Olszewski said relations between Belarus and Poland could “serve as a model for 
relations among other countries in our region”.46 The fact that Poland and Belarus confirmed 
their border so soon after the Soviet Union’s disintegration was important. It conveyed to the 
region “the norm that nation-states are to be built and secured within inherited borders” and 
that Poland had no claim to the territories it had lost during World War II.
47
  By legally 
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confirming its borders with Belarus and Ukraine by mid-1992, Poland “sent a clear signal that 
it had no interest in eastward expansion”.48 
 
When the Belarus parliament’s then speaker, Stanislau Shushkevich, went to Warsaw in June 
1992 to sign the treaty with Poland, he accepted the idea of “European standards” to 
overcome problems associated with minorities.
49
 Shushkevich regarded Poland as Belarus’ 
“best available road to Europe”. 50 He “believed that the interests of Belarus would be best 
served by the integration of a Belarusian nation-state within its present borders into European 
institutions”.51  
 
When in November 1992, Shushkevich began to lose power within Belarus to others with a 
more eastward-looking inclination, Poland’s new Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka stressed in 
Minsk that: “Poland is interested in the independence of Belarus and wishes to be one of the 
elements connecting Belarus to Europe.”52 
 
Snyder says that: 
 
The lasting success of the Polish policy of European standards toward Belarus was that 
it created a legal framework of European standards between the two states, before it 
was too late.
53
  
 
The great dictator 
 
The election of Aleksander Lukashenko as president in 1994 “ended fruitful cooperation with 
Poland and began a dictatorship of Soviet nostalgia.”54 The main issue in the 1994 election 
“was the economy which, in the absence of reforms, had gone into free fall”.55 Angry 
Belarusians, “fed up with old-guard rule” voted for Lukashenko. The latter’s criticism of the 
government won him massive support from a citizenry whose average monthly salary was 
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less than $20 in a time of 40 per cent inflation.
56
 However, Belarusians rejected a candidate of 
the old nomenklatura only to elect another figure of the same ilk. In the July 1994 second 
round of voting, Lukashenko won a landslide victory, polling 80.1 per cent of the total vote.
57
 
Lukashenko “personified all the characteristics of the republic’s Supreme Soviet – 
incompetence, populism, inconsistency, hatred of democracy and utter disrespect for the 
law”.58 After his election win, key figures in the previous administration who had campaigned 
against Lukashenko defected to his side.
59
 
 
Lukashenko used the lack of an independence referendum in Belarus to his advantage. He 
based his legitimacy on the March 1991 referendum for a “revived (Soviet) union”.60 The new 
president, with significant public support, sought to re-unite Belarus with Russia. Poland and 
Lithuania opposed this move, seeing a union of Russia and Belarus as giving Moscow more 
leverage in influencing their countries. In the 1990s, several Russian leaders, including 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, publicly backed 
Lukashenko and Russia repeatedly intervened to support him.
61
 
 
Moving in different directions  
 
During the 1990s, as Poland pursued a foreign policy course with twin main priorities of 
achieving membership of Nato and the EU, Belarus moved in a different direction, towards 
closer integration with Russia. While Poland has become a western-style liberal democracy, 
Belarus has become more authoritarian and clamped down on civil liberties.  
 
Unlike Russia and Ukraine, Belarus did not have a nomenklatura liberalisation phase. The 
country’s nomenklatura “did not have a chance to amass fortunes sufficient to form a class of 
owners”.62 Lack of natural resources meant “no export quotas for oil, gas, or metal to make 
quick millions”.63 Belarus stagnated. It became “the land that time forgot”.64 There were no 
new advertising, companies or tourists. Lack of economic reforms meant huge state debts 
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were incurred supporting collective farms and the military-industrial complex, “which was 
high-tech but useless”.65  
 
Poland’s move to EU accession during the late 1990s did not help improve relations with 
Belarus. If anything, Poland’s obsession with the West and joining the EU contributed to the 
worsening of relations with the authorities in Minsk. After the turn of the century, when 
Poland was surer of its acceptance in the West, the country began once more to become 
actively interested in Belarus. 
 
Lukashenko and his government violate human rights, rig elections and suppress the 
opposition. Opposition to his rule is weak and largely confined to the intelligentsia and 
students. The russified, denationalised masses, with ambivalent identities, are “amorphous”, 
hard to mobilise and “susceptible to ... Soviet nostalgia”.66 The mass of the population seeks 
the relative comfort of the known Soviet way of doing things to the unknown and apparently 
dangerous Western way. Lukashenko has played to this mass.  He continues to have much 
more public support than any other politician in Belarus.
67
 The lack of political freedom has 
prevented the growth of political parties. When Minsk hosted several major anti-government 
rallies, the authorities crushed the protests brutally. Opposition leaders were forced to flee the 
country and hundreds of their supporters were arrested. The authorities “issued a number of 
rulings restricting various constitutional freedoms”.68 The constitution of Belarus is, “at best, 
an occasionally used tool for manipulation by” Lukashenko.69  
 
Poland and the Belarus opposition 
 
In 1992, concerned by the lack of political and economic reform and “threats to Belarusian 
sovereignty”, a group of Belarusians opposed to the authorities in Minsk established the 
Biełaruski Narodny Front (Belarusian People’s Front or BPF), which began to agitate for a 
referendum on having early parliamentary elections.
70
 The BPF strongly opposed plans to 
establish closer political ties or a union between Belarus and Russia.
71
 However, in a speech 
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to the BPF’s founding meeting, one of its leaders said that all the country’s ethnic minorities, 
including Russians, Poles, Jews and Lithuanians, would have a place in independent Belarus. 
“The Poles and Lithuanians are our brothers, and we have countless examples of shared and 
truly fraternal coexistence.”72  
 
Claiming that the mentality of western Belarusians is “genetically” orientated to Europe, 
Lukiewicz notes that there are still Belarusians alive today who lived in Tsarist Russia, 
interwar Poland, fascist Germany and the Soviet Union.
73
 Their personal experience was 
handed on to new generations and cannot but be reflected in the worldview of western 
Belarusians.
 
 
 
In 2005, one Belarusian academic said 
 
Nie możemy zapominać, że stosunki z Polską są bardzo ważne dla białoruskich elit 
intelektualnych. Wystarczy przypomnieć, że dzisiaj najlepiej mówią po białorusku 
Białorusini, którzy mieszkają w Polsce.74 
 
[We cannot forget that relations with Poland are very important for the Belarusian 
intellectual elite. It is enough to remember that today the Belarusians who live in 
Poland speak Belarusian best.] 
 
In contrast to the Belarus regime, the Belarusian opposition, both democratic and nationalist, 
sees in Poland an ally and supporter. Poland has emerged as the main supporter in the EU of 
the Belarusian pro-democracy movement. This is a significant development, as historically 
the Belarusian national movement did not see Poland as an ally, and tended to consider 
Poland to be a greater threat to the Belarusian nation than Russia was. The “beleaguered 
Belarusian national movement, anti-Polish at the beginning of the 1990s, was pro-Polish by 
the end of the decade”.75 
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country higher than us the same lower than us 
2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 
Poland 95 97 3 3 2 0 
Latvia 80 91 15 8 6 1 
Lithuania 75 92 21 8 5 0 
Russia 48 59 41 38 11 3 
Ukraine 7 6 27 22 67 72 
Figures in % 
Table 6.2 Belarusians’ perceptions of living standards in neighbouring countries76 
 
After having helped the pro-Western forces during Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, “Poles as a 
whole seem enthusiastic about supporting democracy in Belarus”.77 In early 2006, Poland’s 
“parliament adopted a resolution condemning the Belarusian authorities for their intimidation 
of opposition candidates and activists”.78  
 
Polish universities have offered Belarusian students and academics internships and 
scholarships.
79
 Polish NGOs “remain intent on helping Belarus in the long term”.80 For many 
Polish NGOs, Belarus is a priority. For their efforts, Polish and other EU-based NGOs have 
run into trouble with the Belarusian government. For example, in July 2005, the authorities in 
Minsk accused the apolitical Dialogue European Fund, which promotes cooperation between 
scientists across Central and Eastern Europe, of spying and ordered it out of Belarus.
81
 
 
In March 2006, thousands of Poles attended a Solidarity With Belarus rock concert in 
Warsaw, featuring Belarusian rock groups banned in their homeland.
82
 Agnieszka 
Komorowska, the coordinator of the European Choice for Belarus programme at the Stefan 
Batory Foundation in Warsaw, said Poles’ interest was inevitable.83 Poland did not have a 
dialogue with Belarus.
84
 “So democracy seems to be a guarantee of change and of having 
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someone in power with whom we can work.”85 In January 2006, Belarusian opposition 
candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich met President Kaczyński in Warsaw. 
 
The European Union and Belarus 
 
In the 1990s, Belarus “retreated completely to the status of a Russian dominion”.86 Integration 
with Russia “questions the very sovereignty of Belarus”.87 EU policies of the early 1990s that 
focused on Russia accelerated the drift. In the early 1990s, the EU struggled to see Belarus as 
separate from Russia. When the Soviet Union broke up, EU policies towards Belarus during 
the early 1990s “reflected a mixture of indifference and lack of interest, and were highly 
Russophile”.88 The EU continued these policies for years afterwards. No CIS country made it 
into even the “slow track” group of prospective member states. Bordonaro says Europe’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy seems to be “a mere set of institutional instruments” 
unable to “effectively coordinate” member states’ policy priorities.89 After 1994, some EU 
countries began to adopt less Russo-centric policies towards Belarus but the election of 
Lukashenko “destroyed any hopes that the slow pace” of democratisation would continue.90 
Oppositionists, dissidents and outspoken journalists have been jailed and murdered. Pro-
democracy elements within Belarus are weak and have not been strong enough to effect the 
type of political advance that occurred in Ukraine from 2004. 
 
After Belarus became independent, relations with the EU initially progressed well towards the 
adoption of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (negotiated in 1995) and an interim 
trade agreement. Both agreements were, however, frozen as a result of the deterioration of the 
political situation in Belarus following the election of Lukashenko as president. The EU 
became interested in Belarus only after Lukashenko smashed moves to democratisation, “by 
which time it was too late”.91 Even then, the EU “followed double standards”.92 Anxious not 
to offend Russia, the EU muted its criticism of Yeltsin’s support for the Lukashenko regime 
after 1995. With Nato enlargement, Moscow geopolitical interest in Minsk increased. This 
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had a detrimental effect on political and economic reform in Belarus.
93
 As relations between 
Russia and the EU deteriorated in the later 1990s, the reform agenda in Belarus suffered. 
 
In early 2002, the EU launched a new attempt to improve relations with Belarus. This 
approach aimed at clearly identified steps towards democratisation to be paralleled at each 
stage by gradual resumption of dialogue with the government and provision of broader 
assistance, ending with full normalisation of relations. EU-Belarus relations deteriorated in 
2002 as Belarus failed to make any progress towards democratisation. In the light of Minsk’s 
clampdown on OSCE activities in Belarus, 14 out of 15 EU member states decided in 
November 2002 to prevent the entry into their territories of President Lukashenko and other 
Belarusian leaders. In February 2003, the European Parliament expressed strong concern at 
the increasing self-isolation of Belarus and declared its support for the approach taken by the 
European Commission and Council. In 2003, the European Commission stated that the EU 
faced “a choice in Belarus: either to leave things to drift ... or to engage.”94 The visa ban was 
lifted in April 2003 after the establishment of a new OSCE office in Minsk. 
 
In 2003, the European Commission admitted that the EU’s relations with Belarus had 
“progressed little since 1996”.95 Kuzio says the EU and other international organisations 
found it hard to influence Belarus because of three factors.
96
 First, they did not want to offend 
Russia. Second, Lukashenko had been elected by a large majority of Belarusian voters and 
had significant domestic popularity.
97
 The EU stopped recognising Lukashenko as the 
legitimate president of Belarus only after his term officially expired in mid-1999. Third, “the 
democratic opposition remained weak, divided, and unable to pose a serious threat to the ... 
regime”.98 
 
In 2004, the European Commission had several contacts with the Belarus regime with a view 
to bringing Belarus “closer to European democratic standards”.99 But restrictions on the media 
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“and other negative developments” demonstrated the reluctance of Belarus “to move towards 
democratic standards”.100 
 
The 2004 enlargement increased EU interest in the situation in Belarus. The fact that Belarus 
now shares a border of more than 1000km with the EU has increased the will to normalise 
relations with the pariah. This will is especially strong in Poland. In December 2002, Poland 
presented a proposal for an “Eastern Dimension” which included coherent policy proposals on 
which EU policy towards Belarus should be based. At the same time as the 2004 enlargement, 
the EC presented its new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), designed to intensify 
relations between the expanded EU and neighbouring countries and permit effective support 
for social and economic reform in those countries. In May 2004, the Commission put forward 
a proposal on relations with Belarus in the context of the ENP. An ENP strategy paper states 
that under the existing conditions in Belarus it was not yet possible to offer the full benefits of 
the ENP to Belarus.
101
 
 
In May 2004, the European Commission’s Country Strategy Paper National Indicative 
Programme Belarus stated that the EU’s long-term goals included:  
 
that Belarus be a democratic, stable, reliable, and increasingly prosperous partner with 
which the enlarged EU will share not only common borders, but also a common agenda 
driven by shared values.
102
  
 
The strategy paper said that the EU had tried to help Belarus begin “the transition towards a 
stable democracy that can ensure respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in line with its UN and OSCE commitments”.103 The EU also attached importance 
to the Council of Europe and OSCE “being able to maintain smooth relations with Belarus 
and enjoy favourable working conditions in the country”.104 The paper added that “the process 
of rapprochement between Belarus and the CoE should continue and reach a positive 
conclusion”.105  
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Belarus was not among the group of countries which could make full use of the ENP. There 
was no mention in the document of establishing contact at the highest level with Belarus or to 
activate the plan there.
106
 The EC stated that Belarus must make fundamental political and 
economic reforms before it could benefit from the ENP.
107
 In the meantime, the EU and 
Belarus would have only a common border until reforms in Belarus allowed a common 
agenda based on common values.  
 
Minsk used the presence of Polish observers at the 2004 Belarusian elections and referendum 
for propaganda purposes. In 2004, European Movement Secretary-General Henryk Krener 
said that for Belarus to become a member of the EU, it would have to reform and, in 
particular, establish a democratic system and rule of law.
108
 The Belarusian economy would 
need to be restructured to become stronger and more competitive in the global market.
109
 
However, a change in regime “is needed before Belarus can fully participate in the ENP 
process.”110 Without a regime change, Belarus “has no chance of becoming an EU 
member”.111 
 
In August 2005, thanks partly to lobbying by Poland, the EU released a declaration 
condemning Belarus in strong language for its failure to meet basic European human rights 
standards, for persecuting its Polish minority and jailing opposition figures following flawed 
elections.
112
 The declaration said the EU was deeply concerned at developments in Belarus 
which had demonstrated “once again the systematic and increasing repression of civil society, 
the political opposition and the independent media”.113 The EU went on to condemn 
government repression of the Union of Poles in Belarus. It said that such interference 
undermined minority rights and contravened “standards of governance to which Belarus has 
signed up to as part of its OSCE commitments”.114 The EU also called on Minsk to halt the 
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repression of its own citizens “and to ensure full compliance with its human rights 
obligations, including on minorities”.115 The declaration expressed disappointment that Minsk 
continued “to hinder the development of closer EU-Belarus relations and prevent the 
Belarusian people from enjoying the benefits of the European Neighbourhood Policy”.116 
Further, the declaration said the EU would continue to assist “Belarusian civil society and the 
population at large in their efforts to promote a democratic and pluralistic society in 
Belarus”.117  
 
In signs of a rapprochement between Poland and Belarus, in September 2008, Polish Foreign 
Minister Radosław Sikorski called for the lifting of EU visa sanctions on Belarusian 
government officials “as soon as possible”.118 However, a meeting of EU foreign ministers in 
Brussels that month was more cautious. It decided that “further friendly gestures” towards the 
Lukashenko regime should be conditional on the regime showing respect for democratic 
values in upcoming parliamentary elections.
119
 
 
Visas and borders 
 
Since the 1990s, the Polish-Belarusian border has been the scene of illegal migration to 
Poland of citizens of African and Asian countries trying to reach Western European countries, 
the flow into Poland of members of criminal groups originating in countries of the former 
Soviet Union, smuggling of cars stolen in western Europe and Poland and the bribing of 
border guards and customs officers by organised criminal groups.
120
 
 
New laws on aliens were introduced in Poland in 1998-2000, causing the withdrawal of the 
Belarusian ambassador from Warsaw. The opening of internal EU borders means that the 
function carried out by border controls must be realised in another way. Detailed provisions 
regulating private traffic between Poland and Belarus are contained in an agreement signed in 
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August 2003.
121
 The charge for a single-entry visa would be €10 and for a multiple-entry visa 
€50, a significant sum of money for an average Belarusian.122 Among those who do not have 
to pay for a visa are academics, students, teachers and members of the Bug, Niemen and 
Białowieża Forest Euroregion working groups.123 Half-price multiple-entry visas are given to 
those visiting family.
124
 
 
A visible result of the introduction of the visa regime was a considerable reduction of 
smuggling and localised cross-border movements of small traders. Zięba and Kowalczyk 
consider that a “decidedly positive result”, as the trade often had a criminal character and its 
temporary blossoming was a result of an economic “pathology” on both sides of the border.125 
On a local scale the limiting of such cross-border trade has had negative impacts for some 
communities. In 1992, for the first time in 45 years it had been possible to cross Poland’s 
eastern border without a visa. The return to a visa regime might be understood by some to 
mark a negative step. 
 
Despite the difficulties, co-operation between the border services of Poland and Belarus is “is 
not the worst”.126 The modernisation of the Polish-Belarusian border infrastructure in the run-
up to Polish EU accession was carried out reasonably effectively, better than on the more 
porous border with Ukraine.
127
 In 2004, dialogue at the highest level was renewed with a 
meeting between the foreign ministers of Poland and Belarus. Negotiations permitted work 
on, among other things, relatively liberal visa rules. On a macroeconomic scale both Poland 
and Belarus could both benefit from more regulated border traffic.  
 
The Russian factor in Belarus 
 
While the EU supported the transition process in Belarus, the influence of Russia has been 
more negative. Belarus “can be described as a national-populist regime that pairs a strongly 
pro-Russian geopolitical stance with resistance to pro-market policies and to Nato 
expansion”.128 Russia “supported the imposition of an authoritarian regime in Belarus for 
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selfish geopolitical purposes”.129 Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, Belarus has gained 
geostrategic importance. In 1991, Belarus hosted 23 rocket bases and 42 military airfields and 
a tenth of the country’s territory was under the jurisdiction of the Soviet military.130 In 1995, 
Moscow and Minsk signed an agreement allowing Russia to keep two bases in Belarus.
131
 
Belarus has become a “semi-sovereign state” due to its “being entangled in the Belarus-Russia 
dyad and counting (depending) on Russian oil and gas to fill the country’s pipelines”.132 
While the oft-trumpeted union with Russia has not been completed, it has remained a 
principle of Minsk’s foreign policy.  
 
Poland’s difficulties with Belarus are not limited to the social sphere. In Minsk and Moscow, 
a future where Belarus and Russia become one country seems natural and desirable. In 
Warsaw, such a prospect is alarming. Russia - especially if it controls Belarus and Ukraine - is 
considered by Poland’s decision-makers as the country’s main geopolitical threat. If a “small 
Soviet Union” including Belarus and Ukraine was created, Poland would share more than 
1000 kilometres of borders with it.  
 
For Poland, the full integration of Belarus into western economic structures, if not the EU, 
would hasten an end to Russia’s grip on strategic energy routes in the region. The energy 
issue is one of the causes of the deterioration in Polish-Belarus relations. It is “linked to the 
new geopolitics of Eastern Europe as a whole”.133 In 2005, Vladimir Putin announced changes 
in Moscow’s energy policy orientation, notably that Russia’s Gazprom and Germany’s BASF 
would build a new gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea.
134
 This would be a blow to Poland’s 
energy security and economic growth. The new pipeline would provide an alternative route 
for Russian gas, bypassing Poland. After Putin’s statements, Warsaw said it would use its 
position in the EU to support alternative strategic projects.
135
 One idea was to build a new 
pipeline from Russia to Europe via Belarus and Poland. This Polish plan would be in danger 
if relations between Minsk and Warsaw continue to worsen. So Warsaw has mulled the 
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possibility of a pipeline via the Baltic states, bypassing Belarus. This plan “increased Minsk’s 
irritation with Warsaw”.136 
 
Poland has actively pursued its own agenda as a power in the region and functions as a close 
ally of the US in Europe.
137
 Since 1991 the main geopolitical issues in Central and Eastern 
Europe have been the eastward expansion of the EU, Nato and capitalism, and the US 
“struggle to roll back the remains of Russian influence”.138 Belarus can be considered as 
Russia’s last satellite state in Eastern Europe. In 2005, the US aimed at bringing about a 
“regime change” in Minsk in the style of the colour revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and 
Kyrgyzstan.
139
 To bring this about, the US financed and supported pro-Western dissidents and 
social movements in Belarus.
140
 In July 2005, Lukashenko said Poland was “pursuing a clear 
policy aimed at reducing Belarus-Polish relations”, adding that Warsaw was working with 
Washington in order to take over Minsk.
141
 The crisis occurred two months after US President 
George W Bush’s speech in Vilnius in May 2005 in which he called Belarus “the last 
dictatorship in Europe”.142 Poland’s quarrel with Minsk signalled that US and Polish interests 
coincided “on several fundamental issues in Eastern Europe”.143  
 
Belarus survives 
 
Since Belarus’ unsought independence in 1991, the relationship between Poland and Belarus 
has varied from lukewarm to confrontational. On the face of it, the EU’s impact on relations 
between Poland and Belarus has been negative. Thus far, Polish efforts to ensure Belarusian 
progress to a freer, more Western way of doing things have been a failure.  
 
In the Polish assessment there is always a discussion as to whether one should talk to 
Belarusian authorities and identify those who could lead the change from the inside or 
whether one should opt for the black-and-white scenario, meaning we only support the 
democrats and you rule out working with members of the establishment and policy is 
vacillating between these two. At the moment it’s more in the camp of those who think 
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that working with the establishment is more promising. There were high hopes at the 
time when the Georgian war happened and Lukashenko was clearly concerned and it ... 
was seen as feasible that he would open up a bit more, but the war subsided, the 
Russians did what they wanted to do and in the elections ... Lukashenko didn’t allow a 
single opposition politician to enter the parliament which was to be a token case of his 
commitment to working with the EU.
144
 
 
The changes which have taken place in Belarus-Polish relations reflect two general integrative 
tendencies whose directions are opposed: Poland has entered the European Union while 
Belarus has sought a union with Russia. Belarus stands almost alone in Europe as a state 
implacably hostile to values such as liberal democracy, pluralism, human rights, free media 
and a capitalist economy. Its “national-populist regime” combines “a strongly pro-Russian 
geopolitical stance with resistance to pro-market policies and to Nato expansion”.145  
 
The experience of the 1990s, when for the first time in half a century people could freely 
communicate across the border, is an asset which cannot be wasted, if one has as goals the 
improvement of relations between the EU and Belarus and the transmission of EU values and 
norms to its eastern neighbour. The economic, social and political development of Belarus in 
a positive direction would likely be accelerated by close economic, social and cultural 
interaction with the EU and its people. The fact that Poland is richer, freer and happier than 
Belarus has served to enhance the country’s image among Belarusians, particularly among 
younger, educated Belarusians. Membership of the EU has improved Poland’s leverage over 
Belarus and made many Belarusians respect the country more. For pro-western and pro-EU 
Belarusians, Poland can have a desirable role as “a guide to Europe, mentor in the art of 
democracy”, and relayer of EU norms and values.146 
 
It is in the interests of Poland and Belarus that the eastern border of the EU does not become a 
new barrier dividing Europe in two major parts. In addition, the EU as a whole should ensure 
that the process of European integration is not viewed by some Europeans through a prism of 
marginalisation and exclusion, which might well preclude the possibility of them being 
positively affected by the EU’s normative power to change. 
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This chapter contains a historical background to Polish-Lithuanian relations, added 
information about the response of Poles and Lithuanians surveyed for this thesis in 2008, and 
information about the general geopolitical and economic context that Lithuania found itself in 
between 1990 and 2010. 
 
Since Lithuania regained its independence in 1990-91, the two countries have enjoyed good 
relations. These good relations are due both to obvious common objectives between the two 
states, and to decisions made in Brussels and Strasbourg. Allowing both Poland and Lithuania 
to travel the path leading to EU membership encouraged the two countries to cooperate more 
than might otherwise have occurred.  
 
Despite excellent government-to-government ties, when it comes to popular sentiment, 
Polish-Lithuanian relations are not as warm as they could be. The traditional Polish view of 
Lithuania is of a country “civilised” and “Europeanised” by its traditional association with 
Poland. The competing nationalisms of the early 20
th
 century saw a change in the view of the 
Lithuania. It came to be seen as anti-Polish. This view came to the fore again after Lithuania 
had secured independence in 1991, when it seemed to Poles that the Polish minority in 
Lithuania was being discriminated against.  
 
Apart from Lithuania’s ethnic Polish minority, popular affection among Lithuanians for 
Poland is limited mostly to the upper echelons of Lithuanian society and then mainly only in 
so far as Poland is seen as a geopolitical counterweight to Russia. As late as the 1990s, some 
Lithuanians feared Poland more than Russia, not because Poland was a military threat, but 
because they saw Polish culture as having dominated and assimilated Lithuanian culture, with 
the potential to do so again. 
 
Historical background 
 
Lithuania’s history is tied more closely with Poland’s than with any other country. The two 
countries spent long centuries together in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and have had 
common geostrategic interests and stances for most of the period they have existed as states. 
Relations between the two countries reached a low in the aftermath of World War I, when the 
two newly reborn states fought over Vilnius. They remained strained throughout the interwar 
period.  
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At the end of the 14th century, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was the largest country in 
Europe. It included the territories of present-day Belarus, most of Ukraine, and parts of 
Poland and Russia. Circumstances and geopolitics drove Lithuania and Poland to seek an 
alliance. “The young states of Lithuania and Poland encountered in both the East and West 
powerful and threatening forces which could be resisted only through joint efforts.”1 
Lithuania officially became Christian in 1385, following Poland’s offer of its crown to 
Lithuania’s Grand Duke Jogaila.2 For the next two centuries, Lithuania and Poland were ruled 
by the same Lithuanian dynasty. The 1569 Union of Lublin between the Kingdom of Poland 
and Grand Duchy of Lithuania led to the consolidation of the two countries into Europe’s 
largest state, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, or Rzeczpospolita, and also led to the 
growth of the Polish community in Lithuania.
3
  
 
The Union of Lublin and Commonwealth period is viewed differently by Polish and 
Lithuanian historians. Poles emphasise its peaceful creation and role in spreading Polish 
culture. Lithuanians point out that the union was dominated by Poland. During the 
Commonwealth era, Lithuania’s nobility and higher culture was polonised, “resulting in the 
relegation of the Lithuanian language to the peasant class”.4 Many Lithuanians (especially in 
western Lithuania, which would later form most of today’s Republic of Lithuania) saw Poland 
as a cultural oppressor, and resisted polonisation, even as the joint state was dissolved and 
Lithuania was taken over by the Russian Empire in the late 18
th
 century.  
 
Importantly for the growth of Lithuanian national consciousness, a small part of Lithuania 
(known as Lithuania Minor, or Memelland in German) around the city of Klaipeda was 
annexed by German Prussia and remained in German hands until after World War 1. The 
Russian Empire banned the written use of the Lithuanian language, but texts in Lithuanian 
were printed in Lithuania Minor and smuggled into Russian-occupied Lithuania. By the end 
of the 19
th
 century, the developing Lithuanian national movement had begun a “move away 
from Polish language and culture and toward a declaration for an independent statehood”.5  
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Vilnius (Wilno in Polish) and its surrounding area had become Polish in language and identity 
by the 19
th
 century. By World War I, Poles accounted for well over half of the city’s 
population.
6
 Most of the rest were Jews. Less than 2 per cent of the city’s population was 
ethnic Lithuanian.
7
 At the end of World War I, the emergent nation states of Poland and 
Lithuania both claimed Vilnius, as did Soviet Russia. After a few years of struggle between 
these entities, Poland was able to take control of the city and surrounding region. The 
Lithuanian government, which continued to claim Vilnius as its de jure capital, fled to 
Kaunas, which became the de facto capital of Lithuania until 1939.  
 
Vilnius and the surrounding district were in Poland until September 1939 when the Soviet 
Union occupied the area. At this time, many Polish soldiers fled across the border into 
Lithuania rather than surrender to the Soviets or Germans. These soldiers were generally well 
treated in Lithuania.
8
 During World War II, unlike what happened in the Polish-Ukrainian 
borderland, “Poles and Lithuanians did little direct harm to each other”, although the dispute 
over Vilnius would continue to prevent good relations between the two ethnicities.
9
 
 
The Polish occupation of Vilnius in the interwar years still impinges on relations between 
Poles and Lithuanians.  
 
Lithuanians fear Polish more than Russians. It was still like a big trauma, losing Vilnius 
to Poland, having Polish people have so much influence in Lithuania, coming as 
tourists, being very present ... they still have the fear.
10
 
 
In October 1939 Stalin gave the city to Lithuania, then in June 1940 annexed the whole of 
Lithuania into the Soviet Union. When in October 1939, Lithuanian soldiers occupied 
Vilnius, they “were astonished to find that they could not communicate with the local 
population”.11 The soldiers even resorted to French and German to ask for directions.12 The 
city had a Polish majority and Jewish minority. At that time, even by the official Lithuanian 
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count, only 6 per cent of the city’s residents were Lithuanian.13 “Vilnius, so desired and so 
dear to Lithuanians, turn[ed] out to be entirely non-Lithuanian.”14  
 
In 1940, the Soviets began large-scale deportations of Poles from Vilnius to remote parts of 
the Soviet Union, a process interrupted by the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. The 
Nazis occupied Lithuania from 1941 to 1944, exterminating most of the country’s sizable 
Jewish minority. In 1944 the Red Army reconquered the country. Lithuania remained in the 
Soviet Union until 1991.
15
 Between 1940 and 1954, according to US State Department 
figures, Lithuania lost over 780,000 of its citizens.
16
 The Soviets killed or exiled to Siberia as 
many as 300,000 Lithuanians.
17
 Many Lithuanians, including Valdas Adamkus, who became 
president of the reborn Lithuania in 1998, fled to the West after the war rather than risk 
deportation or death at the hands of the Soviets.  
 
The Lithuanian nationalists who had brought about the creation of the interwar Republic of 
Lithuania had deliberately created a largely homogeneous nation-state, based on the compact 
Lithuanian-speaking parts of the much larger historical Lithuania. The resulting state was too 
small to defend itself in the environment in which it found itself in the 1930s, particularly in 
the absence of a regional defence alliance. By the end of World War II, Lithuania’s leaders 
realised, in the words of the country’s pre-war President Antanas Smetona, that “the 
restoration of the Lithuanian state on narrow national foundations was a mistake”.18 
Nonetheless, Lithuania’s 20 years of existence as an independent nation state gave it a 
historical and modern foundation on which to base realistic hopes of re-emerging as an 
independent country. It gave newly independent Lithuania a legitimacy and perceived 
naturalness in the 1990s. 
 
Lithuania under communism  
 
Between 1945 and 1956, most of Lithuania’s Poles (including almost all the surviving white-
collar Poles) were expelled to Poland. This “had serious consequences in forming the national 
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consciousness of the Poles [left behind] in Lithuania and in shaping their social and cultural 
life”.19 Many rural and lower-class Poles were left in their homes. Depopulated Vilnius was 
repopulated principally with Lithuanians, although thousands of Russians, Ukrainians and 
Belarusians were also moved in from other parts of the Soviet Union. Most satellite towns and 
villages near Vilnius remained predominantly Polish, notably Naujoji Vilnia (Nowa Wilejka 
in Polish). Strong local resistance (including armed resistance to the 1950s) to Sovietisation 
and Lithuania’s more rural demography ensured that the proportion of Russians in Lithuania’s 
population was kept much lower than in Estonia and Latvia.  
 
In the communist period, as part of the Soviet Union, Lithuania was kept under much tighter 
control by the Kremlin than was Poland, which as a Soviet satellite had nominal 
independence. Given the proximity to Poland, widespread knowledge of Polish in Lithuania, 
traditional ties between the two nations, and the relative freedom in Poland, the latter emerged 
as a major conduit for the transmission of western ideas and knowledge into Lithuania. 
Inhabitants of much of Lithuania could watch Polish television channels, while Polish 
newspapers and translations of Western books became for most of the Soviet period an 
important source of free information in Lithuania.
20
 Middle-aged Lithuanians interviewed in 
June 2008 for this thesis said that they remembered learning Polish from watching Polish 
television as youngsters. The events of the early 1980s in Poland inspired the Lithuanian 
nationalist movement in the late 1980s. In this respect, Poland functioned for Lithuanians 
somewhat as Lithuania Minor had in Tsarist days, linking Lithuania to a relatively freer 
outside world. 
 
The Paris-based Polish-language Kultura periodical, whose founder editor, Jerzy Giedroyc 
was born a Russian citizen in Minsk of a polonised Lithuanian family, regularly published 
information about Lithuania, and analysed Lithuanian-Polish relations and the possibility “of 
the two states drawing together”.21 In the 1950s, Kultura was the first émigré, non-communist 
Polish intellectual circle to openly advocate the recognition of Poland’s postwar eastern 
border and abandon historic claims to Vilnius. In 1981, during the Polish Solidarity spring, a 
periodical called Lithuania, devoted to Lithuanian questions, was launched in Kraków. 
However, “all these things were known only in a narrow circle of intellectuals”.22  
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The greater part of both nations continued living in the so-called ‘informational 
vacuum’, nurtured by Soviet clichés and unhappy recollections of the two countries’ 
relations in the inter-war period. This ‘vacuum’ froze and allowed many old stereotypes 
... to survive.
23
  
 
Lithuania’s Polish minority 
 
Soviet Lithuania was a “national state”.24 In comparison with most other Soviet republics, 
especially its northern neighbours, the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic had a relatively 
homogeneous ethnic profile. Its leaders considered Lithuania “to be an ethnoregional concept 
blending language and territory into a single whole with its own distinctive political 
imperatives”. Although some nationalists insisted that much of Lithuania’s territory was 
outside the borders of the Lithuanian SSR, Lithuania’s leaders, both communist and non-
communist, accepted the borders of the Lithuanian SSR as the final borders of independent 
Lithuania. Within these borders, ethnic Lithuanians made up 80 per cent of the population.  
 
Ethnic group population % 
Lithuanians 2,925,300 79.6 
Russians 345,450 9.4 
Poles 257,250 7.0 
Belarusians   62,475 1.7 
Ukrainians 44,100 1.2 
Others 40,125 1.1 
Total 3,675,000 100.0 
 
Table 7.1 Lithuania’s ethnic composition in 198925 
 
Ethnic Poles, Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians living in Lithuania tend to be grouped 
together as “Slavs” (a word which tends to be used pejoratively by ethnic Lithuanians) by the 
majority community, whose attitude has veered between advocating minorities’ expulsion and 
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assimilation. Lithuanians’ belief in their distinctiveness from Slavs has a basis in linguistic 
and cultural differences. Lithuanian is a Baltic language whose closest extant relative is 
Latvian. The Baltic languages are related to, but distinct from, the Slavic languages. 
Importantly, the Lithuanian language is not mutually intelligible with any Slavic language. 
Lithuanians also tend to consider themselves to be more “northern” than their Slavic 
neighbours and emphasise links with Scandinavia, particularly Denmark and Sweden. To 
some extent, the historic links are exaggerated. Lithuania, unlike the other two Baltic states, 
was never ruled directly by either Denmark or Sweden; Lithuanians are mostly Roman 
Catholic, not Lutheran. 
 
Since the 1980s, the Polish minority in Lithuania has numbered about 250,000 to 300,000 
people - about 7 per cent of the country’s population. The minority is concentrated in the 
Vilnius area. (There is a much smaller Lithuanian minority in northeastern Poland.)  Poles 
living in the Soviet Union were particular targets for repression. Although they suffered 
discrimination in Lithuania, conditions for Poles living in the Soviet Union were least bad in 
Lithuania, where their relative numbers were higher than in any other Soviet republic. In the 
latter 1980s, some ethnic Poles had moved from other parts of the Soviet Union to Lithuania 
to take advantage of the Polish schools there. Meanwhile, many Polish families were sending 
their children to Russian-medium schools, believing that such training would best prepare 
them for life.  
 
Unfortunately, the existence and situation of the Polish minority in Lithuania casts a shadow 
over relations between the two countries.
26
 When Lithuania strove towards independence in 
the late 1980s, the Polish minority, fearing the stated objectives of Sajudis and other 
Lithuanian nationalist groupings to “re-Lithuanianise” Lithuania, found itself in the anti-
independence camp. In 1990, having won a comfortable majority in the new parliament, 
Sajudis deputies elected nationalist Vytautas Landsbergis as chairman of the republic’s 
Supreme Soviet. In effect, he became Lithuania’s head of government. In March 1990, 
Lithuania became the first Soviet republic to declare its independence, or more exactly, in “a 
carefully orchestrated series of votes, ... deputies declared the restoration of the [pre-war] 
Lithuanian republic”.27 They announced “they had no obligations toward the Soviet 
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constitution” and “spoke of dismantling the occupation regime”.28 Such talk unnerved 
Lithuania’s Slavic minorities. Lithuania’s Poles feared they would lose out in an independent 
Lithuania and began “reasserting their national heritage”.29 Attendance at Polish schools 
began to grow, and Polish leaders demanded recognition by both church and state in 
Lithuania. Lithuanians considered much of the Polish minority to be hostile to the idea of an 
independent Lithuanian nation-state. In the 1980s, for the most part, Poles in Lithuania 
“considered themselves citizens of the Soviet Union rather than of Lithuania”.30 Support for 
the Lithuanian Communist Party was strongest in ethnically Polish districts surrounding 
Vilnius.
31
 Many Poles in Lithuania rallied to an organisation opposed to independence. As 
Lithuania pushed for independence, districts with ethnic Polish majorities “began using 
Sajudis arguments to promote their reannexation to Poland”.32 However, “the right to self-
determination was reserved for ethnic Lithuanians and [the Poles’] demands were promptly 
denied”.33   
 
In April 1990 the Soviet authorities imposed a blockade on Lithuania, stopping fuel, coffee 
and sugar shipments to the republic. However, ethnically Polish areas continued to receive 
supplies. The Soviet Communist Party encouraged ethnic Poles to demand autonomous 
regions within Lithuania.
34
 Some Poles in Lithuania called for the establishment of a Polish 
Soviet Socialist Republic within the USSR. In 1991, the Lithuanian government suppressed 
local self-government in the Polish regions in the southeast, saying that the local councils had 
consistently supported reactionary forces in Moscow. The Polish minority had a wide range of 
demands, including the establishment of a Polish university, Polish-language masses in 
Vilnius cathedral and a ban on Lithuanians moving into ethnically Polish regions around 
Vilnius.
35
 When it was suggested that Poles in Lithuania send their children to universities in 
Poland, community leaders responded that those students might not return to Lithuania and 
that therefore this was not in the interests of the ethnic Polish community.
36
 After 1991, Poles 
in Lithuania received support from Poland’s ambassador in Vilnius, who acted forcefully on 
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their behalf. Yet Polish organisations in Lithuania criticised Warsaw for not doing enough for 
Poles in Lithuania.
37
 
 
In the early 1990s, as the country fell behind Poland in the race to Westernise its economy 
and society, Lithuania was haemorrhaged by mass emigration. Lithuanian independence 
dismayed most of its ethnic Russian residents, whose relative standing in the republic 
deteriorated dramatically. Faced with the apparent alternatives of emigration or assimilation, 
many left the country. Between 1989 and 2006 Lithuania’s population fell from about 3.9 
million to 3.6 million people.
38
 Until 1995, the rapid decline in Lithuania’s population was 
caused mostly by emigration of Russian-speakers to Russia and Belarus. Ethnic Russians 
account for a declining single-digit percentage of Lithuania’s population, and are now 
outnumbered by ethnic Poles, whose numbers have not declined as fast. The ethnic Polish 
community, which feels itself to have deep historical roots in Lithuania and is heavily 
concentrated in the Vilnius area, is more resistant to assimilation than is the more scattered 
ethnic Russian minority. There is a strong argument for allowing bilingual street signs in 
districts with Polish majorities or large minorities. These districts mainly surround Vilnius. 
The inclusion of Vilnius city itself in such a bilingualisation move will be politically more 
difficult but might eventually happen. 
 
The fact that Poles and Poland were seen as offering a bridge to Europe, and Poland was seen 
as more advanced along the road to Europe and the West, helped bring about an improvement 
in the situation of ethnic Poles in Lithuania as the 1990s wore on. In the 1990s, there was also 
a considerable flow of Lithuanians to Poland for work. After 1995, and increasingly from 
2000, emigration rates accelerated among the majority Lithuanian-speaking population. The 
destination of emigrants became increasingly EU states, particularly Germany, Britain and 
Ireland, with large outflows in 2004 and 2005, after Lithuania joined the EU.  
 
Unlike in many other parts of the former Soviet Union, ethnic conflict in Lithuania has been 
contained peacefully. Lithuanian voices which called for the expulsion of Slavic minorities 
were silenced as EU entry drew closer, but the official policy of assimilation has continued. It 
is unclear what the long-term future holds for Lithuania’s Slav minorities, but the likeliest 
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future is one where the Polish and Russian communities gradually decline, through 
assimilation and emigration.  
 
Sentiment and history 
 
Opinion polls conducted in 2000 and 2001 reveal that although the number of Poles who 
expressed antipathy towards Lithuanians had decreased slightly since 1994, Lithuanians 
(along with Germans) were still listed among the nations towards which Poles had “more 
negative rather than positive feelings”.39 Other polls showed that for their part, throughout the 
1990s Lithuanians liked Poles less than Russians and much less than Germans.
40
 
Korzeniewska-Wolek says the less-than-positive attitudes towards Lithuanians among 
ordinary Poles, when compared with other neighbours, “call for an explanation by reference 
to historic imagination”.41  
 
Poles believe in the Jagiellonian myth. In school, Poles learn the legendary history of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and for Poles, Lithuania features prominently in history, as 
Poland’s longest-standing ally. Such opinions affect international relations. In 2001, then 
Polish Foreign Minister Bartoszewski admitted publicly that he felt deep sentimental 
attachment to Lithuania.
42
 When in 1997, the Polish and Lithuanian parliaments created a 
combined assembly, Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza waxed lyrical on the common political 
history of the two countries, and particularly on the Union of Lublin.
43
 The Jagiellonian “era 
still constitutes a reference point for the Polish political elite and for some it is still the basic 
line of thinking about Poland and Lithuania”.44 However, this sentiment is much more 
strongly felt among Poland’s intellectual, political and administrative classes and among the 
clergy, than it is among the masses. For many less educated Poles, the exclusive Lithuanian 
nationalism which came to the fore in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a sign of disloyalty 
to the memory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and, therefore, anti-Polish. 
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[H]istorical memory seems to exert significant influence on the way contemporary 
Poles see Lithuanians and relations with Lithuania. This capability also manifests itself 
in mutual relations between other nations.
45
  
 
Szporer claimed Polish-Lithuanian relations “resemble post-divorce bickerings of wounded 
spouses”.46 On signing the Polish-Lithuanian treaty of 1994, President Wałęsa said “Poles and 
Lithuanians are nations entangled in history. We should overcome this entanglement.”47  
 
During Lithuania’s struggle for independence, most Poles in Poland sympathised with 
Lithuania’s efforts to free itself from Soviet domination.48 Sajudis was viewed in Poland as a 
movement similar to Solidarity. Solidarity’s leaders, including the new Polish Foreign 
Minister Bronisław Geremek, welcomed Sajudis and expressed a desire to cooperate.49 
However, the warm words and personal relations between Polish and Lithuanian politicians 
did not find resonance among their peoples, particularly on the Lithuanian side.
50
 For many 
Poles in the 1990s Lithuania remained a “terra incognita”, a “small, unimportant land 
inhabited by strange persons and nationalists”.51 Warsaw’s eastern policy in the 1990s, which 
was supportive of the new governments and states of Lithuania and Ukraine, was not in line 
with Polish public opinion.  
 
At first, Western countries avoided making moves that might accelerate the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.
52
 Although Poland’s leaders felt duty-bound to support Lithuania’s drive for 
freedom, the West’s cautious attitude meant that Warsaw delayed recognising Lithuania’s 
independence and establishing diplomatic relations with Vilnius.  
 
However, Poland early on emerged as one of the main supporters of an independent Lithuania 
and signed a treaty recognising the current border between the two countries even before 
Lithuania has become a member of the UN. At the end of 1990, Poland’s foreign ministry 
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created the “two-track” concept, which provided for parallel contacts with the Soviet Union’s 
leaders in Moscow and leaders of the Soviet republics seeking independence. In early 1991, 
the first foreign visitor to address Lithuania’s new parliament was a Polish senator.53 In 
September 1991, following the abortive coup in Moscow, the Soviet Union recognised 
Lithuanian independence, allowing Lithuania to join the UN the same month. 
 
Lithuania soon found that independence brought problems. Soviet troops, which remained in 
the country, were “a constant threat”.54 The economy remained entangled with the collapsing 
Soviet one. Debate “raged as to which former Soviet institutions should be scrapped and 
which should be saved”. In addition, Lithuania “had to assume new responsibilities toward 
the minority nationalities in their new state”.55 Independent Poland and Lithuania strove “to 
convince the West of their abilities to conform to Western (democratic) norms of 
behaviour”.56 This was “especially the case on the issue of human rights, including treatment 
of national minorities”.57 Some in Poland sought to link the issues of support for Lithuania 
with the rights of Lithuania’s Polish minority.58  
 
Unlike its Baltic neighbours, independent Lithuania declared that “all persons residing and 
working in Lithuania as of 1989 [would be] eligible for citizenship”.59 The Lithuanian 
government also allowed minority groups (mainly Poles and Russians) to organise as such 
and supported the development of schools for the major groups. Lithuania’s liberal citizenship 
law substantially erased tensions with its neighbours.
60
 While Lithuania’s  
 
suspension of two strongly ethnic Polish district councils on charges of blocking reform 
or disloyalty during the August 1991 coup had cooled relations with Poland, ... bilateral 
cooperation markedly increased with the holding of elections in those districts and the 
signing of a bilateral friendship treaty in 1994.
61
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After a testy period in the early 1990s, when it was still unclear where the two newly 
independent countries of Poland and Lithuania were heading, from the mid 1990s there was a 
substantial convergence of interests between Vilnius and Warsaw.   
 
Incidents involving the Polish minority in Lithuania were resolved institutionally, the 
Polish side invariably invoking European standards and the value of Polish help in 
European integration. In these ways, Lithuania and Poland approximated the 
preemptive dispute resolution characteristic of the EU.
62
  
 
Lithuanian nationalists, who had long regarded Poles with a similar disdain to Russians, 
began to change their attitude as it became increasingly clear that the major – perhaps only – 
threat to Lithuanian independence was from Russia. Poland emerged as a major 
counterbalance to Moscow’s clout and malevolence. Among Lithuanian nationalists, Warsaw 
was increasingly seen as a friend and ally. “Lithuania is not tied with any other neighbouring 
country as closely and with so many multifaceted relations as with Poland.”63 In 1998, new 
Lithuanian President Adamkus declared Poland to be Lithuania’s “historically closest 
neighbour”.64 
 
Lithuania’s drive to Europe 
 
Lithuania “balanced its negotiations with Moscow by asserting that it belonged to 
‘Europe’”.65 Newly independent Lithuania’s main concern was the “return to Europe” and 
search for security.
66
 However, in the early 1990s, EU accession lagged “far behind as an 
external policy priority”.67 Instead, the main concerns were gaining membership of the UN, 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and Nato. In 
1994, Lithuania was the first post-Soviet country to apply to take part in Nato’s Partnership 
for Peace programme.  
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From the mid-1990s Lithuania worked intensively to gain entry to the EU. In a 1990 
document, the country’s political leaders agreed that: “The closest road to Western Europe for 
Lithuania will continue to be through Poland, and therefore good relations are important”.68  
Lithuania and Poland signed a free trade agreement in 1995 and then in 1997 an agreement on 
the creation of a combined battalion. That same year many other political, particularly 
parliamentary, institutions were created linking Poland and Lithuania. 
The EU signed a Europe Agreement with Lithuania in June 1995, four years after Poland. 
This “act meant the end of discussion about a possible ‘third way’” for Lithuania.69 The 
signing of the Europe Agreement meant that Lithuania would in principle be treated in the 
same way as Poland. However, the Commission’s 1997 recommendation that Lithuania be 
left out of the selected Luxembourg group impacted on Lithuanians’ attitudes towards the EU 
issue, despite the country being eventually included in the Helsinki group of accession 
countries in 1999.
70
 The 1997 recommendation and Luxembourg decision shocked Lithuania. 
This proved to be positive in stimulating Lithuania to improve its performance in relation to 
accession requirements.
71
 
 
Political 
criteria 
Economic 
criteria 
Membership 
obligations capacity 
Administrative and 
legal capacity 
Poland Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory tendency Satisfactory tendency 
Lithuania Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Satisfactory tendency 
Unable to form 
conclusion 
 
Table 7.2 Commission opinions on Polish and  Lithuanian applications, 200072 
 
A defining moment in the westward shift in Lithuania’s trading links was the Russian 
financial crisis of 1998, which had a “shattering” impact on Lithuanian companies still 
dependent on trade with “the East”.73 The crisis led Lithuania “to disengage from Russia and 
pursue more determinedly trade with” the EU. Many in Lithuania saw EU membership as a 
“consolation prize”, assuming Russian opposition would rule out the country’s accession to 
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Nato.
74
 Meanwhile, a small eurosceptic movement argued that Lithuanian accession to the EU 
would be bad for “national identity and independence”.75 
 
During the EU accession negotiations, Warsaw and Vilnius cooperated “very closely”.76 In 
September 2006, while hosting his Polish counterpart, President Adamkus called relations 
between Lithuania and Poland a “perfect example of cooperation between neighbouring 
countries”.77 He added that the two countries had harmonious, long-term neighbourly 
relations and were in a “strategic partnership”.78 Poland and Lithuania had “laid secure 
foundations together” and were together working to create “an open and competitive Europe 
without borders”.79 Calling for an “alliance of hearts” between the Lithuanian and Polish 
people, Adamkus noted that Lithuania and Poland had strengthened their partnership on join 
the EU and had enhanced political and military links.
80
 The advantages of EU membership, 
such as common infrastructural projects would enhance the welfare and security of the region.  
 
Lithuania at Poland’s side 
Poland’s relations with the rest of the EU were negatively affected after the right-wing 
Catholic Law and Justice Party won power in 2005, particularly after Jaroslaw Kaczyński, 
President Lech Kaczyński’s twin, became prime minister in 2006. Poland found itself in 
diplomatic isolation within the EU. However, partly as a result of this isolation, Poland 
developed even closer ties with Lithuania.
81
 In the 1990s, Poland had been “Lithuania’s 
assistant” on the road to Europe.82 In 2006, Lithuania could repay its debt to Poland by 
helping its bigger neighbour overcome EU scepticism towards the Kaczyńskis. Lithuania and 
Poland have many common interests as new members of the EU. Speaking as one in Brussels 
might “achieve more than acting individually”.83  
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In November 2006, Lithuanian foreign minister Petras Vaitiekunas told Polish daily 
Rzeczpospolita that Lithuania declared “solidarity with Poland, supports Poland from start to 
finish”, because Poland was defending its own interest as well as the interests of other EU 
member states, such as Lithuania.
84
 
How Lithuanians viewed Poland in 2008 
Lithuanian public opinion today seems to be aware that Poland and Lithuania are cooperating 
closely on a government level within the EU. One Lithuanian interviewed for this thesis in 
June 2008 said that as new members of the bloc, Lithuania and Poland “have to support each 
other if they want to ... influence ... [EU] decisions”. However, not all agree that Polish-
Lithuanian relations are close. Some interviewees pointed to the size disparity between the 
two countries as a reason why they might not always have similar interests at the EU table. 
While accepting that Lithuania and Poland had better relations since they joined the EU and 
were communicating with each other better, one respondent said: “Lithuania and Poland are 
very different in the EU, because Lithuania is much smaller.” Nonetheless, the respondent 
thought that relations were “getting better, especially if we think about Poland and Lithuania’s 
historic problems”. 
Another respondent said: 
[The] two countries have some similar interests so they can cooperate in order to get 
better outputs. It’s hard to evaluate if the relationships between two of them are better 
now, but it’s obvious that they are more intense now. 
Another said that the two countries’ membership of the EU “is strongly linked with the 
emergence of more cooperative relations”, adding that:  
Positions that are linked with national interests must be ... coordinated. Much more can 
be gained if [the two countries] acted together now. Thus I think that EU’s impact on 
[Lithuanian-Polish] relations was positive. 
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Not all agree that the EU has had a positive impact on Polish-Lithuanian relations. Some 
respondents said they felt there had been little such impact. Said one: “I believe Polish-
Lithuanian relations are not strongly dependent on the membership of the EU.” 
 
How Poles viewed Lithuania in 2008 
 
Polish respondents surveyed in July 2008 were generally more positive about the EU’s impact 
on relations with Lithuania. One academic in Kraków said that joining the EU had led to 
increased integration of the two countries’ economies and defence arrangements. She 
mentioned in particular the lowering of border barriers and increased scientific contacts, often 
within the framework of EU programmes. Some Polish respondents mentioned that the 
lowering of border and migration controls had increased tourism between the two countries 
and migration for work, and had improved the conditions for setting up joint-ventures. A few 
respondents said that Poles and Lithuanians were becoming more familiar with each other. 
Said one: “Poles and Lithuanians started to learn each other and visit the other country thus 
contributing to the mutual understanding and weakening of distress.” Another respondent 
said:  “Ludzie po prostu poznaje się [People are getting to know each other].” 
 
The majority of Polish respondents interviewed and surveyed stated that they felt relations 
between Poland and Lithuania had improved since the two countries acceded to the EU. One 
respondent listed three particular areas in which the two countries were cooperating together: 
the winning of structural funds, protection of trade interests and protecting Polish industry. 
 
Other Polish respondents mentioned the relevance of cooperation between the two countries 
for the Polish minority in Lithuanian. One respondent said: 
 
Dochodzi do integracji Polski i Litwy w celu zwiększienie bezpiecieństwa i rozwoju 
gospodarczego oraz poprawy sytuacji Polaków mieszkających na Litwie. 
 
[Poland and Lithuania are being integrated with a view to increasing security and 
economic development and correcting the situation of Poles living in Lithuania.] 
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The Russian factor in Lithuania 
Lithuania and Poland increasingly found themselves with similar perspectives on regional 
issues, particularly with regard to Belarus and Russia. One important factor linking Poland 
and Lithuania is a mutual distrust of Russia. Both countries fear that the Kremlin wants to 
dominate its near-abroad again. This fear is particularly strong in Lithuania. In late 2006, 
relations between Russia and Poland deteriorated. Russia banned the import of Polish meat, 
while Poland decided to block the start of EU-Russia negotiations on a new strategic 
partnership agreement. By late 2006, Poland found itself isolated within the EU over its 
stance, with only one supporter: Lithuania. When Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński hosted 
his Lithuanian counterpart Gediminas Kirkilas in July 2006, the two countries were in accord 
on energy security policy, EU politics and environmental issues.
85
 The two governments were 
also keen to maintain a common approach to Belarus.
86
 Kaczyński said that Poland was 
grateful for Lithuania’s support on the matter of the Polish veto on relations with Russia.87 
Lithuania has also found itself functioning as a bridge linking Poland with Latvia and Estonia. 
In November 2006, the presidents of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia met the Kaczyński twins 
to discuss bilateral and EU relations. President Kaczyński said “cooperation between the 
Baltic states and Poland in [the EU could] bring significant results”.88 The meeting indicated 
“that Poland, using its long-time cooperation with Lithuania”, was “now reaching out to all 
three Baltic states”.89 This could “be in the interest of Lithuania, especially if bilateral 
cooperation becomes more pragmatic than before”.90 In November 2006, shortly after a major 
confrontation between Georgia and Russia, foreign ministers of the New Group Of Georgia’s 
Friends, which included both Lithuania and Poland, drafted a motion supporting Georgia’s 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and measures taken by the Georgian government for conflict 
resolution and democracy recovery.
91
 When Lithuania’s Kirkilas visited Warsaw in 2006 for 
“friendly and fruitful” talks, Prime Minister Kaczyński said Polish-Lithuanian relations were 
“exemplary”.92 Kirkilas emphasised that Lithuania backed Poland’s position on the EU’s 
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negotiations with Russia and also noted that “mutual investments” between Poland and 
Lithuania were “increasing, with our support”.93  
In 2006 Presidents Kaczyński and Adamkus stated that it was their “moral duty to work for 
the enlargement of the Union”.94 For both Poland and Lithuania, the priority country to bring 
into the EU is Ukraine, which neither country wants to see revert into the Russian sphere of 
influence.  
Economic factors 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Poland -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9 5.7 
Lithuania -6.9 -13.4 -35.0 -16.5 1.0 3.0 3.6 5.7 4.0 
 
Table 7.3  Change in GDP in Poland and Lithuania in the 1990s95 
 
Independent Lithuania’s economy had a slow start towards a free market.96 As in all 
postcommunist countries, corruption was an issue. A 1995 World Bank survey of 
businesspeople active in Lithuania showed that about 90 per cent were unwilling to invest any 
more in the country “unless corruption was brought under control”.97 After a significant 
collapse of the economy in the early 1990s, Lithuania undertook significant reforms and 
managed to halt the decline by 1994. In most of the years since 1995, Lithuania has grown at 
a healthy rate. By 1998, “the economy had survived the early years of uncertainty and several 
setbacks, including a banking crisis, and seemed poised for solid growth”.98  
The Russian financial collapse of 1998 shocked the economy back into negative growth and 
forced the reorientation of trade from Russia toward the West. In 1997, exports to former 
Soviet states were 45 per cent of Lithuanian exports. Lithuania’s rebound from the 1998 
Russian financial crisis was slow. Lithuania’s government in 1999 “managed to control 
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raging budget deficits in the midst of the crisis, and all successor governments have 
maintained that fiscal discipline”.99 In May 2001 Lithuania joined the WTO. Lithuania 
subsequently restructured its economy for integration into Western European institutions. In 
2005, exports to the Commonwealth of Independent States were only 18 per cent of 
Lithuania’s total, while exports to the EU-25 were 65 per cent of the total.100  
 
population 
(1996, millions) 
GDP per capita 
(1995, US$) 
Real GDP per capita 
(1997, PPS) 
% Jobless 
(1996) 
% Inflation 
(1996) 
Poland 38.4 2790 7500 13.6 19.9 
Lithuania 3.7 1900 5800 6.3 13.1 
 
Table 7.4 The Polish and Lithuanian economies, mid-1990s101 
 
Lithuania’s economy improves 
After 2000, the Lithuanian economy picked up and began to make up some of the ground it 
has lost to Poland in the early 1990s. In the years immediately before accession, the 
Lithuanian economy grew much faster than Poland’s. In 2002, Lithuania’s economy grew 6.8 
per cent.
102
 In 2003, it grew 6.6 per cent.
103
 The corresponding figures for Poland were just 
1.4 per cent and 3.3 per cent.
104
 By the time Lithuania and Poland joined the EU in 2004, per 
capita income in Lithuania had almost drawn level with Poland. By 2006, Lithuanians’ per 
capita income (US$13,700) was higher than Poles’ (US$13,100), though still much lower 
than that of western Europeans.
105
 Unemployment fell sharply from 11 per cent in 2003 to 5.3 
per cent in 2005.
106
 A rise in domestic consumption and investment furthered recovery. 
Privatisation of large state-owned utilities, notably in the energy sector, had taken place. By 
2006, more than 80 per cent of state enterprises had been privatised.
107
 Support from EU 
governments and business helped in the transition to a market economy. 
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In 2006, Lithuania still depended on Russia for about 90 per cent of its oil and almost all its 
natural gas supplies and risked “becoming more reliant on Russia for electricity imports”.108 
That year, Lithuania’s Lietuvos Energija and Poland’s PSE-Operator agreed to jointly build a 
1000MW electricity link between the Baltic and European transmission systems. The project 
comes under the ambit of the EU’s TEN-E programme. On his visit to Warsaw, Kirkilas 
welcomed the entry of Polish oil refinery company PKN Orlen into the Lithuanian energy 
supply market, stressing that it would increase the security of Lithuania’s energy supplies.109  
In July 2006, Russia closed the pipeline supplying Lithuania’s Mazeikiu Nafta oil refinery, 
supposedly “for repairs”, but probably to prevent the sale of Mazeikiu Nafta to PKN Orlen.110 
Part of Lithuania’s Ignalina nuclear power plant was closed in December 2004, as a condition 
of Lithuania’s entry into the EU. The rest of the site was due to close in 2009. In July 2008, 
the power companies of all three Baltic states and Poland agreed to set up the Visaginas 
Nuclear Plant Company, which will be responsible for construction of a new power plant 
expected to be completed between 2015 and 2018. 
Lithuania has adequate and mostly well-maintained infrastructure. Thanks to EU funds, 
facilities at border checkpoints with Poland are much improved. Regional infrastructure 
projects, such as Rail Baltica, a railway to connect Helsinki to Warsaw via Lithuania, the 
north-south Via Baltica highway and energy links between Lithuania and Poland “are projects 
where Lithuania and Poland … can closely work together”.111 In October 2006, transport 
ministers from Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Hungary signed a declaration concerning the 
construction of a highway more than 1000km long running from Kaunas through Poland and 
Slovakia to Hungary.
112
 Via Baltica was scheduled to be completed by 2013.
113
 The enterprise 
is an opportunity for eastern Poland, as the 600km Polish stretch of the route will run from 
Białystok, via Lublin and Rzeszów. The EU would finance the Polish stretch of the highway, 
to cost some €2.6 billion.114 The project would become a priority in the transport policy of 
Poland and Lithuania, with the entire Via Baltica being included in the Trans-European 
Transport Network. 
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In 2006 and 2007 Lithuania and Poland jointly organised conferences in Vilnius. The May 
2006 Common Vision for Common Neighbourhood conference called for “initiatives to 
expand cooperation across Europe” and promote European integration.115 The Vilnius Energy 
Security Conference of October 2007, which “had a similarly high resonance”, was dedicated 
to “challenges and opportunities in shaping the global and European energy landscape”.116  
In November 2006, the presidents of the Baltic states and Poland met at a summit in Vilnius. 
The four presidents said their countries would intensify and deepen their relations within the 
framework of the EU, Nato and other international organisations. They stressed the 
importance of implementing joint energy projects to advance the integration of the regional 
Baltic energy market into the common EU market and agreed on the importance for the region 
of building a new power plant in Lithuania.
117
 The project would enable energy to be 
produced more cheaply and make the Baltic states less dependent on Russian energy 
resources. The leaders also agreed to stand united in negotiations with main power-providing 
countries in the EU. The leaders called on Russia to ratify an Energy Charter Treaty as soon 
as possible.  
Case study: The Rospuda controversy 
In 2006 and 2007 the EU Commission and the Polish government clashed over the latter’s 
plan to build a highway to Lithuania through an environmentally sensitive area. The 
Commission started an “infringement procedure” against Poland in April 2006 which 
threatened to lead to the blocking of EU funds for projects in the Polish-Lithuanian border 
region.
118
 In February 2007 Poland said it planned to hold a referendum in its north-eastern 
region of Podlaskie on whether to build the controversial road.
119
 Prime Minister Kaczyński 
said the dispute had become a “national problem”.120 The EU warned Poland not to build the 
road through the Rospuda valley, a boggy area which borders Lithuania.
121
 The plan to build a 
trans-European highway through the area predated Poland’s accession to the EU but EU 
Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas said the project would lead to a “catastrophe” in a 
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“precious area of Poland”.122 Polish authorities said they wanted to relieve congestion through 
the town of Augustów, crossed daily by about 4500 trucks on their way to and from 
Lithuania. The EU had already warned Poland in 2006 it could face legal action and penalties 
for failing to adequately protect its natural habitats.
123
 The Rospuda area has protected status 
under the EU’s Natura 2000 network of conservation sites.124 Commission biodiversity expert 
Agata Zdanowicz said Poland had not complied with Natura 2000, describing the situation as 
“serious”.125  
In July 2007, the European Commission asked the European Court of Justice to order Poland 
to halt preparatory work through Rospuda.
126
 The Commission said it would be 
unprecedented for a member state to go ahead with such work in defiance with an EU order.  
It wanted the work halted until the court delivered a final verdict on whether the motorway 
construction in the area was compatible with strict EU environmental laws. Commission 
officials said that building the motorway through the valley might compromise EU funding 
for the whole Polish stretch of the planned Via Baltica motorway, which could amount to 
hundreds of millions of euros.
127
 Eventually a new Polish government backed down and 
agreed to change its highway plans. The Rospuda dispute could be a prelude to more conflicts 
between the EU and its new members over the environment as they seek to upgrade 
infrastructure, with Poland and Lithuania finding themselves on the same side of the debate.  
In the end, the EU’s views on environmental issues will probably be transmitted in the bulk to 
Poles and Lithuanians, though in the short term, some defensiveness among the elites of 
Poland and Lithuania might serve to increase a feeling of common interest among the elites of 
the two countries, but in this case, a common interest distinct from the common interests of 
Europe as a whole. 
Poland and Lithuania on the same side  
 
Poland and Lithuania today have close, cordial relations, although the 2008 survey has shown 
that relations between the peoples of the two countries are not as close as relations between 
the governments. The changes in Polish-Lithuanian relations are striking when compared to 
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the situation in the early 1990s. As Lithuanian foreign minister Antanas Valionis wrote in the 
Polish journal Lithuania, Polish-Lithuanian relations “should be set as a model to be followed 
by other nations”.128  
 
The EU’s normative power seems to have served to bring Poland and Lithuania, particularly 
the two countries elites, closer together. The comparatively few disagreements between the 
two countries generally relate to the situation of the Polish minority in Lithuania. For 
example, the recently introduced Karta Polaka, the Polish identity document which citizens of 
former Soviet countries (including Lithuania) with Polish ancestry can apply for and which 
gives such people certain rights to work and visit Poland, is one issue which has seen recent 
public disagreements between Lithuanian and Polish politicians. Another problem is the lack 
of people-to-people social contacts, notably the lack of youth exchange programmes and 
mutual “normal” tourism (as opposed to business trips and Poles’ visits to Polish heritage 
sites in Lithuania). 
 
Lithuania’s integration into the EU means it has returned to its natural place in the world. 
Despite 50 years of suppression, Lithuania “managed to preserve [its] affinity” to Western 
Europe.
129
 The EU’s existence and influence has led to increased cooperation between 
Lithuania and Poland than would have been the case otherwise. Poland and Lithuania 
generally work together within the EU context and have similar objectives in international 
relations. Being by far the bigger of the two states, Poland is the dominant partner in relations 
between the two. In EU contexts, Lithuania usually acts in a supportive role to Poland.  
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The first part of this chapter presents an overview of trends in public opinion in Poland, 
Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine between 1990 and 2008, particularly as such trends relate to 
the relationship between Poles and their eastern neighbours, and to the EU’s impact on that 
relationship. Public opinion polls taken over the course of the last two decades indicate that 
Poles’ perceptions of their eastern neighbours have, on the whole, improved. The neighbours’ 
opinions of Poles seem to have changed less, but on balance are reasonably positive. There 
has been a particularly marked improvement in mutual regard between Poles and Ukrainians 
(at least inhabitants of western Ukraine). Despite poor relations at a government level, most 
Belarusians appear to like Poles, while most Poles are neutral or slightly positive towards 
Belarusians.  
The second part of the chapter includes the results of public opinion surveys and interviews 
undertaken for this thesis in June and July 2008. These surveys and interviews appear to tally 
with findings of previous surveys, although there seems to be an even greater improvement in 
mutual regard between Poles and Ukrainians than was shown in other surveys. It appears that 
the relationship between ordinary Lithuanians and Poles is less warm than it could be. This 
contrasts with the excellent relations between the Polish and Lithuanian governments and 
state elites.  
 
Polish public opinion 
Polish society was highly politicised in the 1980s, a decade dominated by the experience of 
martial law and the continued underground activities of the banned Solidarity movement and 
associated opposition groups. In 1990, politics was “very important” or “important” in the 
lives of 42 per cent of Poles surveyed in one poll.1 Poles were dissatisfied with their 
governments’ performance in the early 1990s.2  
At the beginning of the 1990s, there was a large increase in the proportion of Poles perceiving 
a threat to Poland from the east, primarily from Russia, but also from chaos in other post-
Soviet states which might spill over into Poland. In 1992, 63 per cent of Poles surveyed felt 
their country faced threats from its neighbours, with Russia, Germany, Ukraine and Belarus 
                                                 
1
 Siemienska, R. 2006 ‘Poland: citizens and democratic politics’ in Klingemann, H., Fuchs, D. & Zielonka, J. 
(eds) 2006 Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe Routledge Abingdon UK p.221 
2
 Haerpfer, C. 2002. Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe: The democratization of the 
general public in fifteen Central and Eastern European countries, 1991-1998 Routledge London 2002 p.19 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours                      Public Opinion 
 
158 
 
all being seen as possible threats.
3
 However, the period of political stabilisation in the post-
Soviet states after 1993 calmed the Polish populace so that by the late 1990s there was little 
anxiety about any military threat from neighbouring states. By 1999, when Poland joined 
Nato and was well on the path to EU accession, only one in seven Poles felt their country was 
at risk of military attack from a neighbour.
4
 The equivalent figures in Belarus and Ukraine 
were even lower: 11 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively.
5
 This represented a turnaround from 
attitudes prevalent in the early 1990s. From the mid-1990s, as the Polish economy began to 
improve, the proportion of Poles giving a positive assessment of the communist period 
declined slowly, as support grew for the democratic system in the country. By 2002, only one 
in seven Poles surveyed favoured a return to communism.
6
 
 
Attitudes to democracy 
 
In the 1990s, among the postcommunist nations of Europe, Poles demonstrated the highest 
support for the democracy. In 1991, slightly more than half of Poles supported the new 
political system.
7
 Over the following years, the proportion of Poles supportive of the new 
political system grew steadily, reaching 76 per cent in 1996.
8
 Throughout the 1990s, polling 
by the Centre for Public Policy at the University of Aberdeen and others showed that most 
Poles with tertiary education supported democratic ideals.
9
 From a low of 65 per cent support 
in 1994, the proportion of Polish graduates who supported democracy rose to 86 per cent by 
1998.
10
 In Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine support for democracy among those with a tertiary 
education was much lower than in Poland. The proportion of tertiary-educated Belarusians 
expressing support for democracy rose in the mid-1990s, while in Ukraine there was 
movement in the opposite direction.
11
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Do you feel things in your country 
are going in the right or wrong 
direction? (% percentage 
answering “in the right direction”) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Poland 43 20 27 32 22 40 40 49 
Lithuania 
no 
data 
60 31 41 37 35 35 45 
All postcommunist candidates for 
EU membership 
47 47 39 34 35 36 39 42 
 
Table 8.1 Attitudes to political transformation in EU candidate countries, 1991-
1998
12 
 
Given historical and cultural factors, it might be expected that Poles would show more pro-
Western and Western-type attitudes than Ukrainians and Belarusians, who might be expected 
to have attitudes more similar to those of Russians. One might also expect Lithuanians to 
display attitudes somewhere between those of Poles and the East Slavs. However, while Poles 
do appear to be generally more pro-Western than their eastern neighbours, the case for 
Ukrainians and Belarusians as being “essentially anti-Western ... does not appear to have been 
made”.13 In fact, during the 1990s, polls consistently indicated that Lithuanians were more 
eurosceptic than Belarusians and Ukrainians.
14
  
 
In 1998, Rose et al. estimated the proportion of citizens of each postcommunist country who 
supported the contemporary regime, and the proportion which supported “autocratic 
alternatives”.15 Belarus and Ukraine had the lowest “prevalence of democratic attitudes 
among” among the people.16 Bashkirova found that while during the late 1990s most 
Belarusians and Ukrainians had a highly positive attitude to democratic rule and a moderately 
positive attitude to autocratic rule, support for the contemporary political regime in both 
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Belarus and Ukraine was low.
 17
 Belarusians’ support for democracy seems to have increased 
during the 1990s.
18
 Yet during those years, President Aleksander Lukashenko’s regime 
adopted more of the attributes of a dictatorship. Belarusian society apparently became more 
democratic in sentiment at the same time as the Belarusian government lost what democratic 
characteristics it had held. In the lead-up to the EU’s eastern enlargement, an increasingly 
politicised minority of Belarusian students and graduates looked to the EU, and especially 
Poland and Lithuania, for examples of how their country should be run.  
 
 
“When you compare the overall economic 
situation of your household before the big 
changes in the economy in 1989, would you say 
that in the past it was better?” (% saying yes) 
1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 
change 
1991-98 
Poland 61 68 62 50 51 -10 
Lithuania - - 69 62  -7 
Belarus  - 71 82 82 79 +8 
Ukraine - 80 88 78 90 +10 
 
Table 8.2 Nostalgia for communist times
19 
 
The European Union and identity 
 
Central and Eastern Eurobarometer data show that EU membership had the broad support of 
Poles in the late 1990s.
20
 In 1998, only 6 per cent of Central Europeans surveyed felt that “EU 
membership would worsen the economic crisis, would be too expensive or of no benefit”, 
while 2 per cent felt “EU membership would result in a loss of identity or independence”.21 
Only one in 100 “thought EU membership would promote instability and disintegration”.22 
On the other hand, 35 per cent of respondents who favoured EU membership mentioned “the 
general progress membership would facilitate”.23 A quarter backed EU membership because 
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of “anticipated economic improvements”, while 17 per cent supported membership because 
they expected higher living standards in Poland after accession.
24
  
 
In a 1998 survey, 22 per cent of residents of Poland’s largest cities called themselves 
“Europeans”, while one in seven rural Poles identified with Europe.25 Another study in the 
late 1990s showed that 60 per cent of Poles “believed their European identity to be as strong 
as their national identity”.26 European identity in the CEECs in question was most strongly 
felt among elites, the young, urban dwellers, the more educated and Poles.
27
 Some authors go 
as far as to say that Poles were more likely to feel European than were most western 
Europeans.
28
 However, while Poles identified with Europe, this did not automatically 
correspond with identification with the EU.
29
 
 
This enthusiasm for Europe was not confined to Poland. The proportion of Belarusians and 
Ukrainians who claimed a European identity grew during the 1990. Eurobarometer surveys 
showed the proportion of Belarusians “with a European identity” grew from 12 per cent in 
1996 to 19 per cent in 1998, while the proportion of Ukrainians who expressed a European 
identity grew from just one in 17 in 1996 to one in seven in 1998.
30
 It was the young who 
were most inclined to express a European identity. While one in four Belarusians under 30 
admitted to a European identity, only 8 per cent of Belarusians over 60 considered themselves 
as “Europeans”.31 In Ukraine in the late 1990s the situation was similar. In 1998, almost a 
quarter of Ukrainians under 30 called themselves “Europeans” but just 7 per cent of 
Ukrainians over 60 identified with Europe.
32
  
 
A pro-EU shift in Polish society took place in the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, Poles were 
among the most enthusiastic prospective EU entrants. After hitting a low in 1994, the image 
of the EU among Poles improved until well over half of Poles had a positive opinion of the 
EU by the late 1990s.
33
 In 1994 only a quarter of Polish respondents strongly supported 
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Poland joining the EU, but in 1998 a third did so.
34
 In that year, 87 per cent of Poles 
supported the integration of Poland into the EU, a figure higher than that of any other 
postcommunist country.
35
 During the late 1990s, Poles, along with Romanians, had the most 
positive image of the EU of all the candidate nations.
36
 Throughout the period, an average of 
51 per cent of Poles rated the EU positively.
37
 In every other candidate state apart from 
Romania, only about a third of respondents had a positive image of the EU.
38
 Moreover, Poles 
who did not have a positive image of the EU tended to have a neutral rather than a negative 
opinion.
39
   
 
Percentage with positive image of EU 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Poland 46 49 48 37 42 46 58 56 
Lithuania 
no 
data 
51 43 45 34 23 22 34 
All postcommunist candidates for EU 
membership 
47 45 43 39 37 33 37 42 
 
Table 8.3 The EU’s image in Poland and Lithuania during the 1990s40 
 
 
After 1998, Poles, although “aware that they were not going to join [the EU] on the most 
favourable possible terms and that there would be negative consequences to accession … 
remained broadly pro-EU”.41 This suggested “a much greater solidity in Polish public opinion 
than in other candidate countries”.42 An overwhelming consensus existed among Poland’s 
political elite in favour of EU membership. That helped transmit pro-EU attitudes to the 
general population. Only in fundamentalist Catholic circles were reservations about western 
liberal and secular threats to traditional values expressed. 
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Poland was a special case among the nine countries that in 2003 held EU accession 
referendums and in 2004 joined the EU. It was the largest new entrant, which meant it was be 
among the most difficult to accommodate in the enlargement round. Polish public opinion 
registered a large shift in attitudes towards the EU when accession negotiations began at the 
end of the 1990s.
43
 Surveys showed support for EU membership beginning to fall and a 
significant anti-EU minority appeared. Given the overwhelming pro-EU consensus among the 
political elite, opinion polls might have overstated the level of public support for EU 
accession. With a lack of serious debate about accession’s potential costs and benefits, earlier 
high levels of support may not have been considered positions.  
 
Poland’s accession negotiations focused on concessions the country would have to make. This 
“raised the profile of the European issue in Polish politics in a ... negative way”.44 Levels of 
support fell when “it became apparent that conforming to EU norms would involve negative 
... consequences” in addition to benefits.45 The start of accession negotiations saw cracks 
develop in the pro-EU elite consensus in Poland and the EU membership debate was 
politicised. For the first time, significant anti-EU political forces emerged, while the pro-EU 
camp argued over tactics. Social and geographical divides within Poland with regard to 
opinion on EU accession became more noticeable. EU membership was supported most by 
better-educated Poles living in larger cities and those closer to Germany, while more 
eurosceptic Poles were disproportionately found among less-educated rural dwellers and in 
the eastern regions along the borders with Belarus and Ukraine.  
 
One of the arguments made against EU membership was that Polish accession to the Union 
would serve to reduce everyday contact and trade with neighbours to the east, in particular 
Belarus and Ukraine. Support for EU membership fell from almost 80 per cent in June 1994 
to less than 60 per cent in mid-1999.
46
 Over the same period, the proportion of Poles opposed 
to membership rose from 5 per cent to as much as a quarter.
47
  
 
Political groups hostile to EU accession did well in a parliamentary election in 2001 held in 
the middle of accession negotiations. But although openly anti-EU parties gained a significant 
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parliamentary presence for the first time in 2001, it was unlikely their success was because of 
their anti-EU policies.
48
 Moreover, parties that backed EU membership won most seats and 
support for accession remained high right up to 2004.
49
 Even in the difficult years of 
negotiations in 2000-2002, when support fell somewhat, more than half of Poles felt that EU 
membership would be good for Poland, with stronger support among the young.
50
 
Interestingly, at that time, the percentage of Belarusian citizens who felt strongly that their 
country should join the EU was only a little lower.
51
  
 
 
If your country were to join the EU 
would you feel strongly in favour? 
18-29 years 30-59 years > 60 years difference 
Poland 38 30 27 +11 
Belarus 34 26 21 +13 
 
Table 8.4 Pro-EU sentiment in Poland  and Belarus by age cohort, 199852 
 
By the time of the June 2003 referendum on accession, the result was not in doubt. Poles 
voted overwhelmingly to join the EU (by 77.5 per cent to 22.6 per cent). Polls indicated that 
most Poles made their minds up about the issue well before the referendum.
53
 Most Poles 
“accepted the historical significance” of the EU accession referendum and separated the issue 
of EU membership from that of confidence in what was then “an extremely unpopular 
government”.54 Key actors, including opposition parties and civic organisations, campaigned 
for a Yes vote. Yes campaigners pointed to a lack of alternatives, warning that Poland risked 
becoming “another Belarus”, isolated or “in limbo”, if Poles voted against EU membership.55  
 
The Yes vote in the EU referendum was much higher in western Poland (as high as 85 per 
cent in some regions) than in the poorer eastern regions bordering Belarus and Ukraine.
56
 The 
No vote was highest in relatively eurosceptic Lubelskie, the only Polish region to border both 
Ukraine and Belarus, where only 63 per cent of voters favoured EU membership. The second-
lowest vote for EU membership was in Podlaskie, the only other Polish region that borders 
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Belarus. There, 69 per cent voted in favour of EU membership. The southeastern region of 
Podkarpackie, which borders Ukraine, recorded the third-lowest pro-EU vote (70 per cent).  
 
Various explanations have been put forward for this voting pattern. The former German areas 
that became part of independent Poland after World War I formed – and still form – the most 
industrialised and urban part of the country. The populations of these areas tend to be the most 
economically vigorous, politically active and pro-European of any part of Poland. Together 
with areas which became part of Poland in 1945, these areas saw the biggest majorities (77 
per cent to 85 per cent) in favour of EU membership. Those areas of southern Poland, such as 
Podkarpackie, which were under Austrian rule until World War I, tend to be the most strongly 
Catholic and to vote nationalist and conservative. The population of these areas has a strong 
attachment to the memory of Galicia, the eastern part of which is now in Ukraine. In these 
regions, the Yes vote in the accession referendum was 70 per cent to 76 per cent. In 
Podlaskie, Lubelskie and Podkarpackie, where Ukrainian and Belarusian cross-border traders 
contributed significantly to the local economy, many feared joining the EU would negatively 
impact the productive trade and social ties with neighbouring Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
In 2006, two years after accession, 61 per cent of Poles expressed confidence in the EU.
57
 An 
opinion poll published in October 2006 and quoted on the website of the Polish Committee 
for European Integration showed that 72 per cent of Poles rated Poland’s membership of the 
EU positively.
58
 Only 6 per cent of Poles felt that Poland should not be a member of the EU, 
while 19 per cent said membership had no negative or positive results.
59
 Overall, compared 
with a year earlier, there was a slight increase in the number having a favourable view of 
Polish membership in the EU.
60
 Those who rated membership positively were above all those 
who thought that Poland’s entry into the EU and changed their lives for the better (98 per 
cent) or who thought that membership had a positive influence on the situation within Poland 
(92 per cent) or its position in the world.
61
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Should the following be created? 2003* 2006* 2003 2006 2003 2006 
 Yes No Difficult to say 
Common EU government 47 49 29 39 24 12 
EU President 32 33 41 53 26 14 
Armed forces under joint EU command 52 51 26 37 22 12 
EU foreign minister 45 52 29 35 26 13 
* CBOS poll July 2003, IPA poll April 2006 
Table 8.5 Poles’ support for common EU institutions, 2003-200662 
 
There was a clear relationship between level of education and perception of the EU. Among 
better educated Poles (those who had completed high school or tertiary studies) the proportion 
favourably rating Polish membership was as high as 84 per cent, while only 58 per cent of 
Poles with primary school education approved of EU membership.
63
  
 
In April 2006, most of 1005 Poles surveyed by Poland’s Institute for Public Affairs said they 
favoured a highly integrated EU with strong institutions and closer cooperation among all 
member states.
64
 About half said they supported a common EU government, armed forces and 
foreign minister.
65
 Several studies show that, unlike western Europeans, Poles trust EU 
institutions more than their own government.
66
 Poles see their national institutions as 
“corrupt, inefficient and dealing with unimportant matters”.67 When asked on what issues the 
Polish government should be particularly active in the EU, the most popular response was 
“abolition of restrictions in undertaking work and providing services in the territory of the 
whole” EU.68 “Support for human rights and democracy in EU neighbouring countries” came 
low down the list, with less than a fifth rating it as an area the Polish government should be 
particularly active in.
69
 
 
A Europe-wide opinion survey whose results were released in 2006 indicated that 93 per cent 
of Poles thought their country corrupt, the worst result among all 21 European countries 
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surveyed.
70
 Relatively fewer Russians (88 per cent) and Ukrainians (84 per cent) thought their 
nations corrupt.
71
 Eighty-one per cent of Poles surveyed in 2006 said they did not bribe, a 
figure almost as high as the equivalent for Austrians and Britons.
72
 Only 43 per cent of 
Ukrainians said they did not bribe.
73
 More than 70 per cent of Poles surveyed said they would 
not tell the authorities if they came across an instance of corruption.
74
 Ninety per cent of 
Ukrainians said they would not.
75
 The fact that “Poles held their political elites in such low 
esteem ... made them ... look favourably upon Brussels as a relative haven of honest and 
efficient public administration”.76 Poles seem to think that the EU can help to clean up their 
country’s politics and bureaucracy. 
 
My country is corrupt Percentage agreeing 
Poland 93 
Russia 88 
Ukraine 84 
Italy 79 
Slovakia 77 
Hungary 73 
Czech Republic 66 
Britain 47 
Sweden 28 
Austria 28 
Table 8.6 Europeans’ perception of corruption in 200677 
 
 
Lithuanian public opinion 
 
Lithuanian public opinion has trended differently from Polish public opinion throughout the 
period since 1990. Over the last 20 years, Lithuanians have tended to be more sceptical of the 
EU and the west than have Poles. In the 1990s, Lithuania’s economic decline was even worse 
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and more prolonged than Poland’s. This had a major effect on popular sentiment. The image 
of the EU among Lithuanians took a beating during the decade, with a low of 22 per cent of 
Lithuanians having a positive opinion of the EU in 1997. In 1998 Eurobarometer noted that 
Lithuanians’ low opinion of the EU, showed “no detectable tendency towards 
improvement”.78 
 
Are you for or against your country joining the EU? For Against Undecided 
Poland 63 6 17 
Lithuania 40 13 26 
All postcommunist candidates for EU membership 60 8 17 
 
Table 8.7 Polish and Lithuanian attitudes towards EU enlargement 199879 
 
 
Alisauskiene claims that Lithuania joins Belarus and Ukraine in the group of postcommunist 
“countries with the lowest share of strong democrats and the highest share of autocrats and 
undecided citizens”.80 In 1995 only 22 per cent of Lithuanians had a positive opinion of the 
EU.
81
 This figure then rose consistently year by ear so that by 1998, 45 per cent of 
Lithuanians felt the EU to be a good thing.
82
 By 1998, the clear majority of Lithuania’s elite 
(some 85 per cent) favoured Lithuania becoming an EU member.
83
 However, although 
Lithuania’s economic situation was much improved by the time of EU membership in 2004, 
Lithuania was one of the most eurosceptic of the candidate nations at the time of accession.  
 
How confident are you in the EU? Very Quite a lot Not much Not at all 
% 2.8 49.6 42.7 4.9 
 
Table 8.8 Lithuanians’ confidence in the EU 199784 
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After Lithuania became an EU member, opinion surveys indicate that Lithuanian public 
opinion became more positive about membership. For example, Eurobarometer surveys in 
2007 and 2008 found that 58 per cent and 52 per cent of Lithuanians respectively felt that 
things were going in the right direction in the EU.85 In 2008, just over half of Lithuanians said 
they had a positive opinion of the EU, slightly above the EU27 average, while 60 per cent 
considered Lithuania’s membership of the EU to be “a good thing”.86   
 
Ukrainian and Belarusian public opinion 
 
Out of 11 postcommunist countries surveyed in 1994 the image of the EU was best in Ukraine 
and Belarus.
87
 In 1998, 49 per cent of Belarusians expressed a positive opinion of the EU.
88
 
Young Belarusians were particularly enthusiastic about the idea of EU membership for their 
country. At the start of the 21
st
 century, a third of Belarusians under 30 were “very much in 
favour of Belarus becoming a EU member state”, while only a fifth of Belarusians over 60 
wanted their country to join the EU.
89
 Only 9 per cent of Ukrainian villagers express a 
European identity, while 17 per cent of inhabitants of cities like Kiev and Lviv do.
90
   
 
In 1994, slightly more than half of Ukrainians and 47 per cent of Belarusians viewed the EU 
positively.
91
 In Ukraine, 96 per cent of the population favoured the integration of their country 
into the EU.
92
 More than two in five Ukrainians strongly supported the integration of Ukraine 
into the EU.
93
 The EU was seen as one of “few hopes for economic recovery and political 
stability” in the crisis-stricken country.94 However, as Ukrainians realised they would be left 
out of any EU enlargement project and even any kind of association agreement with the EU, 
sentiment cooled. The percentage of Ukrainians with a positive image of the EU fell to as low 
as 44 per cent in 1998.
95
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In the late 1990s, more than a third of Belarusians and Ukrainians favoured a return to Soviet 
rule.
96
 Throughout the 1990s the “level of nostalgia” for the communist political system was 
higher in Ukraine than in any other country in Europe.
97
 In 1992, 80 per cent of Ukrainian 
households surveyed said their living standard had been better in the Soviet Union.
98
 This 
figure rose to 90 per cent in 1998.
99
 In 1992, a year after the break-up of the Soviet Union, 55 
per cent of Ukrainians rated the Soviet system positively.
100
 This figure rose steadily during 
the 1990s.  
 
In 1998, 82 per cent of Ukrainians expressed a positive assessment of the Soviet regime.
101
 A 
persistence of such a high level of nostalgia for the Soviet past imperils political stability and 
democracy in Ukraine. If political dissatisfaction in Ukraine cannot be addressed effectively, 
a risk exists of “non-democratic alternatives” taking over the country.102 During the mid to 
late 1990s, Ukrainians’ approval rate for their country’s democratic political system oscillated 
between 22 per cent and 33 per cent.
103
 However, a contrast existed between political 
discontent in Ukraine and a “general support for parliamentary democracy”.104 Although 
Ukrainians had the most anti-democratic attitudes of any major European nation in the 1990s, 
only about a third of Ukrainians polled supported a return of communism.
105
 
 
In the early 1990s there was a fall in levels of optimism about the new Ukrainian system of 
government. By 1994, barely more than half of Ukrainians thought their national parliament 
would survive.
106
 However, 1994 was an apparent turnaround year in Ukrainian attitudes to 
their new-found democracy. After 1994, a steadily increasing proportion of Ukrainians felt 
their parliament would survive.
107
 By 1998, 75 per cent thought their parliament would 
survive, a figure which, though “lower than the average” for postcommunist Europe, is high 
compared to many other political indicators in Ukraine, which indicate considerable 
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dissatisfaction with the country’s political system.108 Ukrainians appear to have been 
generally dissatisfied with political and economic conditions in their country during the last 
decade.
109
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Ukrainians’ view of their country’s democratic credentials, 1999-2008110 
 
Meanwhile, Ukrainians’ attitudes to the EU have remained surprisingly positive. When the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems asked a sample of 1254 Ukrainians in 2008 
whether they would vote in favour or against Ukraine joining the EU in any future referendum 
on the issue, 41 per cent indicated they would vote in favour, while 28 per cent would vote 
against (the remainder did not know or did not answer).
111
 The main reason those in favour 
gave for their choice was the “higher living standards” that would result from Ukraine’s 
accession to the EU.
112
 This was most likely related to Ukrainians’ perceptions of the 
successful 2004 enlargement, particularly the experience of Poland.   
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Figure 8.2 Ukrainians’ reasons for voting to join the European Union113 
 
Belarusians also demonstrated nostalgia for communism in the early 1990s. In 1992, 71 per 
cent of Belarusian households believed their economic situation had been “much better or 
somewhat better” in the Soviet Union.114 That share rose to 82 per cent in 1994, before falling 
slightly to 79 per cent in 1998.
115
 In 1992, 60 per cent of Belarusians said they had a positive 
opinion of the Soviet political system. This proportion rose steadily to 77 per cent in 1996, 
almost as high as the contemporary figure in Ukraine.
116
 Since then there has been a 
considerable falling off of the level of Soviet nostalgia in Belarus. In 1998, Soviet nostalgia 
rates had fallen back down to 1992 levels.
117
 The proportion of Belarusians with favourable 
attitudes to their government increased between 1994 and 1998.
118
 During those years, 
President Lukashenko gradually tightened his grip on the country, and political freedoms were 
severely curtailed. In 1994, 29 per cent of Belarusians rated their state’s political system 
positively; this proportion increased to 35 per cent in 1996 and to 48 per cent in 1998.
119
 This 
indicates that most Belarusians supported, or at least, were not against, the Lukashenko 
regime by the late 1990s, despite the regime’s authoritarian characteristics. This is probably 
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due to the regime fulfilling Belarusians’ basic needs. The close relationship between Belarus 
and Russia, and living in a state that continued to possess many of the traits of the Soviet 
Union gave many Belarusians a sense of comfort, especially when they were aware of the 
social and economic turmoil in neighbouring Ukraine.  
 
However, an apparent shift in the attitudes of Belarusians towards democracy took place 
during the earlier Lukashenko years, a shift particularly noticeable among students and 
graduates. In 1994, just under a third of Belarusians with tertiary education were professed 
democrats.
120
 By 1998, almost half said they were in favour of democratic institutions.
121
 
Belarusian society seems to have become “more democratic” in its attitudes, while 
simultaneously the government of Belarus became less democratic. 
 
Do you approve or disapprove of the 
political course of the following states? 
approve (%) don’t approve (%) 
Russia 74.8 15.9 
Germany 70.8 16.4 
Belarus 72.0 22.3 
Sweden 67.3 17.9 
France 64.4 20.6 
Czech Republic 61.9 21.9 
United Kingdom 56.5 29.9 
China 53.2 30.3 
Poland 46.0 39.1 
Estonia 39.6 43.5 
Lithuania 35.0 48.9 
Latvia 33.3 51.2 
Ukraine 26.9 59.2 
United States 25.2 61.7 
Georgia 22.8 61.2 
 
Table 8.9 Belarusians’ view of countries’ foreign policies, 2006122 
 
 
                                                 
120
 Ibid. p.49 
121
 Ibid. 
122
 Ibid. Poll taken May 2006 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours                      Public Opinion 
 
174 
 
In a May 2006 poll, Belarusians were asked if they approved or disapproved of the political 
course of various countries.
123
 Table 10.9 shows some of the results. Drakokhrust says the 
figures reflect “massive state propaganda blackening certain countries ... especially disliked 
by the Belarusian authorities”.124 However, Germany’s high ratings appear to be “at odds with 
the objectives of state propaganda”.125 Other polls show similar results. Belarusians see 
Germany “as a role model for Belarus”.126 Germany is ranked in the top five countries in 
terms of “friendliness of foreign policy” with respect to Belarus.127 German leaders are more 
popular in Belarus than are leaders of East European countries or the United States. This pro-
German sentiment is surprising given that Belarus lost a quarter of its population in World 
War II, a war which still forms a central element of the country’s state ideology. 
 
In another May 2006 poll, Belarusians were asked which group of member states should 
Belarus orient itself to in the event of its becoming an EU member.
128
 The results are 
presented in Table 8.10. Leaving aside the obvious point that there is little chance of Belarus 
becoming an EU member in the near future, what is striking in Table 10.10 is that Belarusians 
would prefer their country to align itself with the likes of Germany and France, rather than 
neighbours Poland and Lithuania. In several polls over the last few years, about a third of 
Belarusians said their country should join the EU, but the “number of latent pro-EU 
Belarusians appears to be higher”.129 
 
Toward what countries should Belarus orient itself if it became an EU member? % 
“Old” Europe (Germany, France, Spain and so on) 41.4 
“New” Europe (Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and so on) 12.9 
United Kingdom 5.1 
undecided/no answer 40.6 
 
Table 8.10 Who Belarusians think their country should align with, 2006130  
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In another poll, Belarusians were asked what ethnic groups they were prepared to see as their 
in-laws, colleagues or neighbours. Here, Belarusians “seem to feel the strongest affinity for 
ethnic Russians, while the runners-up are Ukrainians and Poles”.131 West Europeans ranked 
next, followed by other Central Europeans. Below them, in order, were Lithuanians, Jews, 
Latvians and Americans. In their affinity for Poles, “Belarusians differ from Russians, who do 
not regard Poles as one of their own”.132 Drakokhrust says that “Poles remain one of the 
closest nations to Belarus, but Poland’s powerful ideological and cultural influence is history 
now”.133 Today, says Drakokhrust, “Poland is not much of a role model for the pro-Western 
minded Belarusians who are oriented mostly toward ‘Old Europe’, primarily Germany”.134 
 
Overall, public opinion data over the past two decades appear to indicate that of the four 
nationalities studied, Poles display the most pro-EU attitudes and are also most ready to 
identify themselves as Europeans. However, Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians also 
seem to have basically positive attitudes to the EU. The 2004 eastern enlargement of the EU 
to include Poland and Lithuania is seen favourably by Poles and Lithuanians, with the caveat 
in Poland that the toughening up of the country’s eastern border is seen somewhat negatively 
due to the enforced curtailment of trade and social ties with border areas of Ukraine and 
Belarus. Citizens of Poland and Lithuania believe that EU enlargement has helped their 
countries become more prosperous. Ukrainians and, to a lesser extent, Belarusians are also 
aware that EU membership has been good for Poland and Lithuania. In both Belarus and 
Ukraine a large proportion of citizens appear to believe that the accession of their country to 
the EU would also boost their economies and living standards.  
The polling referred to thus far in this chapter looked at the overall attitudes of Poles, 
Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Belarusians to the EU. However, for the purposes of this thesis 
and to attempt to answer the research question, more data was required about how the 
attitudes of Poles to their eastern neighbours and of those neighbours to Poles and Poland has 
changed as a result of the EU’s presence, enlargement and activities in the region. Data 
collected in the opinion survey carried out for this thesis in 2008 helps answer the initial 
research question.  
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2008 opinion survey and interviews 
 
Overall, all groups of respondents (Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians) surveyed and 
interviewed for this thesis in June-July 2008 had a positive impression of the EU. Most 
respondents saw their country’s relations with the EU as the most important of the issues 
raised in the survey.
135
  
How Poles viewed relations with their eastern neighbours 
When Poles were asked how important relations were with the EU and with eastern 
neighbours, most respondents rated them important or very important. Of second greatest 
importance was “democracy in my country”. Poles felt relations with Lithuania and Ukraine 
were better now than 10 years ago. When asked how the EU had affected Poland’s relations 
with Lithuania, Polish respondents said that there was more cooperation, more people-to-
people contact and easier travel. Poles felt that travel to and from Lithuania and Ukraine had 
become easier, but felt that it had become more difficult to travel to Belarus. Polish 
respondents felt that relations with Belarus had worsened since Poland joined the EU. When 
Poles were asked how the EU had affected Poland’s relations with Belarus, they pointed to 
problems crossing the border. Poles, like all EU citizens, now require a visa to visit Belarus. 
This was not the case in the 1990s. Belarusians also require a visa to visit Poland.  
 
Polish respondents felt that relations with Ukraine had become much better and were now in 
fact better than with any other of their eastern neighbours. Some respondents said that they 
thought that now that Poland is safely within the EU and Nato, Ukraine had become the most 
important partner in the east for Poland, and that, specifically, good relations with Ukraine 
had become more important for Poland than good relations with Russia. Respondents, some 
of whom had visited Ukraine, usually for tourism, did mention problems on the border, 
though Poles, like other EU passport-holders, no longer need a visa to visit Ukraine. 
 
Poles noted that it was harder for Ukrainians to work in Poland to fill jobs made vacant by 
Poles who had left to work in Britain and Ireland. Respondents also noted that EU 
membership had made Poland “more attractive” for Ukrainians. Relations between Poland 
and Ukraine “are very good”, one Polish interviewee said “and they are even better because 
there are certain groups in power in Ukraine”.  
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Do you agree or disagree with 
these statements? 
strongly 
agree 
agree 
neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
The EU has made travel to Lithuania 
easier for me  
60 27 13 0 0 
The EU is a good thing for Poland 27 67 7 0 0 
The EU is a good thing for me 27 60 7 7 0 
Relations between Poland and 
Lithuania are better now than 10 
years ago 
29 57 14 0 0 
Relations between Poland and 
Ukraine are better now than 10 
years ago 
20 67 13 0 0 
The EU has made travel to Ukraine 
easier for me 
0 47 7 47 0 
The EU has made travel to Belarus 
easier for me 
0 7 27 53 13 
Relations between Poland and 
Belarus are better now than 10 
years ago 
0 7 33 40 20 
 
Table 8.11 Poles’ view of the EU and relations with eastern neighbours, 2008 
Figures in % 
 
The interviewee acknowledged that Poland “pulling Ukraine to the western zone will be 
perceived in a specific way by those who are more pro-Russian in Ukrainian society and 
politics, and that would be always a problem”. But the Polish position was clear. “Poland is 
strongly supporting integration of Ukraine with … Europe ... and as long as Ukraine is pro-
democratic and pro-Western, there will be friendly relations.” Normalising relations with 
Russia, said this respondent, will not influence relations with Kiev.  
 
In interviews, informed Poles expressed disappointment with Ukrainian politicians’ perceived 
failure to make the most of it Orange Revolution, particularly as it was felt Poland had helped 
bring about the revolution.  
 
Poland was ... quite influential in getting [the] Orange Revolution underway. President 
Kwaśniewski at the time played a key role in negotiations with former President 
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Kuchma, leading to the rerun of elections in which Yushchenko won a mandate. So it’s 
always hard to see success being turned into qualified failure.
136
 
 
How important are these issues to you? 
1 = very 
important 
2 3 4 
5 = not 
important 
Poland’s relations with the EU 73 27 0 0 0 
democracy in my country 60 20 20 0 0 
being able to work in other European 
countries 
40 33 27 0 0 
Poland’s relations with Ukraine 36 43 14 7 0 
Poland’s relations with Lithuania 27 53 13 7 0 
energy supply reliability 27 40 20 13 0 
Poland’s relations with Belarus 20 33 20 20 7 
 
Table 8.12 Poles’ rating of issues’ importance, 2008 
Figures in % 
 
How Lithuanians viewed relations with Poland 
Lithuanians were enthusiastic when asked how the EU had affected relations between 
Lithuania and Poland. They volunteered answers such as “Poland is an important ally for 
Lithuania within the EU”, “government links are close and good” and “there is easier travel 
and more contact”. Several interviewees contrasted the ease of crossing the Polish border with 
the difficulties with visiting Belarus since Lithuania joined the Schengen zone.  
Almost all the Lithuanians surveyed had a favourable impression of the EU but there was 
little interest in working in Poland, which is understandable, given the much higher salaries 
on offer for Lithuanians working in Ireland, Britain and other western EU states to which 
Lithuanians gained easy access to in 2004. Very important for Lithuanians were democracy, 
energy supply reliability and Lithuania’s relations with the EU. Lithuania’s relations with 
Poland were also considered important. 
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Table 8.13 Lithuanians’ view of the EU and its effect on relations with Poland, 2008 
Figures in % 
 
 
How important are these issues to you? 
1 = very 
important 
2 3 4 
5 = not 
important 
democracy in my country 84 11 0 5 0 
energy supply reliability 71 17 4 8 0 
Lithuania’s relations with the EU 55 41 5 0 0 
Lithuania’s relations with Poland 15 60 15 5 5 
being able to work in Poland 0 0 20 15 65 
 
Table 8.14 Lithuanians’ view of issues’ importance, 2008 
Figures in % 
 
How Ukrainians viewed relations with Poland 
 
For Ukrainians interviewed, the greater difficulty in crossing the border into Poland was the 
main effect of the EU on relations between the two countries. Poland’s entry into the 
Schengen zone has made it much harder for Ukrainians to visit Poland. One interviewee 
Do you agree or disagree with these 
statements? 
strongly 
agree 
agree 
neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
The EU is a good thing for Lithuania 36 59 5 0 0 
The EU is a good thing for me 35 57 9 0 0 
The EU has made travel to Poland 
easier for me  
30 30 26 9 4 
Relations between Lithuania and 
Poland are better now than 10 years 
ago 
17 30 39 13 0 
It is important for me to be able to 
work in Poland 
0 0 53 26 21 
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mentioned the lack of a free visa scheme as the biggest impediment to closer Polish-Ukrainian 
relations. The “Schengen visa is hard to get”. The process of applying for a visa to visit 
Poland was, she said, “humiliating”. She felt that the “number one benefit” of Ukraine joining 
the EU would be “visa-free travel”. Respondents mentioned how easy it was for Poles to cross 
the border to visit Ukraine as tourists. 
 
Some highlighted that many goods were cheaper and more readily available in Poland than in 
Ukraine. One respondent said joining the EU would provide “great possibilities for Ukrainian 
business”, though she noted that the experience of Poland and Lithuania meant there would 
likely be a rise in prices of everyday goods and more competition for Ukrainian companies 
should the country join the EU. Another respondent noted that trade between Poland and 
Ukraine was increasing at a rate of “more than 40 per cent a year”, and was worth as much as 
US$4 billion in 2008. One respondent noted that many Ukrainians had crossed the border into 
Poland several times a day to buy and sell goods.  
 
 
Do you agree or disagree with these 
statements? 
strongly 
agree 
agree 
neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
The EU is a good thing for my country 20 80 0 0 0 
The EU is a good thing for me 20 80 0 0 0 
Relations between Ukraine and Poland 
are better now than 10 years ago 
20 50 30 0 0 
The EU has made travel to Poland 
easier for me  
20 60 20 0 0 
It is important for me to be able to 
work in Poland 
10 60 30 0 0 
 
Table 8.15 Ukrainians’ view of the EU and its impact on relations with Poland, 2008 
Figures in % 
 
Ukrainian respondents noted that Poland had become richer when it joined the EU. One said 
Ukrainians were aware that living standards in Poland were much higher than in Ukraine, and 
that Ukrainians sought equality with Poland. One tertiary-level lecturer interviewed noted that 
there was as yet “no sign” of EU money in Lviv and particularly, no sign of such money at 
her institute. She hoped that Ukraine would eventually join the EU but accepted that this 
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could only be achieved after “many years”. Many respondents mentioned their 
disappointment with their government, which they felt had let them down. Indeed, all who 
expressed an opinion on the matter were critical of the Ukrainian government and state 
apparatus. They felt that Ukraine’s only hope was to follow the path of closer integration with 
Europe espoused by Ukraine’s pro-Western parties. 
 
One respondent said the EU represented a “great prospect for the future” for Ukraine. Another 
said Ukraine must go through many “procedures” to prepare for EU membership, adding that 
“Poland in the EU is an example for Ukraine”.  Another interviewee said the EU was good for 
Ukraine, “good for a better life, better level of life”. Being a member of the EU “gives more 
possibilities” and allows a more “positive attitude” to many things. 
 
The students who answered the written surveys appeared to be more enthusiastic about the 
EU than their lecturers who were interviewed on a one-to-one basis. But all respondents in 
Ukraine expressed a favourable opinion of the EU and Poland. In contrast to Lithuanians, 
many Ukrainian respondents were interested in working in Poland, though democracy and 
Ukraine’s relations with the EU were considered much more important issues.  
 
How important are these issues to you? 
1 = very 
important 
2 3 4 5 = not 
important 
Ukraine’s relations with the EU 90 0 10 0 0 
Democracy in my country 90 0 10 0 0 
Ukraine’s relations with Poland 60 20 20 0 0 
Energy supply reliability 30 40 10 0 0 
Being able to work in Poland 10 20 50 10 0 
 
Table 8.16 Ukrainians’ view of issues’ importance, 2008 
Figures in % 
 
Most respondents indicated a closeness, familiarity and affection for Poland. One respondent 
stressed that Poland and Ukraine are neighbours, with close “historical and geographical 
relations”. As Slavs, Ukrainians and Poles feel “close to each other”, she said. Many people in 
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Lviv have relatives in Poland. Another interviewee noted that Poland was “a neighbouring 
country” and Ukraine’s “largest partner”. Most respondents were optimistic about the future 
of Ukraine’s relations with Poland. One respondent said the general relations between Poland 
and Ukraine were “not bad” before Poland joined the EU and are now getting even better. 
This, the respondent said, might be because Poland had joined the EU, but might not be 
directly related to Poland’s membership of the EU.  
 
Respondents noted that Poland was Ukraine’s main supporter in the EU. Some respondents 
said Ukrainians were unsure of what the EU is. One said that although the EU is known and 
accepted in Lviv, the city’s residents “do not know if it is useful”. Another said most 
Ukrainians, particularly those from areas far from the EU border “don’t know much about it 
[the EU]”. Some respondents linked the EU and Nato, saying that many countries were in 
both. The two organisations, one said, are “similar”. Nato provides “protection” while the EU 
provides “freedom and protection”. 
 
Respondents noted that many university students from Lviv, and not only those with Polish 
ancestry, go to Poland to study. There are several Polish-language schools in Lviv, catering 
mainly to the Polish minority. Many people in Lviv can speak Polish, and even more can 
understand it. One respondent estimated that about a quarter of Lviv residents could speak 
Polish. Others noted that more Poles were visiting Lviv and most expected that contact with 
Poles would increase. There were some exchanges with Polish academic institutions and 
many teachers and students came to Lviv each year. There were particularly close links with 
the Polish city of Jarosław, just across the border. A director of a tertiary institution said 
Ukraine was able to access Council of Europe funding for student exchanges with Poland, but 
there were problems with the visa cost, prohibitively expensive for Ukrainian students.  
 
Some respondents mentioned the frequent meetings between the presidents of Poland and 
Ukraine as a positive sign. The two leaders had been “discussing vital problems”, one 
respondent said. Football was mentioned as another bond between the two nations. Poland 
and Ukraine had been named joint hosts of the 2012 European Championships and as such, 
one respondent said, they “must work together ... improve infrastructure” and border 
crossings.  
 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours                      Public Opinion 
 
183 
 
A few respondents were keen to stress that Lviv is “Polish-oriented”. “Ukraine is closer to 
Poland than to Russia,” one said, adding that “many people here have Polish ancestors” 
including herself. Some respondents said they did not want a return of Russian domination of 
Ukraine. Ukraine’s relations with Russia are “good in public ... good in sentiment” but 
Ukraine has a “not positive history with Russia”, said one. Some respondents blamed Russia 
for Ukraine’s current situation. “Russia is guilty for present situation in Ukraine,” one said. 
Another said that “most people ... in Lviv” think that “Russia doesn’t want Ukraine to be 
successful”. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, the evidence of opinion surveys is that since 1990, and particularly since 2000, public 
opinion in all four countries has become less idealistic and more realistic. Now safely 
ensconced in the EU, Poles remain more consciously “European” and pro-EU than their 
eastern neighbours, although since the late 1990s a vocal eurosceptic minority has become 
established in the country. With regard to attitudes towards eastern neighbours, Polish public 
opinion has tended to follow (with a few years’ lag time) Polish government policy.  
 
Since 1990, and particularly since 2005, Poles have become much more favourably disposed 
to Ukrainians, seeing the latter as a potential buttress in the great geopolitical game with 
Russia. Poles seem to widely hold their leaders’ belief that good relations between Poland and 
Ukraine are of great importance to Poland. They attach less importance to links with Belarus. 
There is a perception among Poles that Polish membership of the EU has improved relations 
between their country and both Ukraine and Lithuania, but has not helped the already strained 
relations with Belarus. Poles appear to have a reasonable positive or neutral attitude to the 
Belarusian people but a very negative attitude towards the Belarusian regime.  
 
On the whole, Lithuanians remain much more eurosceptic than Poles, but are content to be 
tied into the European project with their Polish neighbours, who they increasingly see as allies 
in Brussels and in the face of a resurgent Russia. Ukrainians, who in the early 1990s were 
enthusiastic about the EU and the prospect of integration with the west, have become 
disillusioned, and most accept Ukraine will not join the EU in the near future. But in a 
positive development, residents of western Ukraine appear to have developed strong pro-
Polish sentiments, seeing Poland as Ukraine’s main promoter and supporter in the country’s 
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long march to EU membership. Poland’s economic success has helped improve the country’s 
image in Ukraine. 
 
Economic, political and social changes which have taken place in Poland as a result of the 
country’s striving towards EU membership and as a result of enlargement itself have led to 
many changes in Poles’ attitudes to Europe and to their neighbours. Now that Poland has 
successfully made it into the EU, Poles feel more secure and more prosperous and also more 
confident in themselves when interacting with their eastern neighbours, whom they see as 
having fallen behind Poland economically. Their Ukrainians and Belarusian neighbours, in 
contrast, perceive Poland as having benefited from EU membership. Ukrainians, in particular, 
seem to be envious of Poland’s success and frustrated with their own state’s failure to match 
the great strides made by Poland. The EU seems generally to have had a positive impact on 
Ukrainians’ and Lithuanians’ perceptions of Poles and Poland. The opinions of Belarusians 
are more difficult to gauge, but it does seem that many younger Belarusians and the 
Belarusian democratic opposition see a supporter and example in Poland.  
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9 Migration 
 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours                                Migration 
 
186 
 
The removal of barriers to free movement has made Europeans more mobile. Increased 
individual mobility has allowed Europeans to become more familiar with other European 
countries and nationalities. Migration flows have become more complex, with an increase in 
the movement of professionals and managers. In 1995 the total number of border crossings of 
income-seeking East Central Europeans, mainly Poles, was estimated at some 25-30 million.
1
 
Most migrants crossed borders multiple times. The total number of legal East European 
(mostly Polish) workers in western Europe was estimated at about 400,000-450,000 people in 
1995, with the largest number in Germany.
2
 
 
The EU’s success and enlargement accelerated a westward movement of workers and their 
families from Central Europe to Western Europe. Migration to and from the country is “an 
integral element” in Poland’s incorporation into the EU.3 From May 2004 there was a sharp 
increase in migration from Poland and Lithuania to the British Isles, as Poles and Lithuanians 
were given free access to the British and Irish labour markets. Throughout the 1990s,  because 
of economic collapse in the successor states of the former Soviet Union, thousands of 
Belarusians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians went to Poland to obtain short-term jobs, mostly in 
unskilled and semi-skilled areas.  
 
As Poland readied to join the EU, tighter visa controls curtailed the movement of Belarusians 
and Ukrainians into Poland. Ironically, while Schengen rules have led to an easing of border 
controls between Poland and its new EU partners (including fellow new member Lithuania), 
those same rules have made more difficult the movement of ordinary people between Poland 
on the one hand, and Ukraine and Belarus. This has made more difficult the lives of people 
living near the border, particularly in western Belarus and western Ukraine, who are 
dependent on cross-border trade for everyday existence. It has also hindered contact between 
Poland and residents of Belarus who are most sympathetic to the EU and Western values, thus 
making adding more obstacles to the transmission of EU values and norms to Belarusian 
society.  
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An important factor in Poland’s rapid and largely successful adoption of a Western model of 
society was the relative openness of Poland to Western influence during communist times. 
Compared with their neighbours, Poles were able to travel to Western Europe in much greater 
numbers. They “were able to acquire knowledge, albeit limited, of how the West operated”.4 
From the 1960s, Polish academics and students spent time at Western universities and 
colleges. Millions of Polish émigrés “maintained close contacts with their families in 
Poland”.5 Thus, “Polish society was relatively well prepared for the change of regime”.6 
 
In the early 21
st
 century, most Polish and Lithuanian emigrants are still bound for the West, 
“the source of the ideas and practical models of democracy” for Poland and Lithuania.7 It can 
be expected that when Poles and Lithuanians move to Western Europe, they would observe 
the daily workings of democratic societies. They might then be expected to be more 
sympathetic to the democratisation process in their own countries. Migration has allowed 
Poles to improve their material wealth and social status. In the 1990s, as many as one in eight 
Polish returnees from Western Europe founded their own companies, an investment that 
might have made them “active supporters of democracy”.8 Migration is an influential factor in 
strengthening local economies. It can also help consolidate democratic attitudes. 
 
By the late 1990s, highly skilled people made up about one in seven of the total number of 
westbound migrants from Poland.
9
 These skilled migrants were often young managers of 
successful businesses.
10
 They included employees of multinational firms, for whom 
increasing numbers of highly skilled, multilingual Poles, scientists and researchers work. 
Migration in and out of Poland can be seen as part of the population movement resulting from 
globalisation. The migrations are thus an integral element of Poland’s joining the global 
economic system. As they persist, they will help make intra-EU borders more porous.  
 
In 2002, Morawska predicted that westbound movement of Poles and Lithuanians and 
migration from Ukraine and Belarus into Poland would “maintain their current volume or 
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even increase” after the 2004 EU enlargement.11 Most migration would be of “short-term 
income-seeking migrants who [would] draw from their home countries any public welfare 
provisions they receive”.12 
 
In the run-up to the 2004 enlargement, many academic surveys and estimates had suggested 
“that allowing free movement of labour on accession” was “unlikely to provoke large 
migratory flows”.13 However, fears of mass migration from the poor, crisis-ridden Eastern 
Europe prompted governments in Western Europe “to reassure their voters that the abolition 
of internal EU frontier controls would be complemented by the preservation of tough external 
border controls”.14  
 
Are you interested in working in another EU 
country once Poland enters the EU? (%) 
September 2000 May 2001 
1. Yes, I am interested and will certainly try 10 13 
2. Yes, I am interested and will probably try 8 10 
 
Table 9.1 Poles’ attitudes to working in other EU countries 2000-200115 
 
The EU had a significant impact on border regimes between Poland and its eastern neighbours 
partly because of the limited development of migration policies in Poland before 1989. 
Communist states lacked immigration policies as such as they focused on preventing or 
regulating emigration. Few non-nationals were keen to immigrate to those countries. 
Wholesale transfer of EU border policies filled institutional gaps left over from communism. 
After 1989, Polish border guards no longer had to keep Poles inside Poland, they now had to 
keep foreigners out. 
 
Just as Poles have sought new employment opportunities in Western Europe, so Ukrainians 
and Belarusians have sought work in Poland and elsewhere in the EU. Much of the 1990s 
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emigration from Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine was due to the economic turmoil associated 
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
 
In the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet economy and opening of Eastern Europe’s 
borders saw a rapid increase in immigration into Poland from the former Soviet Union. At 
first, the bulk of immigrants were ethnic Poles, mainly from Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania.
16
 
However, from the mid-1990s, the immigration of ethnic Poles tailed off. After 1993 there 
was a rapid increase in immigration of people with no Polish family connections from 
Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, with numbers tripling between 1993 and 1997.
17
  
 
Overall immigration into Poland and Lithuania accelerated from the early 1990s.
18
 By the late 
1990s, Poland had begun to receive significant numbers of immigrants from more distant 
countries. In 1998, legal immigrants from the former Soviet Union and developing countries, 
mainly Ukrainians, Russians, Vietnamese and Armenians, numbered more than 40,000 
people, still not a large number for a country of 38 million people.
19
 However, the number of 
short-term working “tourists” and undocumented workers, mainly from the former Soviet 
Union, was greater.
20
  
 
Throughout the 1990s, thousands of Belarusians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians travelled to 
Poland to obtain short-term jobs, mostly in unskilled and semi-skilled areas. Temporary cross-
border migrations into Poland after 1990 included undocumented traders and working 
holidaymakers, mainly from Ukraine, Lithuania and Russia. Particularly large numbers went 
to Warsaw, which boomed throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and to border areas both in the 
west near Germany, and along the eastern border with Ukraine and Belarus, where an 
extensive amount of cross-border trade was taking place.
21
 By the mid-1990s, a large 
proportion of the workers on building sites in Warsaw were from Belarus or Ukraine.  
 
With the mass exodus of Polish workers to Britain and Ireland from May 2004, Polish 
companies were soon looking for labour. In mid-2005, Poland and Ukraine signed an 
agreement regulating the status of an estimated 200,000 Ukrainian seasonal workers in 
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Poland. In January 2006, Gdańsk shipyard appealed for workers from Ukraine to help fill 
thousands of jobs vacated by emigrating Poles.
22
 In 2006 the EU and Ukraine signed an 
agreement to make it easier to issue short-stay visas to Ukrainian citizens travelling to the EU. 
An agreement was signed establishing procedures for repatriating illegal immigrants to 
Ukraine.
23
  
 
Since the 1990s Poland and Lithuania have experienced an influx of Westerners. Half of these 
are communist-era Polish émigrés, who for the most part shuttle between their home nation 
and another country. In contrast to westbound Polish emigrants, most of whom had no tertiary 
education, the great majority of Western immigrants to Poland were educated to tertiary 
level.
24
  
 
The 1990s saw a rapid increase in the number of highly skilled Westerners who moved to 
Poland and Lithuania to work, often for multinational companies. Between 1992 and 1995, 
the number of tertiary-educated Westerners (excluding people who qualified for Polish 
citizenship) in Poland on long-term work permits more than doubled to about 30,000.
25
 The 
number of short-term Western business visitors, most from EU states, was much larger.  
 
It was only in the late 1990s that the undocumented Western workforce in Poland began to 
attract attention from Polish authorities and media. Turn-of-the-millennium estimates by the 
country’s National Bureau of Labour estimated the number of “illegally employed Western 
migrants” in Poland at more than 50,000.26 Migrations of highly skilled west Europeans 
seeking work have been common within the old EU. Their appearance in Poland and 
Lithuania can be seen as reflection of those countries’ “progressive incorporation into the 
European ... system”.27 As the integration of Poland and Lithuania into the EU and wider 
Western world continues, more Western professionals can be expected to migrate to the two 
countries. 
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Case study: Polish and Lithuanian migration to Britain and Ireland 
 
Greater interaction between peoples can aid in the transmission of values and norms. The 
common experiences of European migrants working and living side by side in other European 
countries can help the “normalisation” of relations between them. Poles and Lithuanians, in 
common with other Central Europeans and Balts, gained free access to the British, Irish and 
Swedish labour markets with the 2004 eastern enlargement. The months following May 2004 
saw a sharp increase in migration from Poland and Lithuania to the British Isles. It is hard to 
measure the scale of the new migration. Official British figures in late 2005 gave a total 
number of 175,000 workers registered in Britain from the countries which joined the EU in 
2004.
28
 But other estimates suggested there were 300,000 Poles alone (and another 100,000 in 
Ireland).
29
  
 
In 2005, the Lithuanian government estimated that more than 100,000 Lithuanians, or 3 per 
cent of its country’s citizens, had gone abroad to work.30 Official statistics probably 
underestimated the numbers. Though Poles and Lithuanians arriving in Britain were officially 
required to register before seeking work, many did not. According to official statistics, in late 
2005 there were only 95 Polish plumbers living in Britain.
31
 However, a newspaper found that 
number in a day, by advertising in an area of west London which had attracted a large number 
of migrant Poles.
32
 In 2006, the British Home Office estimated that some 427,000 Poles 
moved to Britain to work legally in the two years to mid-2006.
33
 Somewhere between 
100,000 and 200,000 Poles and Lithuanians migrated to Ireland over the same period. This 
“new reservoir of good, cheap labour” was a boon for British and Irish employers.34 In fact, 
business leaders, desperately short of labour, had “pressed repeatedly for the immediate lifting 
of all restrictions on the free movement of workers” in the enlarged EU.35 
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Official data “put the number of Poles in Britain at about 264,000” but the real number was 
“much higher”, according to a 2006 report.36 Other official figures indicated 447,000 people 
from Poland and other 2004 accession countries arrived in Britain after the 2004 
enlargement.
37
 The bulk of these migrants were Poles. Poles felt “at home in London because 
it already had a thriving Polish community” thanks to a wave of Polish immigration during 
World War II and further influxes in the 1980s and in the years leading up to Poland’s EU 
accession.
38
 
 
This new wave of Polish immigration spread out all over Britain, with local concentrations in 
areas short of agricultural workers, such as East Anglia and Inverness. In several British 
towns, newspapers moved to cater for the new Polish immigrants. Several local British 
newspapers set up Polish-language versions or supplements. For example, in October 2006, 
The Reading Chronicle printed 5000 copies of its regular edition in Polish, as an experiment 
in catering for the large number of Poles living in the town, and to help reach out to that 
section of its population.
39
 Poles had contributed much to the town, especially in areas such as 
trades and the service industry. The newspaper aimed to work towards “community 
cohesion”, getting Polish migrants “involved in the fabric of the community”.40 The 
Chronicle’s Polish version was “a Reading paper for Polish people, not a Polish paper for 
Polish people”.41 Some national newspapers in Britain looked at going down the same route. 
 
In September 2006, the Welsh town of Llanelli opened a support centre for its new Polish 
residents.
42
 The centre was supported by Welsh Assembly government funding.
43
  Estimates 
indicated that by 2006 over 1500 Poles were living in the area, many arriving in the two years 
since Poland joined the EU.
44
 Of about 1100 foreign nationals who applied for National 
Insurance numbers in Carmarthenshire in 2005/2006, more than 60 per cent were Poles.
45
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After 2004, Poles in Britain, as EU citizens, were entitled to vote in local and regional 
elections. In 2007 Poles living in Scotland were urged to register their vote for upcoming 
elections, in a campaign launched by the Scottish Executive and the Electoral Commission.
46
 
Voter registration forms were translated into Polish.
47
 Backing for the registration campaign 
came from a bus operator, 200 of whose drivers in Scotland came from other EU member 
states, mainly Poland.
48
 
 
Poland and Lithuania are well placed to be “brain factories”.49 Demand in Britain for Polish 
bus drivers has offered an “incentive for Poles with related skills ... to adapt”.50 Poland and 
Lithuania have a surplus of members of some professions and trades. In 2005, a European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development spokesman said both countries had “up to twice as 
many doctors per head of population” as it needed.51 With a fall in the number of children, 
Poland and Lithuania have too many teachers.
52
 The task is “to make returning home a case of 
‘when’ rather than ‘if’, by removing bureaucratic obstacles and maintaining ties between 
diasporas and the homeland”.53 The Lithuanian government sponsored “new Lithuanian-
language schools in places like Dublin” in the hope that they would “remove a barrier for 
émigré families who are considering returning”.54  
 
Official figures indicate that in the year to April 2006, 86,900 immigrants arrived in Ireland, 
“the highest number since modern record-keeping began in 1987”.55 Most of these immigrants 
were Poles. Between 2004 and 2006, the number of Poles in Ireland grew from a few 
thousand to over 120,000 according to several estimates.
56
 This had a significant impact on 
both Ireland and Poland. Ireland fast became “a second home for Poles”, with “Polish shops, 
pubs, bakeries, barbers, newspapers, priests and translation services to help access services 
like bank accounts and social welfare”.57 Polish “flying doctors” took advantage of low-cost 
air services between Poland and Ireland to work for “a few days or weeks per month” in Irish 
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hospitals, while continuing to treat patients in Poland.
58
 A weekend working in Northern 
Ireland paid a Polish doctor as much as three weeks in Poland.
59
  
 
Ireland has not proved be the promised land for all immigrants. Irish President Mary 
McAleese outlined some of the problems for the people the media designated “new” Irish.  
 
The new immigrants now feature among the homeless and with them come new issues 
around language, culture, legality of status, access to education and to jobs.
60
  
 
The biggest barrier to Poles working in Ireland is language. Many highly skilled Poles have 
problems speaking English, which led to difficulties getting a good job.
61
 Despite the large 
increase in numbers migrating west, the overall number of East Europeans moving west was 
not as much as was feared by some. In October 2006 the European Commission said that 
overall migration from Poland and Lithuania to Western Europe had been “lower than 
expected” since the 2004 enlargement.62 A study by the Irish-based European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions concluded that although migration from 
east to west would continue “geographical mobility within Europe has been, and is likely to 
remain, relatively low”.63 
 
The effect of migration on Poland 
 
The post-enlargement migration of Poles and Lithuanians to western Europe was “driven by 
economics not politics”.64 Most Poles who moved west for work pointed “to the necessity to 
make additional money to ‘make ends meet’”.65 Most of the remainder sought “to elevate 
their socioeconomic status through the accumulation of material goods”.66 
 
Polish authorities worried about the impact of the departure of so many skilled people. The 
migrant workers left labour-thirsty industries in Poland such as construction and retailing 
short of workers. Polish enterprises had to import labour from further east, principally 
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Ukraine and Belarus, or raise wages. Poor, rural areas in Lithuania and eastern Poland have 
been depopulated to the extent that children and the elderly “feel abandoned”.67 There was a 
danger that the outflow of skilled workers might “aggravate a bad situation, with so many 
people leaving a poor country that its problems worsen”.68  
 
In the 21
st
 century, returning home is inexpensive and fast. A notable change brought about by 
the single market programme was the loosening of regulations on air transport. The number of 
cut-price airlines has grown. Europeans now have greater choice and can fly more cheaply 
than before. By 2005, budget flights between Britain and Poland cost just a few dollars. That 
made “migration more efficient”.69 Migrants within the EU could “choose easily how long 
they go for, and where”.70  
 
After reaching a high of 20.7 per cent in 2003, Polish unemployment fell steadily in the 
following years.  In August 2006, Polish unemployment reached its lowest level in five years, 
spurred in part by the rush of people seeking work abroad.
71
 But although the jobless rate fell 
to 15.7 per cent in July 2006, it was still the highest in the EU.
72
 A column in The Irish Times 
in 2006 claimed that although the Polish jobless rate was still high, relatively few jobless 
Poles had left the country for work abroad.
73
 Most Polish migrants were “young, dynamic, 
skilled and educated” people who “should have no problems finding a job in Poland”.74 The 
columnist noted that: “Poles working abroad improve their language skills, gain new 
experiences, know-how and contacts, all of which can be useful in their future careers.”75 
Since 2004, all sorts of specialists, from hairdressers to lifeguards, have left Poland for more 
lucrative jobs in western Europe. Meanwhile, the Polish economy boomed in the years 
following accession, with exports growing by 20 per cent a year.
76
 Polish companies faced a 
new dilemma. In parts of northwest Poland where the jobless rate exceeded 30 per cent 
companies found it hard to locate new staff.
77
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The coming years will see a large influx of EU money into Poland, as the country becomes 
the biggest beneficiary of EU cohesion and regional policies. However, due to the westward 
outflow of young workers, local governments across Poland lacked engineers to plan 
investments, while building firms lacked workers to build the infrastructure and housing 
planned in the national development plan for 2007-2013.
78
 By 2006, Polish officials were 
encouraging UK-based Poles to return to job opportunities back home. In July 2006, officials 
from the city of Wrocław travelled to Britain to convince Polish migrants that more job 
opportunities existed in the city than when Poland entered the EU.
79
 The officials visited bars 
and pubs frequented by Poles in London to try and lure them back, concerned that a shrinking 
labour pool would mean Wrocław would attract less investment.  
 
In November 2006, Polish President Lech Kaczyński downplayed the negative aspects of the 
migration of young skilled to Britain and other western European countries, saying that while 
such large pay differentials existed between Poland and those countries, it was natural such 
migration would take place.
80
 Kaczyński pointed out that the biggest pay differentials between 
Britain and Poland were in trades such as painter and carpenter.
81
 In fields such as IT the pay 
difference was much less.  
 
After 1989, the huge increase in the number of visits made by Poles and Lithuanians to 
western Europe gave them “a more realistic view of the West, of both its democratic 
achievements and their social consequences”.82 Short tourist stays may not have a major 
impact on attitudes towards democratisation. On the other hand, longer stays abroad 
associated with migration for work might encourage adherence “to democratic norms”.83 The 
migration of Poles and Lithuanians westward helped ease domestic unrest following “the 
traumas of economic transformation by providing subsidiary work and income abroad”.84 
Migrants who invested in businesses might contribute to creating a “democratic investment” 
for the future.
85
 However, Morawska believes that most westbound migrants have had 
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“minimal or no impact on the consolidation of democracy in” Poland and Lithuania.86 Most 
stays in the West “reinforce undemocratic attitudes and habits, as traders and migrants find 
that informal methods get things done abroad as well as at home”.87 Pravda argues that even 
those well-heeled travellers “who generally support democracy, tend to help strengthen ... 
cronyism and corrupt practice”.88 
 
Border security 
 
In the 1990s Poland, Lithuania and other prospective members were seen by the EU not just 
as countries to be protected by the embrace of international security organisation, but as 
sources of cross-border crime. The collapse of the Iron Curtain and other barriers within 
Europe led to security worries. With the breakdown of state authority in the former 
communist bloc in the early 1990s, crime became rampant and black markets flourished.
89
  
 
The security of Poland’s eastern borders had long been of concern for the EU.90 There were 
fears that border problems would arise when the EU frontier moved to Poland’s border with 
Belarus and Ukraine. Many feared the “chances of this border being well policed” would be 
low.
91
 German newspapers warned that “chaos and corruption” prevailed on Poland’s 
frontiers with Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.
92
 Corruption is “widespread on both sides of 
the Polish-Ukrainian border”.93 There was considerable corruption among Polish customs and 
borders officers, despite them receiving their (low) wages regularly.
94
 Corruption in Poland 
appears to have worsened considerably in the 1990s.
95
 The data shows that Poland in the late 
1990s and early 2000s was more corrupt than in the last decade of communist rule.
96
 In 1995, 
36 Polish customs officers were arrested, and “legal proceedings were ... mounted against 102 
officers”.97 Of particular concern “was the widespread collusion between customs officers and 
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criminal gangs”.98 In February 1997, an official campaign was begun against corruption in the 
border service, with more arrests of border service officers and as many as 41 officials put 
under investigation.
99
 In mid-1997, after a major corruption scandal at a border crossing with 
Belarus, the head of the Main Customs Office resigned.
100
 Ethics classes were introduced for 
Polish customs officials in response to their high levels of corruption.
101
 
 
In Ukraine, many law enforcement officers were “not paid at all” for months or even years.102 
By the late 1990s, Ukrainian border guards who had stopped receiving salaries were helping 
illegal migrants cross into Poland.
103
 Customs officials’ poor pay, training and equipment 
invited corruption and meant Poland’s eastern border was far from tight. Highly organised 
Russian, Ukrainian and Polish mafias took advantage.
104
 The resulting levels of crime and 
migration were “hard to stem”.105 There were problems with policing Poland’s eastern 
borders, because Ukraine and Belarus could not or would not, cooperate.
106
 The biggest 
problem was the largely uncontrolled “green border” which crossed forests, rivers and 
fields.
107
 Poland’s border with Belarus stretches for about 407km. The border with Ukraine is 
526km long. In Belarus, the army exercises control from the east. But by 2002, Ukrainian 
authorities had become “totally deficient in their policing of the border”. 108 
 
In response, the EU (first through the Phare programme) provided money and technical 
assistance to help Poland to control its borders.
109
 German patrols were stationed on Poland’s 
borders with Belarus and Ukraine.
110
 Germany also supplied “financial and technical 
assistance to upgrade Poland’s border infrastructure” and in particular, border policing.111 
Joint operations and training for German and Polish border guards was introduced. This sped 
up the development of mechanisms for migration control, meaning that would-be migrants 
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heading for Germany would be stopped and held in Poland. After 1993, asylum seekers 
arriving in Germany were no longer accepted as refugees if they had previously passed 
through Poland, due to a bilateral readmission agreement signed that year.
112
 
 
Long before joining the EU, Polish and Lithuanian leaders were already thinking about future 
EU enlargement. In 1997, then Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek said Poland did 
“not want barriers at its eastern frontiers”.113 Poland’s Minister for Europe, Ryszard 
Czarnecki, spoke “of a tightly controlled border” that could simultaneously be a bridge to 
Belarus and Ukraine.
114
 Czarnecki said that stabilising Ukraine and Belarus was in the 
interests of both Poland and the EU.
115
 With eastern borders “only controllable if there is 
cooperation with the other sides”, Poland attempted “a delicate balancing act”.116 From the 
mid-1990s, Polish authorities stabilised and effectively controlled the country’s borders but 
avoided “total closure towards the east”.117 During the 1990s, more than 80,000 illegal 
immigrants, virtually all crossing from east to west, were arrested at the Polish-Ukrainian 
border.
118
 As the situation on the Polish-Ukrainian border continued to be unsatisfactory and 
as Ukraine seemed far from becoming a prospective EU candidate, Poland seemed more 
inclined to harden its eastern border. 
 
A greater distinction between “hard and soft borders” was a feature of EU migration policy 
after 1996.
119
 The “sharper edges” of the external EU border would be “harder to penetrate 
from the outside”, while intra-Schengen borders became even “softer and more porous”.120 In 
the run-up to enlargement, the European Commission told Poland that the country’s “chances 
of joining the EU depended to a large degree on how well it could police its borders”.121 In 
Germany in particular, the hardening of Poland’s eastern border was seen as “necessary ... to 
erect a first serious obstacle to illegal migration and illegal trade from east to west”.122 
German officials made it clear “that progress in opening the German-Polish border” depended 
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partly on “the effectiveness of Polish controls on their country’s eastern border”.123 But EU-
mandated, more effective, control would choke off “the flourishing cross-border trade that 
had developed between eastern Poland and western Ukraine in the mid-1990s, opening Poland 
to the west at the expense of shutting its borders to the east”.124 
 
Poland and Lithuania tightened controls on their eastern borders to comply with the acquis 
communautaire. Measures in the late 1990s led to a halving of border traffic between Poland 
and Ukraine.
125
 Warsaw was keen to allow Ukrainians continued access to the Poland for as 
long as possible before it would have to clamp down in the face of EU pressure, so in 1997, 
Ukraine and Poland initiated a visa-free regime. Part of Poland’s role in helping Ukraine 
advance economically and socially has been to provide jobs for Ukrainian migrant workers. 
Many Ukrainian households depend on the earnings of family members working in Poland as 
their main source of income.
126
 The fact that thousands of Ukrainians were able to experience 
life in “a large Slavic state where public institutions work and the free market functions” 
helped build societal “support for reform in Ukraine”.127 Poland introduced a new aliens law 
at the beginning of 1998. From then on, Ukrainians and Lithuanians crossing into Poland had 
to prove that they had sufficient means to sustain themselves while in the country.
128
 As a 
result, there was a significant fall in the amount of “undocumented trade in the borderland 
areas” and the number of “worker-tourists” also fell.129 Border traffic was curtailed, “reducing 
economic, political and civil societal interactions”.130  
 
After 1998, Belarusians were required to have Polish invitations or pre-paid hotel-vouchers if 
they wanted to enter Poland. In protest at the change, Belarus temporarily withdrew its 
ambassador from Warsaw.
131
 Polish traders who depended on cross-border traffic also 
protested. In eastern Poland, more than 1000 local traders protested against the “economic 
catastrophe” caused by tighter border controls.132 With the sharp fall in trading, incomes in 
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eastern border towns fell dramatically and jobs were lost.
133
 At Warsaw’s “Russian bazaar”, 
trading fell almost a third after the introduction of the new aliens law and the new visa 
regime.
134
  
 
The Polish minority in Belarus, already persecuted by the Lukashenko regime, has also been 
disadvantaged by the new regulations. Since 1991, most Belarusian traders have had ties with 
Poland “and thus to a wider world of free trade and democratic institutions”.135 Some pro-
democracy activists in Belarus worry that the tougher border regime could isolate them 
further.
136
 To “keep Belarusians from Poland is to close one democratic possibility in 
Belarus”.137 
 
In 1998, the number of recorded illegal crossings of Poland’s border with Germany fell by 40 
per cent, yet “the overall number of illegal crossings of Polish borders increased”.138 Unlike 
the Polish-German border, the Polish-Ukrainian border “lacks the favourable circumstances of 
economic transition and European integration to nurture ... cooperation”.139 In 1999, there 
were only four official crossing-points on the Polish-Ukrainian border.
140
 The same year, 
there were 26 crossings open on the Polish-German border.
141
 The ability to replicate the 
effective arrangements along the Polish-German border along Poland’s border with Ukraine is 
limited by economic disparities and political problems “but also because the EU accession 
framework inhibits it”.142  
 
A “re-weighting of the relative strengths of the eastern and western borders of Poland, in 
favour of the eastern border” was in Poland’s interest and “the long-term interests of the other 
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member states”.143 For Poland, it was important to see extra resources and manpower on the 
country’s eastern border, “a fact recognised in the Polish Strategy on Integrated Border 
Management, which states that the eastern borders of Poland should have priority in all EU-
related funding”.144 
 
By 1999, Polish customs officials began to police the border in line with EU expectations. 
German-trained Polish border units tightened surveillance and “curtailed the vibrant ‘bazaar 
economy’ that was flourishing in the border regions” at a political cost within Poland, 
contributing to a swing away from support for pro-EU parties to anti-EU parties which would 
form the Polish government a few years later.
145
 German leaders gave Poland “little credit for 
exercising tighter control, despite the fact that they recently experienced similar problems 
themselves and were considerably more conciliatory towards the Poles than they expect[ed] 
the Poles to be towards” Ukraine and Belarus.146 Polish police officers showed “signs of 
disillusionment”.147 Poles desired EU membership “for economic reasons but enthusiasm for 
EU values” waned.148 By 2000, only 59 per cent of Poles were in favour of EU membership, 
down from 80 per cent in 1996, with the negative impact of a tightened eastern border being 
part of the reason for this decline in euro-enthusiasm.
149
 
 
Under German pressure the Commission “suggested that free movement of labour would not 
be extended to new member states from the day of their accession”.150 By 2001, a perception 
grew that Poland might be excluded from the first eastern enlargement.
151
 The new Polish 
government decided a change of approach might accelerate the country’s progress. It decided 
to accept restrictions on Polish workers’ access to current EU member states’ labour markets 
for as much as seven years.
152
 It also eased restrictions on the sale of Polish land to 
foreigners.
153
  
                                                 
143
 Brown, D. 2002. ‘The New Hurdle: The Prospects for Polish and Estonian Accession to ‘Pillar III’ in the 
Post-Tampere European Union’ in Ross, C. (ed.) 2002. Perspectives on the Enlargement of the European Union 
Brill, Leiden, Netherlands p.245 
144
 Ibid. p.246 
145
 Mungiu-Pippidi 2002. ‘Facing the ‘desert of Tartars’p.67 
146
 Bigo, D. 2002. ‘Border regimes, police cooperation and security’ in Zielonka, J. (ed.) 2002 Europe Unbound: 
Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union Routledge London p.236 
147
 Ibid. 
148
 Ibid. 
149
 Ibid. 
150
 Zielonka 2002 Europe Unbound p.9 
151
 Ibid. 
152
 Ibid. 
153
 Ibid. 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours                                Migration 
 
203 
 
 
Ukraine was deeply affected by the introduction and extension of the Schengen 
arrangements.
154
 As early as March 1999, Ukraine announced it would implement visa 
regulations based on the Schengen arrangements and planned “to meet EU requirements on 
borders”.155 Until 2001, Poland had resisted pressure from Brussels to end its visa-free 
arrangements for Ukrainians, saying that it would meet its Schengen obligations when it 
joined the EU.
156
  
 
Poland did not follow EU demands to introduce even tougher visa requirements on visitors 
from its eastern neighbours, because the restrictions it had already implemented had hurt trade 
with those countries. By one estimate in 2001, the informal export trade was earning Poland 
£5.9 billion per annum.
157
 When new measures to seal the border with Ukraine were 
introduced, they had “a dramatic effect”, causing a fall of as much as a third in Polish-
Ukrainian trade, according to at least one source.
158
 In November 2009, Polish Foreign 
Minister Sikorski and his Ukrainian counterpart committed themselves to working towards a 
smoother, more efficient border regime between their two countries. However, a year later, 
border infrastructure was still inadequate. 
 
In 2003, a European Commission communication to the European Council and European 
Parliament said that Ukraine and Belarus “should be offered the prospect of a stake in the 
EU’s Internal Market and further integrations and liberalisation to promote the free movement 
of – person, goods, services and capital”.159 From October 2003, new regulations governing 
the movement of people across Poland’s border with Belarus came into effect, a direct result 
of Poland’s decision to join the EU.160 When Poland joined the EU, its special arrangements 
with Ukraine ended. After May 2004, the number of Belarusians and Ukrainians crossing the 
Polish border fell to a fraction of what it had been in 2003.   
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With Poland’s entry into the Schengen zone in December 2007, visa restrictions on Ukrainian 
visitors to Poland became much tougher. The reintroduction of visas for Ukrainians visiting 
Poland “drastically reduced cross-border trade and investment, causing severe economic 
problems, especially in the border regions”.161 Partly in response, the Polish government 
planned for the introduction of a “Karta Polaka” (“Pole’s Card”) for ethnic Poles living in the 
former Soviet Union. People who qualified for such a card would get a refund of visa fees and 
study rights in Poland. The main requirement for the award of the Karta Polaka is links with 
Poland, with knowledge and use of the Polish language being considered the foremost marker 
of Polishness. Those who have at least one Polish parent or two Polish grandparents can also 
qualify for a Karta Polaka.    
 
Zielonka notes that “the Schengen system has evolved in a direction not originally 
envisaged”.162  Not only do hard borders make trade more difficult trade, they alienate the 
EU’s neighbours and jeopardise the “system of civic rights and freedoms”.163 In 2006, 
Legrain estimated that the EU as a whole had “seven or eight million illegal immigrants”.164 
EU border controls can foster this illegality by raising the costs and risk of migration and 
encouraging labour laws to be broken.  Zielonka sees “little evidence that attempts to control 
terrorism, international crime and migration at the EU’s rigid border are effective”.165 Instead, 
hard borders encourage more sophisticated organised cross-border crime operations.
166
 In the 
run-up to Polish accession, EU states seemed “more interested in promoting their own border 
surveillance technology than in sharing intelligence” to combat cross-border crime.167  
 
Far from protecting society from the waves of immigration, the EU’s external border controls 
have helped “to undermine the fabric of law and order”, in the EU and in neighbouring 
countries.
168
 In the 21
st
 century, many of the “new risks” facing Europe involve borders, “but 
the function of borders in security has changed”.169 Borders are no “longer used primarily to 
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deter military attack and to keep unwilling populations [in]”.170 Instead, “borders have 
become multi-functional”.171 They are seen by many “as a discriminatory division between 
peoples”.172  
 
Conclusion 
 
Poland’s implementation of Schengen external controls on its eastern border had significant 
implications for Poland’s relations with Ukraine and Belarus. Erecting an external Schengen 
border presented “a major challenge to Poland’s eastern policies”.173 Polish leaders had 
“consistently presented their country as a bridge to Ukraine [and] Belarus. They had pursued 
“active bilateral political engagement with these countries”.174 Throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, Polish leaders have stressed that the stabilisation of Belarus and Ukraine is a key 
foreign policy goal for Poland. In particular, Poland has pushed for expanded EU links with 
Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania were allowed to enter the Schengen zone only after applying 
more vigorous controls on their eastern borders.  
 
Freedom to travel, work and live in other EU countries has had a huge, largely positive impact 
on Poland and Lithuania, and on relations between the two countries. In contrast with the 
situation on Poland’s borders with Belarus and Ukraine, the border between EU members 
Lithuania and Poland is an open intra-Schengen one. For one Lithuanian businesswoman 
interviewed for this thesis in June 2008, the end of border controls between Lithuania and 
Poland has been a boon to cross-border interaction:  
I think the main change is that ... the border with Poland is open. That is the main 
change in our life. ... We have a lot more contacts with Poland.
175
 
On joining the EU in May 2004, Poles and Lithuanians gained access to the labour markets of 
several EU states, including Britain and Ireland. Belarusians and Ukrainians, locked out of the 
expanded EU, have not been able to migrate in such numbers. Not only have Ukrainians and 
Belarusians not been able to work freely in Western Europe, they have also lost the relatively 
easy access they had to jobs in Poland. The EU’s migration policy and border controls have 
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served to make more difficult interaction between Poles and their eastern neighbours, and 
have, in particular, negatively affected economic and social ties between eastern Poland and 
western parts of Belarus and Ukraine. The EU’s normative power, so successfully in evidence 
in Poland and Lithuania in the 1990s and early 2000s, is not operating at the strength in 
should be in the Union’s post-Soviet near abroad, specifically Ukraine and Belarus. In the 
interests of continuing the areal expansion of EU values and norms, every effort should be 
made to expand social and economic ties between EU peoples and the peoples of 
neighbouring states. One way of doing this is to allow easier access of young Belarusians and 
Ukrainians to Poland, Lithuania and the wider EU. 
 
EU policies for dealing with its external borders have been at variance with the idea that 
regional integration is a way “of ensuring long-term stability and security”.176 The EU needs a 
smarter approach to border management on its eastern frontier. As a country at the front of the 
EU membership queue Poland was forced to adopt stricter immigration controls on 
Ukrainians and Belarusians. This contributed to tensions between Poland and its eastern 
neighbours and could hamper democratic consolidation in Ukraine and, potentially, 
democratisation in Belarus.
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This chapter presents overviews of the media in Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus, 
before looking at the media’s role in transmitting European values and norms through Poland 
to each of the other three countries, particularly in the context of EU enlargement. The focus 
is primarily on Poland’s media, which, in general, seem to have displayed more convergence 
with media in western Europe, in terms of reporting, ownership structure and lack of 
government interference, than have the media in post-Soviet countries. In the last 20 years, 
Poland’s media filtered and retransmitted western and EU ideology to Ukraine and Lithuania.   
 
Since 1990, West European, notably German and Italian, companies have invested heavily in 
the media markets of the countries which joined the EU in 2004, including those of Poland 
and Lithuania. This level of investment has been impossible in Belarus and difficult in 
Ukraine.  
 
During the 1990s and run-up to eastern enlargement, many media commentators highlighted 
the divide within postcommunist Europe between Western-orientated countries such as 
Poland and Lithuania on one hand, and the traditionally eastward-looking countries such as 
Belarus and Ukraine. In this, apart from highlighting a convenient prospective new border for 
integrating Europe, the media was also emphasising a divide that exists in Europe between 
countries whose predominant religion and traditions are within the sphere of Western 
Christianity and those whose history owes more to Byzantine and East Slavic traditions.  
 
During the Cold War, Eastern Europe had been another world for Western Europeans. After 
1990, the media helped to redefine what was understood by the term “European”. The media 
helped move the dividing line between the European “Us” and post-Soviet “Them” eastward, 
so that Poles and Balts moved from the Eastern European “Them” category to the Central 
European “Nearer to Us” category.  
 
On balance, Western media’s portrayal of the region served to increase public support in 
Western Europe for the entry of Central Europe and the Baltic states into the EU. Some media 
in Poland took on a similar role with regard to Poles’ perceptions of their eastern neighbours, 
in particular the Lithuanians and Ukrainians. During the 1990s and 2000s, most of the 
mainstream media in Poland and Lithuania had a generally pro-EU attitude and helped 
transmit a pro-EU attitude to their audiences. In the run-up to the EU’s eastern enlargement, 
much of the media in Poland, notably the popular daily Gazeta Wyborcza, served to enlighten 
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Poles about the situation of their eastern neighbours and move beyond the stereotypes of the 
communist period. This “positive journalism” helped promote peaceful conflict-resolution 
and “stimulate the identification of common ground” between and within the societies of 
Central and Eastern Europe.
1
 
 
An overview of Poland’s media 
 
To understand the role and position of Poland’s media for Polish society and the impact of 
that media on Poles’ perception of neighbouring countries and peoples in the 21st century, it is 
important to be aware of historical developments in the 1980s and 1990s. Here, the role of 
one popular Polish daily newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza, is instructive.  
 
In the 1980s, during the last decade of communist rule in Central Europe, the Polish 
underground press prepared for its role in a postcommunist state. Poland’s Solidarity-led 
opposition recognised the power of the written word. It inherited from the communists a 
belief that the manipulation of the masses was both possible and desirable. The 1980-81 
alliance of intelligentsia activists such as Adam Michnik and Bronisław Geremek with 
Solidarity was the most powerful and enduring opposition force Poland’s communist 
government had had to deal with. Aid from the US and Western Europe was channelled to 
Poland’s opposition, mainly to Solidarity and closely allied groups. Access to a free media 
and the abolition of censorship were key demands of the Solidarity leadership during the 
1980s.  
 
In 1989, Solidarity won semi-democratic national elections and took power in Poland, helped 
by new access to national media and its own newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza (whose name can 
be translated as “Election Newspaper”). In March 1990, Poland’s new democratically elected 
Sejm closed down the communist-controlled Robotnicza Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza (Workers’ 
Publishing Cooperative), which had controlled and distributed Polish newspapers for 40 
years.  
 
In the early 1990s, Gazeta Wyborcza was a strong supporter of both pluralism and the drive to 
independence in Poland’s neighbours. Edited by Michnik and with substantial US financial 
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backing, Wyborcza represented the liberal, most pro-EU, voice within Poland’s mainstream 
press, complemented to some extent later by new commercial radio stations, such as RMF-
FM. For many Poles, Wyborcza’s main competitors were seen as being rather staid and old-
fashioned (broadsheet Rzeczpospolita for instance), or too closely aligned to either reactionary 
right-wing nationalist (Gazeta Polska) or postcommunist (Trybuna) political groupings.  
 
During the first half of the 1990s, Gazeta Wyborcza featured a slogan saying “Nie ma 
wolności bez Solidarności” (“There’s no freedom without Solidarity”) under the masthead 
until President Wałesa banned the paper’s use of the Solidarity logo after it supported Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki’s bid for the presidency. Despite the early 1990s spat between then President 
Lech Wałęsa and Wyborcza’s editor-in-chief Adam Michnik, Gazeta Wyborcza consolidated 
its position as Poland’s most-read daily. This is despite the fact that the party to which its 
editorial line and owners were closest – the liberal, pro-Western Freedom Union – hovered at 
only 5 per cent to 15 per cent support in opinion polls throughout the mid-1990s, and would 
eventually be merged with other political groupings.  
 
Title Date of launch Average Print Run in 1994 
Super Express November 1991 461,000 
Gazeta Wyborcza 1989 (as legal paper) 450,400 
Rzeczpospolita 1940s 274,303 
Kurier Polski September 1957 130,000 
Sztandar Młodych May 1950 130,000 
Życie Warszawy October 1944 128,300 
Trybuna February 1990* 100,000-120,000 
Słowo-Dziennik Katolicki January 1993 60,000 
Express Wieczorny May 1946 40,600 
*Trybuna is the revamped Trybuna Ludu, which dates from the communist takeover of Poland 
Table 10.1 Poland’s main national dailies in the 1990s2 
 
By the mid-1990s, with its role as the only source of real news available to many Poles 
superseded, Gazeta Wyborcza began broadening its market appeal to increase profitability. By 
the mid-1990s, the newspaper had a circulation of about half a million. No longer associated 
with the Solidarity movement, it had become a national newspaper. For many years, 
Wyborcza was Poland’s most popular newspaper, until the circulations of sensationalist 
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tabloids such as Super Express and, later, Fakt began to exceed it. Various regional editions 
of Wyborcza appeared during the 1990s. In the early 21
st
 century, Gazeta Wyborcza remains 
Poland’s most popular serious daily newspaper, appealing to a wide section of the population. 
Its readership tends to be younger on average than other serious dailies such as 
Rzeczpospolita.  
 
Gazeta Wyborcza’s political slant can be described as mildly centre-left. Throughout the 
postcommunist period in Poland, led by Michnik, the daily has tended to support the liberal 
and centrist parties which grew out of the intellectual wing of the Solidarity movement, 
although it has remained open to other forces in Polish politics, including the postcommunist 
SLD and its erstwhile leader, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Poland’s president from 1995 to 
2005. 
 
The 1990s were a turbulent period for the Polish media, as Poland became increasingly 
westernised and “Europeanised”. In the 1990s, print runs of Polish newspapers were lower 
than in most west European countries. Faced with declining readerships, Poland’s media tried 
to adapt. For example, by 1997, a breakaway from Życie Warszawy, a tabloid called simply 
Życie (which had a print run in the late 1990s of about 140,000) made inroads into the market. 
But within a few years, both Życie Warszawy and Życie were forced to shut due to lack of 
readership and poor management. Many papers were put up for sale at auction, drawing the 
interest of Western investors.  
 
Foreign-owned titles in Poland were frequently printed abroad, thereby avoiding local taxes. 
The papers were then sold cheaply, undercutting locally owned competitors and thus took a 
lot of money out of the country.
3
 By 2002, foreign concerns owned many of Poland’s 50 daily 
newspapers.
4
 Although the country’s expanding print and electronic media were independent, 
media empires controlled much of Polish journalistic output. By 2001 Gazeta Wyborcza’s 
founders controlled 14 local radio stations and printing presses and had significant internet 
interests.
5
  
                                                 
3
 Rohwedder C. 1995. ‘West Courts Trouble In Media Liaisons’ in  Central European Economic Review 
February 1995 
4
 Freedom House 2002. ‘Poland (2002)’ Retrieved 2/02/2007 from www.freedomhouse.org 
5
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By the mid-1990s, Poland’s press was among the world’s freest, ranked by Freedom House 
between the Czech Republic and Japan, and slightly ahead of Britain, Canada and France.
6
 
This surprising result was a sign of Poland’s dramatic progress in developing an open society 
since 1989. Press freedom declined somewhat as the 1990s wore on, with a reduction of 
diversity of media ownership. During the late 1990s, Poland’s media developed a reputation 
for investigative journalism and the country’s newspapers were zealous in exposing 
corruption. For example, in 2000, Polish newspapers reported that about 200 judges were 
being investigated for corruption, a figure that seems to have been an exaggeration.
7
 Only 65 
judges were under investigation by the end of 2000.
8
  
However, Polish government and state officials exerted increased pressure on Poland’s public 
and state-owned media from the late 1990s. By 2002, although the Polish constitution 
guaranteed press freedom and forbade censorship, Poland’s libel law was treating slander as a 
criminal offence. Journalists faced a growing number of lawsuits. Seats on regulatory 
agencies and directorships of state-owned media became political appointments.
9
  
 
Poland’s robust political and social debate ensured though that in the early 2000s a new, much 
debated, Polish media law remained in draft form for years. The proposed law’s critics argued 
it was “motivated by successive governments’ desire to strengthen control over public media 
and to rein in private sector media through constraints on ownership”.10 The latter months of 
2005 saw a reorganisation of Poland’s State Committee on Radio and Television, with a new 
law reappointing an entirely new committee. Media advocates criticised these changes for the 
accelerated manner in which they were conducted, the lack of public consultations and what 
they called an unclear vision for the future of the media.
11
 
 
State-owned Polish Television and its five channels remain the major source of information 
for Poles, but the country also sustains a number of private television stations, among them 
TVN and Polsat, which have gained a considerable share of viewers. In 2006 about a third of 
the population accessed the internet. During the last decade, there were no reports of the 
government restricting internet use. 
                                                 
6
 Freedom House 1996. ‘Poland (1996)’ Retrieved 1/10/2001 from www.freedomhouse.org 
7
 Holmes, L. 2006. Rotten States? Corruption, Post-Communism & Neoliberalism Duke University Press, 
Durham NC p.74-75 
8
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9
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10
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11
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Poland’s media, the European Union and neighbours 
 
While the Polish print media’s presentation of neighbouring countries varied between 
publications and even between issues, Poland’s media, in general, presented the EU in a 
positive light. With Gazeta Wyborcza in the vanguard, most Polish newspapers, television and 
radio, adopted a largely positive attitude towards the EU in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
although linked to extremist groupings did not. 
  
Since its founding, Gazeta Wyborcza has tended to portray Lithuania and Ukraine in a much 
more positive light than those nations were portrayed by most other Polish media. In common 
with other Polish media, Wyborcza has generally been critical of the Belarus regime, in 
particular the regime’s clampdown on civil liberties, press freedom and the Polish minority in 
Belarus. In 2006, an EU-funded radio station began broadcasting into Belarus to offer 
Belarusians independent news. The Polish Government itself has sponsored a number of 
media initiatives related to Belarus, including a Belarusian-language radio station, Radio 
Racyja, which broadcasts from Poland into Belarus. 
 
Some Polish media, notably the anti-Western and anti-EU Radio Maryja, run by ultra-
conservative factions of Poland’s Roman Catholic Church, have discouraged positive 
relations with neighbouring peoples. In the run-up to the EU referendum in Poland, most of 
the Polish media backed a Yes vote. The only mass medium firmly in the anti-EU camp was 
Radio Maryja.
12
 In the 1990s, with almost 3 million, mostly older, poorly educated listeners, 
Radio Maryja mobilised the religious right, which accounts for about one in 10 Poles. After 
2000, however, Radio Maryja was pressured by the broadly pro-EU Catholic hierarchy to 
tone down its anti-EU stance.  
 
An overview of Ukraine’s media 
 
The Ukrainian media began to develop a separate existence when Ukraine achieved 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. By 2008, Ukraine had 647 television stations 
                                                 
12
 Szczerbiak, A. 2005. ‘History Trumps Government Unpopularity: The June 2003 Polish EU Accession 
Referendum’ in Szczerbiak, A. & Taggart, P. (eds.) 2005. EU Enlargement and Referendums Routledge, 
Abingdon UK p.124 
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and 524 radio stations.
13
 As is the case in other postcommunist countries, television is the 
dominant media in Ukraine. The three main public broadcasting companies are the First 
National Television Channel, the National Radio Company of Ukraine and the State 
Television and Radio Company. The main non-state broadcasters are listed in Table 10.2. 
Commercial networks attract most viewers.
14
  
 
TV channels Website 
Inter www.inter.ua 
Novy www.novy.tv 
1+1 www.1plus1.ua 
5 Kanal www.5.ua 
STB www.stb.ua 
TRK Ukrayina  http://kanalukraina.tv 
ICTV www.ictv.ua 
NTN ww.ntn.tv 
Radio stations  
Gala Radio www.galaradio.com 
Europa FM www.europa.fm 
Radio Svoboda www.radiosvoboda.org 
Hit FM www.hitfm.ua 
ERA-FM www.era-fm.net 
 
Table 10.2 Main broadcasting stations in Ukraine, 200915 
 
The main print media are listed in Table 10.3. Most are in the Ukrainian language, though 
some, such as Zerkalo Nedeli are available in English and Russian versions online. The Kyiv 
Post is Ukraine’s main English-language newspaper. Several of the biggest-selling tabloids 
publish only in Russian. As of 2009, Ukraine had four main news agencies: the National 
News Agency of Ukraine (Ukrinform), Unian, Interfax-Ukraine and Ukrainian News.  
 
Despite an expanding advertising market, many media outlets rely on the support of wealthy 
sponsors. Under former President Leonid Kuchma, some opposition papers were closed and 
several journalists investigating high-profile crimes died in mysterious circumstances. 
                                                 
13
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Prominent journalist Georgiy Gongadze disappeared in September 2000; his body was found 
two months later. A parliamentary investigative commission said it believed that Kuchma was 
one of the organisers of the abduction.
16
 The former president denied his involvement in the 
crime.
17
  
 
 
Uryadoviy Kuryer 
http://uamedia.visti.net/uk/ 
Holos Ukrayiny www.golos.com.ua 
Dzerkalo 
Tyzhnya 
www.dt.ua 
Den www.day.kiev.ua 
Po-Ukrayinsky www.gazeta.ua 
Investment 
Newspaper 
www.investgazeta.net 
Korrespondent www.korrespondent.net 
Kommersant-
Ukrayina 
www.kommersant.ua 
Segodnya www.segodnya.ua 
24 http://24.ua 
Fakty i 
Kommentarii 
www.facts.kiev.ua 
Silski Visti www.silskivisti.kiev.ua 
Vecherniye Vesti vv.com.ua 
Ukrayina 
Moloda 
www.umoloda.kiev.ua 
Zerkalo Nedeli www.mw.ua 
Ukrayinska 
Pravda 
www.pravda.com.ua 
Kyiv Post www.kyivpost.com 
 
Table 10.3 Main print media titles in Ukraine, 200918 
 
Ukrainian media were prominent actors during the Orange Revolution. This was particularly 
the case with the internet and television stations. Before the Orange Revolution, Ukraine was 
dominated by three wealthy regional oligarchic groups which enjoyed close connections with 
President Leonid Kuchma and owned media empires. Non-governmental media organisations 
include Internews-Ukraine, International Public Organisation (www.internews.ua), the 
Ukrainian Association of Press Publishers (www.uapp.org) and the International 
Philanthropic Foundation (www.openukraine.org/ua). Mainstream newspapers were 
government-controlled and of poor quality in the early 2000s, and Ukrainian oppositionists, 
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young people and eventually many others, turned to the internet, particularly the online 
publication Ukrainska pravda, which served as the main news medium of the Orange 
Revolution.
19
 A few years earlier, the same website played an important role in events leading 
up to the Orange Revolution, particularly when its first editor-in-chief, Georgiy Gongadze, 
was murdered, apparently on the orders of the President.
20
 After the Orange Revolution, the 
state’s and media owners’ influence on editorial policy weakened, although politicians 
continue to launch partisan attacks on opponents via the media.
21
 After the 2004 Orange 
Revolution, the influence of the state and media owners on editorial policy became weaker. 
However, partisan attacks on political opponents continued to be made on some TV channels, 
in newspapers or on websites.
22
 
Ukrayinska Pravda www.pravda.com.ua 
Glavred http://glavred.info/ 
From-Ua.com www.from-ua.com 
Obozrevatel www.obozrevatel.com 
ForUm www.for-ua.com 
RBC www.rbc.ua/ 
LigaBusinessInform http://news.liga.net/ukr 
 
Table 10.4 Main internet news media in Ukraine, 200923 
 
The number of Ukrainians using the internet increased significantly during the latter months 
of 2004. According to a December 2004 summary, Ukraine had 5.9 million internet users, 12 
per cent of the population.
24
 In October 2004 that number had been about 4 million.
25
 In 2006, 
Ukraine had 5.5 million internet users in a population of about 46 million.
26
 By 2008, there 
were between 6.7 million and 10.4 million internet users in Ukraine.
27
 The internet has 
                                                 
19
 Aslund A. & McFaul, M. (eds.) 2006 Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic 
Breakthrough Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington p.6 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 BBC News 2009 Country Profile: Ukraine. Retrieved on 29/3/2010 from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1102303.stm#media 
23
 European Journalism Centre 2010 ‘Media Landscape - Ukraine’ Retrieved on 28/12/2010 from 
http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/ukraine 
24
 Prytula, O. 2006 ‘The Ukrainian Media Rebellion’ in Aslund & McFaul (eds.) 2006 Revolution in Orange: 
The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough p.120 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 CIA World Factbook. 2008 
27
 BBC News 2009 Country Profile: Ukraine 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours                              The Media 
 
217 
 
become a popular source of news, with more than a dozen leading sites of various shades of 
opinion.  
Of note in Table 10.5 are the relatively high number of mobile phone subscribers, television 
stations and, particularly, the high circulation of daily newspapers given in the data. 
 
Radios  45,050,000 
Televisions  18,050,000 
Households with television 97.3%  
Television stations  647 
Mobile phone subscribers  17,214,280  
Newspaper circulation  8,683,100 
Daily newspaper circulation  8,683,000 
Number of daily newspaper titles  61 
Cinema attendance  5,138,200 
 
Table 10.5 Ukrainian media-related statistics, 200328 
 
Ukraine’s media, Poland and the EU 
 
People-to-people contacts are a primary source of information about the EU for little more 
than a third of Ukrainians (36 per cent in 2006).
29
 Visa and other restrictions on the movement 
of Ukrainians to the EU explain this relatively low figure. In contrast, Ukraine’s mass media 
is a primary source of EU-related information for many Ukrainians, with as many as 61 per 
cent of Ukrainians obtaining EU-related information from their country’s mass media.30 
Unlike the case in Poland, Ukraine’s media has not thus far acted as a transmitter of EU 
values and norms to the Ukrainian population. Ukrainian affairs feature regularly in Polish 
newspapers. In contrast, in the Ukrainian media, at least before the Orange Revolution, there 
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was comparatively little coverage of Poland, either in newspapers or on television.
31
 Shumylo 
advocates “more advanced training for the Ukrainian journalists to turn them into an effective, 
impartial transmitter of the EU-related information”.32 
 
An overview of Lithuania’s media  
 
Lithuania’s media has followed a similar path to Poland’s, with liberalisation and a growth of 
private media in the early 1990s followed by increased concentration of ownership in later 
years. Lithuania’s media sector is competitive and generally free from direct government 
interference, as might be expected in a northern EU country. Lithuania’s constitution and two 
laws regulate mass media competition and activity. The only subsidy granted to Lithuanian 
media is a fund for the media financed from the state budget.
33
 The revised version of the 
Code of Ethics of Lithuanian Journalists and Publishers, adopted in 2005, lays down the main 
ethical provisions for media in the country.
34
 An ombudsmen and Commission of Journalism 
and Publisher Ethics regulate the industry.
35
 
 
Lithuania has no laws regulating the media market and lacks an anti-monopoly law. Thus, by 
default, the state allows both monopoly rights and cross ownership.
36
 As a result, large sectors 
of the media belong to conglomerates. During the early years of the 21st century, the print 
media attracted foreign, especially Scandinavian and Estonian, investors.
37
 All newspapers are 
privately owned. Fourteen dailies are published in Lithuania.
38
 As in other European 
countries, tabloids have the highest circulation figures among the newspapers, but the total 
number of newspaper readers in Lithuania is much lower than that of television viewers.
39
 
There are as many as 543 published magazine and other periodical titles, with a total yearly 
circulation of almost 60 million copies.
40
 Newspapers and magazines are published in 
Lithuanian (311 newspapers and 477 magazines), Russian (18 newspapers and nine 
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magazines) and English (four newspapers and 34 magazines).
41
 There are two news agencies 
in Lithuania: ELTA and BNS (Baltic News Service). BNS, the first private news agency in 
Lithuania, is by far the bigger 
 
Lithuania has three public radio channels.
42
 There are 47 commercial radio stations in 
Lithuania, including 11 national, 7 regional and 30 local radio broadcasters.
43
 With the 
exception of the national broadcaster, all radio stations and television channels are 
commercial entities that have been established since 1990.  
 
The television market began to develop after foreign capital (mainly from the United States, 
Britain and Scandinavia) poured into Lithuania. The country’s television market has become 
increasingly fragmented. By late 2008, Lithuania had 31 television stations. Apart from two 
state channels, all the stations are privately owned and operated. A large proportion of 
Lithuanians are exposed to international broadcast media on a daily basis. Polish television 
channels are readily available in Vilnius and the surrounding area and are watched by many 
members of the Polish minority. They play a role in the “normalising” of relations between 
the two countries and peoples. The proportion of Lithuanians able to watch multi-channel 
television (cable or satellite) exceeded 40 per cent in 2005.
44
 Digital television broadcasting 
started at the end of 2007 in the country’s five largest cities, its development greatly 
dependent on state policy. In 2008, analogue television was still the most widespread way of 
watching television in Lithuania but by the beginning of 2009 a digital terrestrial television 
network covered almost all of the country’s territory.45 The gradual switch-off of analogue 
television is scheduled to start in 2012.
46
 The advertising market of both television and radio 
grew every year between 2000 and 2008.
47
 
 
Internet use in Lithuania is low compared to the European average. In 2008 less than a third 
of Lithuanians had an internet connection, a figure which was much lower than the equivalent 
in Belarus.
48
 After 2000, many Lithuanian media websites were turned into news portals. 
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Examples of these include Verslo žinios and Lietuvos rytas.49 Broadcasters have also created 
their own mini portals. For example, Lithuanian national broadcaster’s LRT.lt provides 
domestic and foreign news. The Law on Electronic Communications, which came into force 
in 2004, applies to internet content.
50
 
From 1990 onwards, Lithuania’s mass media enjoyed high levels of public confidence.51 Polls 
showed that the media and the Catholic Church were the only social institutions that 
Lithuanians trusted.
52
 In the late 1990s, as many as four in five Lithuanians believed what the 
country’s mass media told them.53 Although Lithuanians in that decade were less pro-EU than 
were Poles, it was clear that if Lithuania’s media began a campaign to develop pro-EU 
sentiment among Lithuanians, “public opinion would probably change”.54 
Not all parts of Lithuanian society were positive about the country’s national media. As far as 
the media in both Lithuania and Poland is concerned, the one major sore point between the 
two countries is the status and situation of the Polish minority in Lithuania. In May 2008, the 
Association of Poles in Lithuania (Związek Polaków na Litwie or ZPL) wrote to the 
government of Lithuania to complain about anti-Polish rhetoric in Lithuania’s mainstream 
media, a move extensively reported by media in Poland.
55
 That year’s parliamentary elections 
were cited as a motive. The ZPL asked for better treatment of ethnic minorities in Lithuania, 
lodged a legal complaint and appealed for investigation of the issue.
56
  
 
Overall, Lithuania’s media fills an information and entertainment role similar to that filled by 
media in Poland and other EU countries and quite different from the role of Belarusian media. 
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An overview of the media in Belarus 
The media in Belarus has a very different profile to the media in the other three countries. In 
Belarus, the state continues to hold a virtual monopoly of the media. While Poland and 
Lithuania have comparatively free media, and Ukraine’s media is largely controlled by 
oligarchic groups, the Lukashenko regime maintains firm control over media in Belarus. The 
Belarus regime’s ideology portrays the West, chiefly the United States, but to a great extent 
also Poland and the European Union, as enemies or, at least, not friends of Belarus.  
In 2005, the limited amount of press freedom that did exist in Belarus diminished further as 
the government tightened its control over the media leading up to the March 2006 presidential 
elections. Disregarding constitutional provisions for freedom of the press, December 2005 
amendments to the penal code made criticism of the president and government a criminal 
offence punishable by up to three years in prison. These amendments permitted the jailing of 
those who presented “false information” concerning Belarusian policies to foreign entities.  
In May 2005, a Lukashenko decree banned all non-state media from using the words 
“national” or “Belarus” in their names, in effect forcing many titles to re-register. The courts 
often sentenced local and foreign journalists who reported on opposition events. In 2005, 
Belarusian journalists who covered rallies demanding rights for the SPB were jailed for weeks 
for “participating in an unauthorised gathering”.57 Courts restricted criticism of the 
government by being pedantic in their interpretation of libel laws and forcing independent 
newspapers to pay high fines for libel. The twice-weekly Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta was 
fined US$22,800 in 2005 for raising queries about another publication’s article about 
Lukashenko, while Narodnaja Volja, a leading independent newspaper, was found guilty of 
defamation and forced to pay about US$53,500 in damages.
58
 
The written press in Belarus includes both privately owned and state-owned newspapers. As 
of 2009, state-owned newspapers account for about 85 per cent of total circulation.
59
 The 
newspaper with the highest circulation is state-owned Sovetskaya Belarussia – Belarus 
segodnya, with a circulation of 500,000.
60
 Other newspapers include Rehijanalnaya Hazeta, 
Respublika, a daily newspaper published by the Cabinet of Ministers, Beloruskaya Gazeta, 
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Sovietskaya byelorussia, Svaboda, Komsomolskaya Pravda v. Belarusi, private newspaper 
Intex-press, Hantsavitski Chais, Brestskiy Kuryer and Inform-progulka.
61
  In 2008, there were 
about 30 privately owned political newspapers operating in Belarus.
62
 
About half of these non-state-supported periodicals are excluded from state-backed means of 
distribution such as kiosks and subscription.
63
 State-run newspapers have the advantage of 
administrative support and financing, an amount which increased every year in the early 
2000s.
64
 Non-state media face strict supervision from local executive bodies. In order to 
survive and continue their work, Belarusian journalists are reviving traditions of underground 
printing, publishing material without any official registration.
65
 
The Belarusian State University is the only university in the country which provides 
journalism training.
66
 The non-governmental Belarusian Association of Journalists, a non-
partisan and non-profit professional union of media workers, seeks to defend journalists’ 
rights and campaigns to promote the freedom of expression in Belarus.
67
 
Belarus’ independent press is systematically harassed. In 2005, the Belarusian KGB and 
police raided the homes of many editors and journalists. Journalist Vasil Hrodnikau was 
found dead with a head wound in his locked flat. Authorities excluded homicide and shut the 
case.
68
 The inquiry into the murder of Veronika Cherkasova, a journalist investigating Belarus 
arms sales to Iraq, was shelved in December 2005 when the court declared it to be a case of 
domestic violence in which the police would be incapable of identifying the assailant. In 
April, just before the UN was due to comment on Belarus’ human rights record, prosecutors 
reopened the inquiry into the July 2000 abduction of cameraman Dmitry Zavadsky.  
The state uses other measures to harass independent media. Authorities routinely pressure 
managers of state enterprises to advertise only in state media. They pressure distributors and 
printing presses to restrict printing access for independent media. Courts ordered the 
liquidation of two independent publishing companies in 2006 and state-owned newspaper 
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distribution companies ceased distribution of numerous privately owned papers.
69
 Many 
independent journalists practise self-censorship. Belarus has about nine press organisations. 
Most run their own websites, six of which are available in English.
70
 Since 2000, internet use 
has increased enormously within Belarus, as can be seen in Table 10.6. Belarus has six radio 
and television channels which can only be found online.
71
 National telecommunications 
agency Beltelcom is the only internet service provider, allowing the regime to watch over 
internet usage and block sensitive content. Officials have claimed that the internet has “a 
negative influence on state ideology and would incite public disorder”.72  
 
Year Users Population % of population with internet access 
2000 180,000 10,073,600 1.8 
2003 1,391,900 9,755,025 14.3 
2005 2,461,000 9,714,257 25.3 
2007 5,477,500 9,678,864 56.6 
 
Table 10.6 Internet penetration in Belarus, 2000-200773 
 
The licence needed for television broadcasting is available at the Republican Commission on 
Television and Radio Broadcasting.
74
 The chair of this group is the Belarusian minister of 
information. In order to start broadcasting, groups have to meet stringent criteria.  
 
As political relations between Poland and Belarus worsened in 2005, Polish and other EU 
reporters in Belarus faced greater difficulties. During the 2006 presidential elections in 
Belarus, the government suppressed the media, shutting down many newspapers. That year 
the government jailed more than 30 Belarusian journalists and 12 foreign journalists from 
countries such as Poland, Ukraine, Canada and even Russia.
75
 They were arrested for 
covering the elections and opposition demonstrations. By law, citizens of Belarus are 
guaranteed freedom of speech and information. But the president largely controls the content 
of media and the appointment of senior editors of state media. With no laws on freedom of 
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expression, the government has become co-owner of nine mass media publications. Most of 
the press and all national radio and television are controlled by the government. Svaboda, 
Minsk’s last main Belarusian-language newspaper and only independent weekly, was banned 
in November 1997, on the eve of that year’s general election.76 Two liberally oriented 
programmes on state radio were also silenced and their producers fired.
77
  
 
Two national newspapers, Ezhednevnik and Neopolis, publish only online.
78
 More recently, 
the internet has played a significant part in the democratisation process in Ukraine and 
Belarus.
79
 All radio channels, television channels and newspapers also publish on the 
internet.
80
 Belarus has a lively blogging scene. Many blogs about the political situation in 
Belarus have been created outside the country.
81
 Belarusian authorities frequently block 
independent internet sites. Sometimes, the authorities redirect website visitors to pro-
government websites.
82
 Beltelecom has a monopoly on telecommunications within Belarus.  
Of the 216 media outlets operating in Belarus in 2009, 183 are state-owned.
83
 The National 
State TV and Radio Company dominates the broadcast market. Non-resident foreigners are 
not allowed to set up a television or radio station in Belarus. The only producer of broadcast 
news is the Belarusian Television and Radio Company, which runs 27 television channels.
84
 
Most channels broadcast in either Belarusian or Russian. Some broadcast in English.  
 
Belarusian media, Poland and the European Union 
 
For media in Poland and Lithuania, the situation in Belarus is of more pressing importance 
than it is for media in west European countries. The European Commission in 2006 funded a 
consortium of Polish, Lithuanian, German, Russian and Belarusian broadcasters to increase 
access to independent news via radio, television and the internet.
85
 The two-year project gave 
rise to European Radio for Belarus and Radio Baltic Waves. These stations’ broadcasts are 
directed at young people.  
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Poland has sponsored a number of media initiatives related to Belarus, including the 
Belarusian-language Radio Racja (Radio Reason), which broadcasts from Białystok into 
Belarus.
86
 Launched in 1999, Radio Racja suspended operations in 2002 because of a lack of 
funding. Following “the flawed elections in Belarus in 2004”, the EU increased support for 
Belarusian NGOs and civil society.
87
 In 2005, €8.7 million was earmarked for the support of 
democracy and human rights in Belarus.
88
  
 
In January 2006, the European Commission announced which media consortium would 
undertake a €2 million project to increase access in Belarus to independent sources of news 
and information.
89
 The selected consortium, led by Media Consulta (Germany) includes 
implementing partners from Poland (European Radio for Belarus), Lithuania (Radio Baltic 
Wave), Belarus (journalists, civil society and NGOs), and Russia, which would broadcast by 
satellite from Germany.
90
 It would be supported by a number of EU NGOs specialised in the 
media sector. The two-year project covered radio and television broadcasts, internet, support 
to the Belarusian written press and training of journalists.
91
 Broadcasting of radio and 
television programmes started in February 2006 before the presidential elections in Belarus. 
Lithuanian-based Baltic Waves, run by a team of Polish, Lithuanian, German, Russian and 
Belarusian journalists, broadcast a daily hour-long bulletin of news, music and information on 
Europe.
92
 In March 2006, at about the same time as the launch of Baltic Waves, Radio Racja 
was brought back on air.
93
  
 
In 2006, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy, warned that “tight controls on the media in Belarus make it hard for 
Belarussians to find independent sources of information”.94 Ferrero-Waldner looked “forward 
to the day when Belarus will have its own free media, because this is crucial to the 
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functioning of a democracy”.95 In response, a Belarus foreign ministry spokesman said: “If 
our EU partners have money to cast to the winds, that’s up to them.” 96 
 
Thus far, owing to the unfavourable conditions for the propagation of EU norms and values in 
Belarus, as in other sectors, the EU’s impact on Poland’s relations with Belarus with regard to 
the media has not as positive as would have been hoped. This stands in sharp contrast to the 
developments in Poland and Lithuania, and to a lesser extent in Ukraine, where the local 
conditions have been more favourable to allowing a freeing of national media and their use in 
the transmission of EU values and norms to the societies in each of those countries.   
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11 The Future 
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The EU’s impact on Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbours will develop and change 
over the coming decade. Poland and Lithuania are now firmly part of the EU and the 
Schengen area. The EU’s border can be seen as a rolling zone. As of 2010, the EU includes 27 
states. Several more states are set to join the Union over the next decade. Any of the EU’s 
immediate neighbours could be considered as a prospective member state. Eventually, all of 
the west Balkan countries will become part of the EU. Several other European countries are 
interested in joining the EU at some time in the future, including Ukraine.  
The present configuration of states and borders in Central and Eastern Europe dates only from 
the early 1990s. Few national borders in the region are older than a century. A century ago, 
Lithuania’s capital Vilnius was a largely ethnically Polish city in the Russian Empire. Over 
the past century Vilnius has passed from Russian to German (1916) to Lithuanian (1918) to 
Soviet (1920) to Polish (1921) to Soviet (September 1939) to Lithuanian (October 1939), 
back to Soviet (1940), to German (1941), to Soviet (1944) and finally back to Lithuanian rule 
(1991). During most of that time it was not the capital of a nation state. Poland’s borders with 
Ukraine and Belarus were fixed along their present alignment in the 1940s. It is not 
impossible to imagine that there would be circumstances where those borders might again 
change.  
 
Poland and Lithuania together in Europe 
 
Poland’s role as the leading nation among the postcommunist EU states is likely to continue. 
The close relationship between fellow EU members Poland and Lithuania is likely to 
strengthen. The only significant source of tension between the two countries is the treatment 
of the Polish minority in Lithuania. However, it is likely that those tensions will continue to 
be handled peacefully and with a positive attitude from the leaderships of both countries. 
Extending the pattern of treatment of minorities in western EU countries to new members like 
Lithuania should mean that Lithuania’s Polish minority will be afforded enhanced rights in 
future years.  
 
It is probable that over the next 10-20 years, Poland’s political system will further mature and 
more moderate and progressive parties and leaders will come to the fore.  
 
In 2002, one analyst noted that even if the economies of Poland and Lithuania grew at 6 per 
cent a year, their per capita gross national products would require a dozen years to reach the 
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2002 levels of GNP per capita in Portugal or Greece, the poorest of the EU-15 member 
states.
1
 Poland and Lithuania would need 20 years to attain the 2002 GNP levels of Austria or 
Britain.
2
 If, in the more likely scenario that Poland and Lithuania developed at their median 
rate of the late 1990s, it would take them 30 years to catch up. Even with more EU financial 
assistance, Poland and Lithuania are unlikely to maintain such a high growth rate, for various 
reasons, including a fast-growing trade deficit and too-slow increases in productivity. With 
the growth of the Polish and Lithuanian economies, the large discrepancy in wages between 
those countries and “old Europe” will diminish, but it will still be wide and “a push/pull 
factor” for many years and so it is likely that there will be net migration from Poland and 
Lithuania to western Europe for years to come, although that net migration should lessen as 
the relative wealth disparity diminishes.
3
    
 
Poland’s relations with Ukraine and Belarus 
 
EU leaders are uncertain not only about how deeply existing EU member states should be 
enmeshed but also about how far the EU should expand. Following the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements, the EU is suffering from enlargement fatigue. Public opinion in the EU does 
not favour further EU enlargement. The EU’s final eastern border, if there is to be one, has 
not been determined. In the 1990s, the ambiguity concerning Europe’s borders helped the EU 
to stabilise its neighbourhood. But in the 21
st
 century, that ambiguity has become a source of 
instability for Ukraine, and potentially, Belarus.
4
  
 
“Although participation in the ENP does not formally exclude future accession, the 
widespread belief is that it does de facto define the frontiers of Europe.”5 It is important to 
work out what to do with those countries left outside the EU following the 2004 and 2007 
rounds of enlargement. Moving towards EU candidature would be the best path for both 
Ukraine and Belarus. If the EU is permanently closed to Ukraine and Belarus, the outlook for 
those two countries is bleak. The EU must seek new ways to prevent instability in Ukraine 
and Belarus. Some commentators have argued for Poland to take a more prominent advocacy 
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role for Ukraine and Belarus, in a similar manner to the way Germany acted as an advocate 
for Poland and other Central European countries in the 1990s.
6
 
 
In 2003, the European Commission acknowledged that in the decades ahead the EU would 
have to work with its neighbours  
 
to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper 
economic integration [and] intensified political and cultural relations.
7
  
 
The EU will have to work within an adaptable framework based on progress in political and 
economic reform made by Ukraine and Belarus. If Brussels is not ready to admit Ukraine and 
Belarus to the EU as full members, it might have to devise forms of associate membership 
that give the two countries improved access to EU markets.
8
 
 
Russia’s relations with Belarus and Ukraine will become more critical as Moscow seeks to 
mitigate its “perceived isolation, leading either to heightened tension” or an embattled sense 
of EU unity.
9
 In the coming decade, Ukraine and Belarus will need to resolve “questions 
about their relationship with Russia and how quickly they make the transition to free market 
policies”.10 Kovalova claims that Ukraine can choose to “join Europe” or to remain “part of 
the post-Soviet space”.11    
 
Russia is unlikely to join the EU or Nato. EU enlargement to include Ukraine and possibly 
Belarus could provoke a further deterioration in EU-Russian relations. The EU must be 
involved in stabilising Ukraine and Belarus “not only for their own sake, but to fend off 
Russia and diversify away from its energy”.12 If Russia continues to exert heavy pressure its 
neighbours, the short and medium-term prospects for Belarus and Ukraine, caught between 
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the EU and Russia, are bad. It is difficult to see any Russian government willingly 
withdrawing its military forces from Belarus and Ukraine in the next 20 years.  
 
Establishing and maintaining a civil society in post-Soviet countries is more difficult than in 
Central Europe. Creating a politically active citizenry and democratic political culture 
depends on the legitimacy voters allot their governments. The democratisation of Poland and 
Lithuania, with ensuing political pluralism, free elections and a market economy, were 
externally supported “and even directed” by the EU and other western institutions.13 Western 
assistance has produced much better outcomes in Poland and Lithuania than in Ukraine and 
Belarus.  
 
The Soviet bloc’s collapse in 1989 happened mainly because of the collapse of the Soviet 
economy and “failure of political elites to satisfy the material aspirations of the masses”.14 
Poles, Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians will assess the success of their future 
governments in a similar way. Where living standards fail to match public expectations, 
political elites might not be able to deal with the disenchantment which follows. Widespread 
disenchantment among Ukrainians with unsatisfactory economic developments over many 
years could destroy Ukraine’s imperfect democracy. 
 
Ukrainian leaders no longer believe “vague EU hints about eventual membership”, but want 
“something more substantial” than they have been offered so far.15 Germany and others in the 
EU have sought to expand the Union’s engagement with Kiev, “by extending bits of the 
single market eastwards to Ukraine, to bind it closer to the EU”.16 Much will depend on how 
Ukraine’s relations with Russia develop and on domestic factors within the EU, including 
whether member states eventually agree to the principle of further enlargement beyond the 
west Balkans.
17
 
 
Bringing countries into line with EU regulations is expensive. For example, The World Bank 
has estimated that over 20 years, Poland would need to spend up to 7 per cent of its 2000 
                                                 
13
 Smith, M. & Timmins, G. 2000. Building a Bigger Europe: EU and NATO enlargement in comparative 
perspective Ashgate, Aldershot p.5 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 The Economist 2006. ‘Europe, Russia and in-between’  
16
 Ibid.   
17
 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. 2006 The European Union as a Global Actor 2
nd
 ed Routledge Abingdon UK 
p.153-4 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours                             The Future 
 
232 
 
GDP to implement EU environmental policy.
18
 EU accession has clear advantages but puts 
economic strain on old and new members. Smith & Timmins argue that delayed accession to 
the EU means higher accession costs in the long run.
19
 In other words, if a state such as 
Ukraine or Belarus accedes to the EU earlier, the costs of that accession for the EU and the 
joining state are likely to be less.  
 
However, Ukraine and Belarus have different historical, socio-economic and cultural 
experiences from the countries of “old Europe” and from the 2004 enlargement countries. In 
particular, Ukraine and Belarus have limited experience of democracy. Further eastern 
enlargement of the EU to include Ukraine and Belarus would impact on the EU’s 
“institutional frameworks, decision-making processes and policy outputs”.20 It could lead to 
socio-economic and political tensions if businesses shifted production to low-wage Belarus 
and Ukraine.  
 
Future relations between Poland and Ukraine 
 
Ukraine is as yet not close to being prepared to meet the obligations of membership, to open 
up its economy to global market forces or even effectively police its own border. But Ukraine 
should not be permanently excluded from the EU because of an outdated belief in a black-line 
fixed European border.  
 
A “privileged partnership” with Ukraine would give the country a “voice within EU councils 
without the complications that would follow” it becoming a full member.21 The European 
Commission has said that all neighbouring countries, including Ukraine, “should be offered 
the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to 
promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital”.22 Ambiguously, the 
Commission went on to say that: “If a country has reached this level, it has come as close to 
the Union as it can be without being a member.”23 It is unclear whether there is an implication 
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that if a country such as Ukraine successfully integrates to the required degree with the EU 
that that country would then be in a position to apply for membership.  
 
Realising membership ambitions would require a much more concerted effort by Ukraine’s 
leaders and opinion makers. Unlike in Poland and Lithuania, where the drive to EU 
membership was supported across the political spectrum and among most of the elite, in 
Ukraine a significant proportion of citizens, particularly in the east and south of the country, 
are ambivalent to EU membership.  
 
If Ukraine’s economy continues to underperform and the country falls further behind its 
neighbours, it is likely that the pressures to split the country will become stronger. Western 
anger with Ukraine’s slow pace of reform, widespread corruption and misgovernance at times 
have caused Ukraine “to shy away from the West” and move towards Russia.24 Repetition of 
this shift “could have dire geopolitical consequences”.25 As noted previously, Crimea and the 
city of Sevastopol have ethnic Russian majorities. Large Russian and Russophone populations 
live in eastern and southern Ukraine, in many areas forming a majority of the population. 
These populations are often ambivalent or hostile to the government in Kiev, and especially to 
anything they consider might distance them from Russia. Russia might yet intervene in 
Ukraine again in a decisive way to subvert and reverse Ukraine’s westward tilt. However, on 
balance it would seem that Ukraine, unlike Russia, does not have an autocratic future.
26
 
 
The geographical distribution of votes in all presidential and parliamentary elections in 
Ukraine since 2004 have shown a clear and consistent divide between an EU-leaning western 
and central Ukraine and a Russian-leaning eastern and southern Ukraine. A reasonable fear is 
that by not entertaining the idea of Ukrainian accession, the EU might be tipping the scales in 
favour of Ukraine’s pro-Russian forces, and helping to produce election results which will not 
help Ukraine’s modernisation and Europeanisation. A zero-sum point of view among some in 
Moscow sees good relations between Poland and Ukraine as having developed at Russia’s 
expense. If Russian pressure on Ukraine increases so much that Ukrainian independence is in 
jeopardy and the pro-Western and pro-EU forces in the country feel they cannot bring the 
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whole of Ukraine into the European sphere and out of Moscow’s control, then it is 
conceivable Ukraine will divide in two, with its western, more consciously Ukrainian, part 
moving towards the EU and looking towards Poland as a shepherd to guide it into the EU.  As 
Trenin notes, in recent years “the chances of a split within Ukraine … have dramatically 
reduced”.27 Trenin feels that “Ukraine will join Europe” by 2027.28 However, the next decade 
will tell us where Ukraine’s future lies and whether the country will hold together as an 
independent nation-state. 
 
In the last 10 years, several western European countries have expressed openness to further 
eastern enlargement into post-Soviet states, with Britain actually “signalling a membership 
perspective for Ukraine”.29  
 
Future relations between Poland and Belarus 
 
Belarus finds itself in a new ideological and military-political borderland. New Belarus-
Poland and Belarus-EU relationships are appearing. 
 
In March 2008, a demonstration in Minsk marked the short period of Belarusian 
independence in 1918. The authorities reacted violently to the demonstration. 
 
In violent clashes the police dragged some protesters along the ground. They 
confiscated European Union flags and the red and white banner of the pre-Soviet 
state.
30
 
 
Here, it is noteworthy that the (mostly young) protesters carried the flags both of the short-
lived pre-communist Belarusian Republic (which was also the flag of newly independent, pre-
Lukashenko Belarus in the early 1990s) and that of the EU. Nationalism and euroenthusiasm 
are on the same side in Belarus, although both remain weak in the face of the fatalistic post-
Sovietism which pervades the country.  
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Pawel Świeboda, for one, does not expect a dramatic change in Belarus in the near future, 
even if Lukashenko’s reign ends soon.  
 
Once you get used to a certain system, even if there is a change at the top, it takes time 
for that change to trickle down, because people will have been used working under a 
certain regime of governance and they will be relatively less willing ... and less open to 
adopt new ways and means. It all depends on who [any new leader] ... will be, whether 
it will be someone with the aspirations to repeat Lukashenko’s stint or is someone who 
is a reformer. ... There is no obvious answer, no natural successor.
31
 
 
One scenario is that Belarus will be absorbed into Russia either by simple annexation or 
“union” or some other guise “although this looks increasingly unlikely”.32 The Russian-
Belarusian Union State as envisaged by Lukashenko and Yeltsin “is no longer an option”.33 A 
second alternative is that the country manages to retain some independence and becomes a 
semi-permanent buffer state between the EU and Russia. Perhaps there will be a dramatic 
change in the country’s orientation after Lukashenko finally leaves office and the country sets 
sail down the long road to integration with Europe. Within Belarus, a variety of viewpoints 
are found among opposition forces. Some want Belarus to pursue a path which would bring 
the country closer to the EU and further from Moscow. Part of the Belarusian opposition 
seeks to emphasise the period in history when Belarus was Lithuanian, and wants Belarus to 
rebrand and reimagine itself as a contemporary descendant of the old Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania. The Grand Duchy’s legacy and history offers Belarusians an alternative source on 
which to base their national consciousness, rather than the Soviet-based version of history still 
propagated by the regime in Minsk.  
 
The EU must continue to support the efforts of Poland and Lithuania to positively engage 
Belarus and provide support for Belarusian opposition groups, particularly those which have a 
pro-EU outlook. If Belarus does integrate fully with Russia, EU membership for Belarus will 
effectively become impossible in the foreseeable future. If Russia absorbs Belarus, there will 
be increased pressure on Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine to conform with Moscow’s wishes, at 
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least to the extent of toning down expression of suspicion of Moscow’s machinations in 
Central and Eastern Europe. For Russia this would be a return to the old days of Russian “Big 
Brothership” in its near abroad. For the EU, allowing Russia to have such an influence on 
governments and states in the region would be a serious mistake which could lead to a 
reversal in fortune for the Union or its decline into something other than a free union of 
wealthy, democratic and peaceful countries. 
 
If Belarus does not integrate with Russia, then a new path for the country will be possible 
after the demise of the Lukashenko regime. Repeated efforts by Poland, Lithuania and the EU 
as a whole to engage Belarus could pay dividends. Some see a future role for the EU Baltic 
Sea Strategy, launched in 2009, which groups the EU member states bordering the Baltic 
Sea.
34
 This grouping might enhance relations between Poland and Lithuania, and potentially 
Belarus, much of whose territory lies in the Baltic drainage basin. However, Świeboda sees in 
the current Polish frame of mind a preference for fluid ad hoc alliances rather than permanent 
ties with any particular country or group of countries within the EU.
35
 
 
A post-Lukashenko Belarus might take a path that leads to EU candidate status. That path 
could ultimately lead to EU membership, particularly if Ukraine makes it into the ranks of EU 
candidate countries. Despite its democratic failings, Belarus might be an easier country for the 
EU to absorb than the much larger, poorer and less stable Ukraine would be. However, if 
Belarus were to join the EU, its role in the union might “differ substantially” from the roles of 
Poland and Lithuania.
36
 Because Belarusian society has markedly different political and 
cultural views from those of Poles, Lithuanians and even Ukrainians, Belarus would not fit 
easily into the “new Europe” camp. With its communitarian inclinations, a future EU member 
Belarus might conceivably become “an outpost of ‘Old Europe’” on the EU’s eastern 
marches.
37
 
 
Belarusians and Ukrainians think of themselves as European and many believe they stand “a 
chance of getting into the EU one day”. Ukraine and, potentially, Belarus are important 
partners for the EU, but the countries are unlikely to become full members soon. Practical 
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reasons exist for the EU not admitting Ukraine and Belarus in the near future. This means that 
Poland and Lithuania will probably lie on the EU’s central-eastern frontier for many years to 
come. An external EU border which separates Poland from countries and peoples with which 
it has been entwined for centuries cannot be a permanent border. Europe’s internal and 
external borders have been defined and redefined many times. They will be redefined again.  
“[S]omewhere between the depths of Russia and the heart of Europe a new dividing line will 
have to be established”.38  
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12 Conclusion 
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How well the conceptual framework worked 
 
Overall, the conceptual framework for this thesis worked well. As predicted, there has been 
easier and greater transmitting of EU norms and values from Poland to Lithuania than from 
Poland to Ukraine and Belarus. Because of its unique role, the EU has been able to reshape 
ideas of what is “normal” in relations between CEECs. As the survey data and findings of this 
thesis show, the EU’s normative power has, overall, had a positive effect on relations between 
and among Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. The transmission of the EU’s norms and values to 
Poland and then to Lithuania and Ukraine has encouraged Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians 
to engage each other more positively and productively. The three countries have managed to 
successfully negotiate many issues of past conflict, thanks largely to the favourable 
international situation resulting from the EU’s success.1  
The transformation from communism to democracy was difficult in the CEECs. Poland and 
Lithuania endured their toughest years of postcommunist transformation in the early 1990s. In 
those years, most observers would not have thought it possible that Lithuania and Poland 
could so successfully make the transition from the difficult situations they were in to be able 
to become part of the EU in 2004. From the mid-1990s, economic conditions improved in 
both countries. The goal of EU membership mobilised Poland and Lithuania and provided 
momentum to reform programmes. The two countries became richer, freer and happier than 
they would have been had they not successfully strived to join the EU. Having to adopt the 
acquis communautaire during their accession negotiations helped Poland and Lithuania 
advance. The drive to achieve EU membership and full integration into Western political, 
economic and cultural structures has been the dominant catalyst for improvement in living 
standards, security and governance in Poland and Lithuania, and has helped improve relations 
between the two countries.  
The presence of a rich, peaceful and stable normative model on its doorstep helped Poland 
develop positive relations with Lithuania and Ukraine. Poland’s proximity to and positive 
view of the EU, together with its striving for EU membership, helped in the transfer of EU 
norms and values to Poland. EU enlargement has changed the dynamics of the relationship 
between Poland and its eastern neighbours. Poland and Lithuania, predisposed to regard the 
                                                 
1
 Snyder, T. 2002  ‘Memory of Sovereignty and sovereignty over memory: Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, 1939-
1999’ in Muller, J-W. (ed.) Memory and Power in Post-war Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past 
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EU and what it stands for favourably, have accepted a package of EU norms by which to 
abide. Poland has been a conduit for the transmission of EU norms to Lithuania and Ukraine, 
and, to a much lesser extent, Belarus. This is as predicted by Manners’ and Sjursen’s visions 
of Europe as a normative power. A western-style market economy and democratic system are 
secure in Poland and Lithuania, with both countries now firmly within the EU.  
 
The relevance of receptivity to European norms 
 
Part of the reason for the improvement in relations was realisation in the 1990s by most 
Lithuanians and Ukrainians that it was Poland, more than any other country, that could help 
theirs gain entry to Western and pan-European structures. During the 1990s, Lithuanians and 
Ukrainians increasingly saw Poland as a modern, successful postcommunist state with 
European credentials and prospects of joining the EU. Leaders in Lithuania (successfully) and 
Ukraine (less successfully) sought to emulate Poland’s successful transition to a western-style 
economy and integration into Western institutions. Poland’s striving towards EU membership 
and the 2004 enlargement helped change Poles’ attitudes to their eastern neighbours. With 
Poland now an EU member state, Poles feel more secure, more prosperous and more 
confident interacting with their eastern neighbours. 
 
The EU’s self-image includes the idea that the Union has broad responsibilities towards the 
rest of Europe.
2
 During the last decade, the EU invited those postcommunist states that have 
travelled furthest along the road of democratic consolidation to become members. The 2004 
EU enlargement transformed Europe’s social, political and economic landscape. By 2008, the 
EU had embraced most of the CEECs. This is a continuation of the policy which saw the 
earlier enlargements which brought Greece, Spain and Portugal into the European Community 
and, in the middle of the last century, the admittance of West Germany into the structures of 
integrating Europe.  
 
The EU reinvigorated the sense of European identity among Poles and Lithuanians. The 
prospect of EU entry greatly helped the work of democratic activists in Poland and Lithuania. 
The activists did not have to convince their fellows that democracy was worthwhile in itself. 
Ideological appeals could be combined with the “bread-and-butter benefits” of joining the 
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EU.
3
 EU aid has been important in encouraging and maintaining the post-communist 
transition in CEECs. It has helped reform programmes and reward CEECs that do well. EU 
entry offers many benefits to the elites and masses of acceding countries. EU subsidies and 
access to a vast market provide a stable framework on which to build strong economies which 
will attract foreign and domestic investment. Compared with less democratic, “less normal” 
states, countries that have adopted most of the EU’s values and norms are more likely to enter 
into institutionalised relationships with the EU, to apply for membership and to be invited to 
accession negotiations. The less democratic a state is, the more likely it is to be excluded from 
the EU, or have its membership application frozen or suspended. 
 
Poland and Lithuania 
 
After Poland and Lithuania ratified their mutual treaty in 1994, political relations between the 
two countries improved dramatically. It became obvious that Poland and Lithuania had no 
significant strategic differences. Lithuanians saw Poland as the road to Europe. The entry of 
Poland and Lithuania into the EU is an important step in the erosion of the scars of Yalta. For 
Poland and Lithuania, membership in the EU shows the world they have successfully 
transformed their states into modern European countries. They are increasingly regarded as a 
part of the West. Poland’s relations with Lithuania on a government-to-government level are 
very good. On the whole, Lithuanians see Poles as allies in Brussels and in the face of a 
resurgent Russia. EU membership has allowed Poland and Lithuania to permanently cast off 
the shackles of their communist, “Eastern European” past. The EU’s influence has helped 
Poland and Lithuania transform their relationship into one between two “normal” European 
countries.  
 
Lithuania’s main weaknesses are its small population, dependence on Russian energy and 
location on the EU’s eastern march. The loss of a huge proportion of its population to 
emigration (first of Russian-speakers to Russia, then of Lithuanians as a whole to Western 
Europe) has haemorrhaged Lithuania. In the two decades since 1990, Lithuania’s population 
has fallen from about 3.9 million people to as few as 3.3 million people by some estimates, a 
15 per cent decrease.
4
 It must be hoped that Lithuania’s population loss (particularly the loss 
                                                 
3
 Ackerman, B. 2004 ‘And Now for the Bad News?’ in Kornai, J. & Rose-Ackerman, S. (eds.) 2004 Building A 
Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition Palgrave Macmillan, New York p.220 
4
 World Bank and other sources. 
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of such a high proportion of skilled and educated people) will be stemmed soon, otherwise 
difficulties may be experienced in continuing to build a stable and prosperous country.  
 
Poland and Ukraine 
 
The great improvement in relations between Poland and Ukraine since 1990, which has been 
aided by Poland’s success in its efforts to move towards EU entry, has been one of the most 
positive features of the international system in postcommunist Europe. This improvement 
could rank on a par with the Franco-German rapprochement of the 1950s and 1960s in its 
importance as a stabilising factor in Europe.  
 
Aiming to join the EU gave Poland the tools to enhance its relationship with Ukraine, while 
joining the EU meant that Poland’s image among Ukrainians improved. These improvements 
were possible because Poland was accepted EU norms and values. The EU is Ukraine’s 
largest trading partner. In the 1990s, Ukraine performed poorly by most economic and 
political measures, but EU policy since 2000 – particularly support for the Orange Revolution 
– brought some dividends, with improved economic growth and prospects, at least 
temporarily, after 2005. 
 
Today, Poland is playing an active role in EU internal politics and is at the heart of a 
developing eastern bloc within the EU, which supports Ukraine’s bid to join the EU and 
favours active steps to engage Belarus. Since its entry into the EU, Poland has usually led the 
EU response to developments in Ukraine, particularly at the time of the 2004-2005 Orange 
Revolution. The creation of the joint Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian inter-parliamentary 
assembly in 2005 was a positive portend of continued good relations between the three 
countries.  
 
All Ukrainian respondents interviewed and surveyed in July 2008 for this thesis expressed a 
positive opinion of the EU, though many voiced concern about the imposition of visas on 
Ukrainian visitors to Poland after the latter joined the EU. Ukrainians interviewed for this 
thesis saw the toughening of the visa regime on the Polish border because of Poland’s 
accession to the Schengen zone as the main negative effect of the EU on Polish-Ukrainian 
relations. Respondents said it was more difficult for them to obtain visas after Poland became 
part of the Schengen zone. Ukrainians, once enthusiastic about the prospect of integration 
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with the EU have become disillusioned. Most Ukrainians accept that Ukraine will not join the 
EU in the near future. However, in a positive development, the surveys and interviews carried 
out for this thesis show that many Ukrainians, at least in Lviv, appear to have developed 
strong pro-Polish sentiments, seeing Poland as Ukraine’s main promoter and supporter in the 
country’s long march to EU membership. Poland’s economic success has helped improve the 
country’s image in Ukraine.  
 
Ukraine’s future orientation is still undecided. Ukrainians consider themselves part of Europe, 
but the deep, geographically based political split in Ukraine is negatively affecting stability 
and economic growth in the country. Unfortunately, Ukraine’s attempts at economic 
transformation have been half-hearted, ineptly managed, and stalled and even reversed by 
inopportune political developments. Much in the country could go wrong without more 
effective internal political leadership and continued strong support for the country’s European 
vocation from Poland and the rest of the EU.  
 
Poland and Belarus 
 
Just as being part of the European integration process increases the likelihood that a country 
will adopt the norms which characterise the EU modus operandi, it is also true that a state 
which chooses to isolate itself from that process is unlikely to adopt those norms and is, 
instead, likely to have severe difficulties interacting positively with countries which have 
accepted the norms.  
 
While Polish diplomacy has helped the country engage with Lithuania and Ukraine on a 
positive basis since 1990, Poland has found it difficult to engage Belarus as a partner, 
especially since 1994. Relations between the two countries – on almost all measures – have 
deteriorated since a highpoint in the early 1990s. It appears that the EU’s impact on Poland’s 
relations with Belarus, especially on a government-to-government level, has not been 
positive. The main reason for this appears to be the different conditions (“the cultural filter”) 
which existed in Belarus in the 1990s (such as a lack of a strong sense of distinct identity, the 
psychological closeness of Belarusians to Russia, lack of political and economic dynamism 
among Belarusians, particularly non-governmental groups) and the choices Belarusians made 
in choosing a leader and path that carried them away from democracy, the EU and a market 
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economy. Belarus has failed to carry out major reforms and has over the last 15 years reverted 
instead to a Soviet-style system.  
 
Once Poland chose its trajectory of aiming to join the EU and Western institutions and made 
the substantial efforts required to achieve its goal, it was inevitable that its relations with the 
undemocratic state of Belarus would suffer. Most Belarusians have little interest in or 
understanding of the EU, and are, on the face of it, reconciled to an autocratic future as part of 
a revived political entity dominated by Russia. Belarus’ future existence as a nation state is 
still uncertain, but the country’s identity is maturing.  
 
The isolation of Belarus has served to increase the salience of a Belarusian identity distinct 
from all neighbouring national identities. Alexander Lukashenko has preserved a sovereign 
Belarusian state, despite itself and himself.
5
 He has been “a bizarre dictator” who has 
promised to unite his country with Russia.
6
 However, in many ways Belarus has functioned 
better as an organised state than Ukraine and Russia have since the mid-1990s.
7
 Being 
Belarusian today is something more than merely living in Belarus. The Roman Catholic 
Church in Belarus is gradually loosening its close association with Polishness.
8
 The longer 
that Belarus continues to exist as a separate country from Russia, the more difficult it will be 
for Russia to re-absorb it as a vassal state or junior partner in a union.  
 
Belarusian nationalism, if it survives, will probably involve co-opting the legacy of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania. That should lead to closer ties between Belarusian nationalists and 
Lithuanians and Ukrainians, primarily, but also with Poland. Despite difficult state-to-state 
relations, the Belarusian people share an affinity for Poles. The attitude of ordinary 
Belarusians to Poles remains reasonably positive. The weak Belarusian opposition of 
democrats and nationalists looks to the EU, and especially Poland and Lithuania, as an 
inspiration to continue to fight for democracy and civil liberties, and against the Lukashenko 
regime. In the opinion of many Poles, including some who were interviewed for this thesis, 
Poland has over the last 20 years been “a guide to Europe, mentor in the art of democracy, 
and a kind of ‘big brother’ for the Belarusians”.9  
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The Russian factor 
 
Closer ties with the EU can help Ukraine and Belarus manage risks to their countries. Russia 
has shown it is ready to use energy prices, and the threat to cut off supplies to put pressure on 
Ukraine and Belarus. It has used its control of gas and oil supplies to pressure Belarus and 
Ukraine to act more submissively to Moscow. The 2008 Georgia conflict accentuated 
concerns in Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania, and even among the Belarusian leadership, that 
cashed-up Russia was in a more belligerent mood and could threaten the security of these 
countries.  
 
For Poland, it is important that Ukraine be stabilised and brought into a wider European zone 
of prosperity. Closer links between Warsaw and Kiev could provide a strong counterweight to 
a revival of Russian influence in the region. Warsaw feels that the EU must act to stabilise 
Ukraine partly to deter Russia.
10
 It is vital for Poland’s security and sense of well-being, and 
important for Europe as a whole, that Ukraine is able to maintain its independence from 
Russia. Acting individually, European states can do comparatively little to contain Russia. EU 
membership, with its associated economic benefits, has possibly been as important as Nato in 
deterring potential Russian revanchism targeted at Poland and the Baltic states. An EU of 27 
countries and still growing can remind Russia that Belarus and Ukraine are in Europe’s 
immediate neighbourhood, and thus of immediate strategic interest to the Union.  
 
The movement of people 
 
Visas are an important issue for contacts between Ukraine and Belarus and their EU 
neighbours. Before Poland joined the EU, many Ukrainians and Belarusians had obtained 
work in Poland. Visas were easy to acquire or not required. In the 1990s, contacts among 
educated elites in Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and, even, Belarus helped the reconstruction and 
reconciliation of Poland and its eastern neighbours. EU enlargement and the associated 
treaties have allowed Poles and Lithuanians to move to richer parts of Europe. However, the 
transmission of EU norms and values to Ukraine and Belarus has been curtailed dramatically 
by the imposition of expensive visa requirements on citizens of Belarus and Ukraine who 
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 The Economist 2006. ‘Europe, Russia and in-between’ 26/10/ 2006 Retrieved on 30/10/2006 from 
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wish to visit Poland or Lithuania for tourism or trade. The bureaucracy and cost associated 
with obtaining the required tourist visa deter Poles and Lithuanians from visiting Belarus. 
Poland’s accession to the EU’s migration zone restricts the access of Ukrainian and 
Belarusian elites to Poland. With Poland in the EU and Schengen zone, Belarusians and 
Ukrainians “find themselves materially and symbolically separated from ‘Europe’”.11 With 
Poland in the Schengen zone it is much more difficult for Ukrainians and Belarusians to get a 
Polish visa.  
 
Poland’s introduction of the Karta Polaka document, which allows citizens of post-Soviet 
countries who can prove Polish ancestry or cultural ties to visit Poland without requiring an 
expensive visa, has the potential to produce an increase in the number of people in Belarus 
and Ukraine who declare themselves to have Polish connections. This is likely to have more 
repercussions in Belarus, given the greater size of the Polish minority there and the more 
weakly held sense of nationality among Belarusians, compared with Lithuanians and 
Ukrainians. Potentially, some Catholic Belarusians of Polish or part-Polish ancestry might 
declare themselves to be of Polish ethnicity.  
 
The media’s role 
 
European media have played a considerable role in the transmission of European norms and 
values through Poland to its eastern neighbours. After 1990 and especially after 2000, 
Western European media’s coverage of CEE served to increase public support in Western 
Europe for the entry of Poland and Lithuania into the EU. The media helped to redefine what 
was understood by the term “European”. The Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian media’s 
portrayal of the EU has generally been positive. In Poland and Lithuania, mainstream media 
during the 1990s and 2000s helped transmit a pro-EU attitude to their audiences.  
 
In the early 1990s, Poland’s media at times portrayed the country’s eastern neighbours in a 
stereotypical light as being crime-ridden and less European than Poland, but at times over the 
past 20 years has taken a genuine interest in publicising and promoting positive developments 
in those neighbours. Poland’s media have been a filter and transmitter of EU ideas, behaviour 
and ideology to Ukraine and Lithuania. Ukrainian media were prominent actors during the 
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Orange Revolution. But unlike the case in Poland, Ukraine’s media has not transmitted EU 
values and norms to the Ukrainian population. The media of Poland and Lithuania, and to 
some extent Ukraine, have tended to adopt similar postures towards the situation in Belarus. 
 
The new Europe 
 
The countries of East-Central Europe have become part of the European integration project 
for the first time. The EU has changed the lives of Poles and their eastern neighbours. 
“Europe” has come to be defined by inclusion in the democratic zone of prosperity and peace 
with the EU as its core. Although its prospects of becoming a military great power are 
uncertain, the EU is already a normative and economic superpower which has fundamentally 
recast Europe. The result has been a fundamental redefinition of what Europe is. The 
“Europeanness” of countries is now measured by how intense institutional relations are with 
the EU and other Western organisations and by how comprehensively those countries have 
adopted EU values and norms.
12
 The EU’s eastern enlargement “asks rather than answers the 
question of the eastern border of Europe”.13 The EU’s final eastern border, if there can be 
such a thing, is unlikely to be its current one. 
 
EU enlargement has played a huge part in reform and reconciliation in Poland, Lithuania and 
Ukraine. The EU’s role in dampening national and social tensions in Central and Eastern 
Europe is often underestimated. Had the EU lacked its normative power and not enlarged to 
include Poland, the relationship between Poland and its eastern neighbours would be very 
different. Western European political procedures and mentalities have become more familiar 
to CEE elites. Nations live on within the EU but no longer threaten to war with each other. In 
Vilnius and Warsaw, foreign and defence policies have been rebuilt to bring Poland and 
Lithuania into line with Nato and EU norms. The changes the EU has brought have spun a 
mesh of links among states that would not unravel easily. Rarely has a Western policy had 
such a positive effect in eliciting change.  
 
After a period of rapid change and often chaotic conditions in the 1990s, Poland and 
Lithuania, which have re-orientated to the West and particularly the EU, have become 
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 Schimmelfennig, F. 2003 The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric Cambridge 
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relatively stable and their long-term future looks promising. Poland’s relative wealth and 
success has encouraged those Ukrainians who see their future as a nation state within the 
democratic European community and has played a significant role in the Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine. However, the already pronounced orientation of Belarus towards Russia has been 
accentuated. The border between Poland and Belarus has proved to be a much bigger barrier 
to the transmission of EU norms and values eastward than the Polish-Lithuanian and Polish-
Ukrainian borders. 
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Map 1 
 Poland and its neighbours 1989 
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Map 2 
Poland and its neighbours since 1993 
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Map 3 
 2008 survey and interview locations 
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Map 4 
Ukraine 
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Map 5 
 Ukrainian language use 2001 
(% using Ukrainian as first language, by region) 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. 2001.  All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001 Retrieved on 
24/01/2007 from www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/ 
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Map 6 
  Russian language use in Ukraine 2001 
(% using Russian as first language, by region) 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. 2001.  All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001 Retrieved on 
24/01/2007 from www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/ 
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Map 7  
Ukraine parliamentary election 2007 
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Map 8  
Belarus on the eve of World War II 
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Map 9 
 Grodno region in Belarus
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Map 10 
 Lithuania on the eve of World War II 
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours                             Appendix 1 
 
 260 
Map 11 
Lithuania and its neighbours 2009 
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Map 12 
 Lithuania’s Polish minority: Polish population by municipality 2001 
Source: Kent, B. 2001 ‘Poles in Lithuania’ Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved on  31/05/2009 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Poles_in_Lithuania_Barry_Kent.png 
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Map 13 
Polish referendum on EU accession: % Yes vote by region 
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Appendix 2 2008 survey and interview questions 
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The following were some of the questions asked of interviewees in Lithuania and Ukraine. 
 
Open-ended questions 
 
1. How has the EU affected relations between your country and Poland? 
 
2. How has the EU affected your life? 
 
3. How have relations between your country and Poland changed over the last 10 years? 
 
4. How do you feel about the future of your country’s relations with Poland? 
 
 
The following is an example of the questionnaire distributed to respondents. This version was 
given to respondents in Poland. A slightly different version was used in Lithuania and 
Ukraine. 
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The European Union’s impact on Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbours 
 
 
Survey questionnaire 
 
 
1. What is your age group? (tick box) 
   
18-29   30-39  40-49  50-59  60+  
 
2. What is your occupation?    ....................................................... 
 
3. What is your citizenship?   ....................................................... 
 
4. What is your home country?  ....................................................... 
 
5. In which country do you live now?  ...................................................... 
 
6. How long have you lived in this country?   
 
Less than 6 months   
6 months - 1 year   
1-5 years     
More than 5 years   
 
 
7. Which of these countries have you lived in, worked in or visited? 
 
Country lived in worked in visited 
Poland    
Lithuania    
Belarus    
Ukraine    
Ireland    
Britain    
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8. Do you agree or disagree with these statements?  
 
 strongly 
agree 
agree neither agree 
nor disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
The EU has made travel to Lithuania easier for me       
The EU has made travel to Belarus easier for me      
The EU has made travel to Ukraine easier for me      
Relations between Poland and Lithuania are better 
now than 10 years ago 
     
Relations between Poland and Belarus are better 
now than 10 years ago 
     
Relations between Poland and Ukraine are better 
now than 10 years ago 
     
The EU is a good thing for Poland      
The EU is a good thing for me      
 
 
9. How important are these issues to you?  
 
Issue 1 = very important 2 3 4 5 = not important 
being able to work in other European countries      
democracy in my country      
energy supply reliability      
Poland’s relations with Lithuania      
Poland’s relations with Belarus      
Poland’s relations with Lithuania      
Poland’s relations with the EU      
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10. How has the EU affected relations between Poland and Lithuania? 
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
  
 
11. How has the EU affected relations between Poland and Belarus? 
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
12. How has the EU affected relations between Poland and Ukraine? 
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
....................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
Thank you for your time. 
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Information Sheet 
 
 
INFORMATION 
 
You are invited to participate as a subject in a research project looking at the European 
Union’s impact on Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbours. 
 
The aim of this project is to examine the European Union’s impact on Poland’s relations with 
its eastern neighbours. 
 
Your involvement in this project is limited to being interviewed or filling in the attached 
survey. You have the right to withdraw from the interview or survey at any time. 
 
There are no known risks involved in this project. 
 
The results of this project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: the identity of participants will not be 
made public without their consent. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, no record of 
your name will be kept with the answers to you questions. 
 
The project is being carried out as part of research for my PhD thesis by Desmond Brennan 
under the supervision of Professor Martin Holland and Doctor Natalia Chaban of the National 
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